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ABSTRACT
Wallrabenstein, John Ross Ph.D., Purdue University, December 2014. Rational Multiparty Computation. Major Professor: Chris Clifton.
The field of rational cryptography considers the design of cryptographic protocols
in the presence of rational agents seeking to maximize local utility functions. This
departs from the standard secure multiparty computation setting, where players are
assumed to be either honest or malicious.
We detail the construction of both a two-party and a multiparty game theoretic
framework for constructing rational cryptographic protocols. Our framework specifies the utility function assumptions necessary to realize the privacy, correctness,
and fairness guarantees for protocols. We demonstrate that our framework correctly
models cryptographic protocols, such as rational secret sharing, where existing work
considers equilibrium concepts that yield unreasonable equilibria.
Similarly, we demonstrate that cryptography may be applied to the game theoretic
domain, constructing an auction market not realizable in the original formulation.
Additionally, we demonstrate that modeling players as rational agents allows us to
design a protocol that destabilizes coalitions. Thus, we establish a mutual benefit from
combining the two fields, while demonstrating the applicability of our framework to
real-world market environments.
We also give an application of game theory to adversarial interactions where cryptography is not necessary. Specifically, we consider adversarial machine learning,
where the adversary is rational and reacts to the presence of a data miner. We give
a general extension to classification algorithms that returns greater expected utility
for the data miner than existing classification methods.

1

1 INTRODUCTION
Rational cryptography is the study of designing cryptographic primitives and protocols in the presence of rational players. By modeling all players as rational agents
acting to maximize a local utility function, the security model more accurately captures how agents behave in real world settings. This departs from the standard model,
where players are modeled as either semi-honest or arbitrarily malicious. The field of
rational cryptography integrates results from the game theoretic literature into the
security analysis of cryptographic primitives and protocols.
The standard model consists of two polar frameworks, each considering how to
model the subset of players that act in an adversarial manner. The first considers
semi-honest behavior, where adversaries are bound to follow the protocol specification,
yet may attempt to learn additional information from the protocol transcript. The
second considers malicious behavior, where adversaries may deviate arbitrarily from
the protocol specification. The semi-honest model relies on the strong assumption
that adversarial players will always follow the protocol specification, as this yields
more eﬃcient protocol constructions. The malicious model makes no assumptions
about adversarial behavior beyond what is possible in an adversary’s complexity
class, but does so through increased computational cost to the protocol.
Rational cryptography provides an intermediary framework between the two poles
of the standard model. First, the assumption that players will follow the protocol
specification is removed. Second, the assumption that players select actions to maximize a utility function is added. Removing the first assumption admits more powerful
adversaries than the semi-honest model, while the addition of the second assumption
bounds adversaries to be strictly weaker than those considered in the malicious model.
Acting together, the two assumptions are designed to admit realistic adversarial ac-
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tions (those that benefit a player) while eliminating those that are unrealistic (those
that do not).
A final departure from the standard model is in the adversarial classification of
players. Both the semi-honest and malicious models divide players into an honest
and adversarial class. Protocol robustness is defined with respect to the proportion
of adversarial to honest players the protocol will tolerate. Rational cryptography
considers only a single class of players: rational agents. That is, all players may act
in an adversarial manner if doing so is a utility-maximizing strategy. This modeling
choice facilitates security proofs for protocols when all players may act adversarially;
a statement even the malicious model is unable to capture.

1.1 Contributions
We first present a game theoretic solution to the problem of adversarial machine
learning, which demonstrates the utility of a game theoretic approach in an adversarial setting. We then demonstrate the utility of applying cryptographic primitives
to a classic game theoretic problem, establishing the synergy between the two fields.
We then merge cryptography and game theory, presenting two frameworks for reasoning about the security and construction of cryptographic protocols where all players
are rational, rather than semi-honest or malicious. We first introduce the two-party
framework, and demonstrate the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for protocols
providing privacy, fairness and correctness in the presence of rational participants.
Finally, we extend the two-party framework to the multiparty setting where players
have access to point-to-point communication channels. We argue that our multiparty framework provides a more realistic model for collusion than prior work, and
demonstrate that a broad class of non-trivial games are realizable under our model.

3
1.1.1 Rationality Applied to Non-Cryptographic Domains
We demonstrate that the notion of rational adversaries may be eﬀectively applied
to domains where cryptography is not necessary. Specifically, we consider the area of
adversarial machine learning, and model adversaries as rational agents. We demonstrate that adjusting classifiers to the expected behavior of a rational adversary yields
more accurate classification rules that are robust against future adversaries. We use
this as evidence of the power a rational adversary model may bring to cryptographic
constructions.

1.1.2 Applying Cryptography to Game Theory
To illustrate how cryptography can be applied to problems in game theory, we
consider the Walrasian Auction Market [1]. In this setting, we consider a set of sellers
and buyers that wish to determine the equilibrium price for a good without executing
any trades. Typically, excess demand is revealed through trade, which determines
the equilibrium price of a good. However, the Walrasian Auction theory holds only
if no trade occurs prior to reaching equilibrium. We construct a secure protocol that
takes as arguments the buyers’ utility functions and the sellers’ initial quantities and
prices, and outputs the equilibrium price for all goods. No information about the
buyers’ utility functions or the sellers’ supplies and initial prices are revealed, and
the only information learned is the equilibrium prices and what can be deduced from
knowledge of the function and its output.

1.1.3 Rational Two-Party Computation Framework
We combine cryptography with game theory to present a rational two-party computation framework. To reason about the security and construction of cryptographic
protocols from a game-theoretic perspective, we build a framework to support the
standard properties desirable in a cryptographic protocol: privacy, correctness, and
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fairness. This work illustrates how game theory can be applied to cryptography,
where all players are considered rational, rather than semi-honest or malicious. We
use this rational 2-party computation framework to construct protocols that satisfy
the privacy, correctness, and fairness properties under the assumption of rational
players.

1.1.4 Rational Multiparty Computation Framework
We extend the two-party framework to reason about the security of cryptographic
protocols in the presence of multiple rational agents. Our framework makes no assumptions about the communication interfaces available to agents, which departs
from the strong restrictions imposed by prior work. As our framework only permits
those game specifications allowing point-to-point communication, our results are not
general. However, we demonstrate that a non-trivial class of games (including those
that restrict communication) have equivalent formulations that are admissible under our framework, and have realizable protocol constructions. We argue that our
multiparty framework provides a more realistic model than prior work, as real world
players typically have access to point-to-point communication channels.

1.2 Thesis Statement
In this work, we argue that there exist equilibrium concepts from the game theoretic literature that accurately capture how rational multiparty computation participants engage in cryptographic protocols. We propose a novel two-party framework
for rational cryptography, proving necessary and suﬃcient conditions for protocols
providing privacy, correctness, and fairness in the presence of rational participants.
We extend our two-party framework to the multiparty setting, where players have access to point-to-point communication channels. We demonstrate that our framework
captures a large class of non-trivial games, which may be realized into equivalent

5
protocol constructions. We then demonstrate how game theoretic and cryptographic
concepts may be applied to build solutions for existing problems in both fields.

1.3 Organization of Thesis
1.3.1 Cryptography Background
In Chapter 2, we describe the necessary cryptographic concepts for understanding
the material presented in the Thesis. We describe homomorphic encryption, which is
used to construct a privacy preserving protocol for the Walrasian Auction Market. We
review standard concepts from secure multiparty computation, which are necessary
to understand our rational two-party and multiparty frameworks.

1.3.2 Game Theory Background
In Chapter 3, we review the necessary concepts from the game theoretic literature.
These are necessary for the proofs of incentive compatibility in our construction of
the Walrasian Auction Market, as well as to understand the proofs of security for
both the two-party and multiparty frameworks.

1.3.3 Rationality Applied to Non-Cryptographic Domains
In Chapter 4, we present a general method for computing optimal operational
decisions in adversarial environments. We approach the problem from a machine
learning perspective, where a defender deploys a machine learning algorithm and
an adversary responds to the presence of the classifier. We consider the setting of
spam detection, where adversaries continuously adapt to the presence of classifiers.
The defender may only inspect a proper subset of all records generated, as manual
inspection is costly in email and network intrusion detection settings. We show that
a game theoretic approach, under the assumption of rational adversaries, yields a
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general solution for increasing classification accuracy and utility when inspection is
bounded.

1.3.4 Applying Cryptography to Game Theory
In Chapter 5, we present a cryptographic construction of the Walrasian Auction
Market. The protocol preserves the privacy of all participants, and is incentive compatible against coalitions of individuals not controlled by a third party. Here we
demonstrate that cryptography may be successfully applied to game theoretic problems.

1.3.5 Applying Game Theory to Cryptography
In Chapter 6, we present a framework for constructing cryptographic protocols
that provide privacy, correctness and fairness in the presence of rational adversaries.
We demonstrate that game theoretic concepts may be applied successfully to the
cryptography domain, allowing more eﬃcient constructions of protocols to be built.

1.3.6 Realizing Rational Multiparty Protocols
In Chapter 7, we present the multiparty framework for constructing cryptographic
protocols in the presence of more than two rational agents. We examine the issue of
player collusion, which is critically aﬀected by the communication resources available
to players. We demonstrate that our framework is able to properly model collusion
in real world protocols, and describe how ideal game specifications are translated into
realizable protocols.
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1.4 Summary
This work considers the intersection of cryptographic protocol design and game
theoretic principles. We first present an application of game theory to adversarial
domains to demonstrate the utility of the approach. Second, we present an application of cryptography to a game theoretic problem to demonstrate synergy between
the two fields. We then present a two-party framework for rational cryptography,
combining game theoretic principles into the framework for cryptographic protocol
design. Finally, we build on the two-party framework and present a rational multiparty framework, considering an arbitrary number of rational players in standard
communication models.
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2 CRYPTOGRAPHY BACKGROUND
In this chapter, we review the necessary cryptographic concepts for understanding
the two-party and multiparty frameworks presented in Chapters 6 and 7, as well as
the cryptographic protocol construction of the Walrasian Auction Market presented
in Chapter 5.

2.1 Secure Multiparty Computation
A Secure Multiparty Computation (SMPC) Protocol ⇡ is an interaction between
n

2 mutually distrustful parties pi 2 P . Each party pi has a private input xi 2 ~x,

where ~x is drawn from some distribution D(~x). The goal of ⇡ is to compute some
functionality f (~x) 7! ~y , which may be probabilistic. For randomized functionalities,
a common random string r 2 {0, 1}⇤ , unknown to any party, is included as an argument and we write f (~x, r) 7! ~y . Each party pi receives output yi at the conclusion of

the protocol. The transcript ⌧ of ⇡ contains all messages that were sent during the
protocol execution. The general problem was introduced by Yao [2], where two millionaires wish to learn which one is wealthier. In a later work, Yao demonstrated that
any function computable in polynomial time can be computed securely in polynomial
time [3]. The two-party case was generalized to the multiparty case by Goldreich et
al. [4].
Informally speaking, the desirable properties of a SMPC protocol include:
1. Correctness: Protocol ⇡ outputs f (~x) for all ~x in the domain of f .
2. Privacy: The transcript ⌧ of ⇡, and the output ~y reveal no additional information beyond what can be deduced from the output ~y and knowledge of f .
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3. Fairness: f (~x) = yi is output by all parties pi,0in computing ⇡, or the probability of computing the correct output is at most negligibly diﬀerent for the
malicious and honest parties.

2.1.1 Adversarial Players
The standard model consists of two polar frameworks for modeling adversarial
players, each of which classifies only a proper subset of the players as adversarial
[5]. The two frameworks are referred to as the semi-honest, or "honest-but-curious"
model, and the malicious model. In both models, the adversary is monolithic: a
single entity that corrupts and controls a subset of the players in the protocol. The
diﬀerence between the two models is the degree of power assumed of the adversary.

Semi-Honest Adversaries
In the semi-honest model, adversarial players are bound to follow the protocol
specification. However, a semi-honest adversary may attempt to learn additional
information by performing additional computation over the protocol transcript ⌧ in
order to learn more information. Security against semi-honest adversaries is the
weakest form of security considered in the standard model, however it yields the most
eﬃcient protocol constructions.

Malicious Adversaries
Stronger adversaries, referred to as malicious adversaries, are allowed to deviate arbitrarily from the protocol specification. Thus, protocol constructions secure
in this model require that players demonstrate each step of the protocol was performed correctly. This requirement imposes a considerable burden on the protocol
construction, as demonstrating correctness is usually achieved through computation-
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ally expensive zero knowledge proofs [6]. However, security under the malicious model
is the strongest form of security considered in the standard model.
While there exists a deterministic compiler for converting protocols secure in the
semi-honest model to one secure in the malicious model [5], the resulting protocol
incurs a substantial computational overhead. As this limits the likelihood that the
protocol will be deployed in real world settings, the majority of protocols are constructed under the weaker but more eﬃcient semi-honest model.

Rational Adversaries
Rational cryptography proposes an adversary model more powerful than the semihonest framework, yet less powerful in general1 than the malicious framework. The
core of the argument towards an intermediary model is centered around the following
two questions:
• Will adversarial players follow the protocol specification, even when doing so is
not in their best interest?

• Must adversarial players be prevented from choosing actions that are not in
their best interest?

Throughout the remainder of this thesis, we argue that the answer to both questions should be in the negative. By removing the assumption that adversarial players
will follow the protocol specification, we consider more powerful adversaries than the
semi-honest case. However, we consider weaker adversaries than those in the malicious model, as we do not protect against actions that are not in the best interest
of the adversary (as defined by assumptions about the adversary’s goals, which is
expressed through a utility function [Chapter 3]).
1

As we will demonstrate in this thesis, modeling players as rational agents yields protocol properties that are unachievable under even the malicious framework. For example, guaranteeing that
rational agents will choose to provide their true input to the protocol [Chapter 5], or will continue
participating in the protocol rather than aborting [Chapter 6].
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A final departure of rational cryptography from the standard model concerns how
players are classified. In both the semi-honest and malicious frameworks from the
standard model, players are classified as either honest or adversarial. Neither model
provides security guarantees in the case where all players are classified as adversarial.
However, rational cryptography assumes that all players are rational agents, and will
deviate from the protocol specification if doing so is in their best interest. In this
sense, rational cryptography considers a stronger class of adversaries than either of
the traditional frameworks, as all players may act adversarially.

2.1.2 The Simulation Paradigm
The security of a SMPC protocol is demonstrated by showing an equivalence between an ideal and a real model of execution under explicit assumptions. In the
ideal model, each party pi sends xi to an incorruptible trusted third party (TTP) T .
The output of f (~x) is computed by T , who then distributes yi to pi . The standard
assumption limits the running time of all parties and adversaries to probabilistic polynomial time (PPT), and security is demonstrated by showing that the ideal and real
distributions are computationally indistinguishable [5].
Definition 2.1.1 Let X and Y be probability ensembles. We say that X and Y
c

are computationally indistinguishable, written X ⌘ Y , if for every non-uniform

probabilistic polynomial time distinguisher D there exists a negligible function ✏(·)
such that for all suﬃciently large

2 {0, 1}⇤ :

|P r[D(X) = 1]
Here,

P r[D(Y ) = 1]|  ✏( )

(2.1)

is the security parameter of the protocol, given in unary as 1 .

By demonstrating that the real view of the protocol is computationally indistinguishable from the ideal view, we guarantee that with only negligible probability PPT
adversaries gain more information than the protocol specifies.
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2.1.3 Secure Function Evaluation
We review Yao’s constant round secure function evaluation (SFE) method for
evaluating any polynomial-time function securely in the semi-honest model [3]. The
goal is to take a deterministic functionality f (x, y) and build a garbled circuit C that

implements f (x, y). For a complete treatment, see Lindell et al.’s proof of security [7].
The protocol occurs between a circuit generator and a circuit evaluator. The generator
constructs C implementing f (x, y), and the evaluator computes C by obtaining their
input values through a series of 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer2 .

To construct the garbled circuit, we will choose wire encodings kw drawn from
some distribution D, where kw is the encoding of

2 {0, 1} for wire w. As all wire

reveal whether

7! {0, 1} is known only to the

encodings kw are drawn from the same distribution D, knowledge of kw does not
= 0 or

= 1. The mapping

circuit generator. The wire encodings kw are used as keys to a symmetric encryption
algorithm, which decrypt to either the proper encoding for the next gate in the series,
or the final output value.
We give a construction of a garbled NAND gate, as any function can be computed
solely through a chain of NAND gates:
Table 2.1: Garbled NAND Gate
Input w1
k10
k10
k11
k11

Input w2
k20
k21
k20
k21

Output w3
1
1
1
0

Garbled Computation Table
Ek10 (Ek20 (1))
Ek10 (Ek21 (1))
Ek11 (Ek20 (1))
Ek11 (Ek21 (0))

When gates are chained together, the output wire wi contains ki , which is the
input encoding for the next gate. As the evaluator does not know the proper encoding
for its value

2 {0, 1} for wire wi , it must ask the generator for ki . Clearly this

will reveal the evaluator’s input to the generator, which defeats the purpose of the
2

See Rabin’s original protocol for realizing a 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer [8].
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construction. Thus, a 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer is used, where the evaluator learns
exactly one of {ki0 , ki1 } and the generator does not learn which encoding was requested.
The general SFE construction with n-ary gates yielding m outputs has complex-

ity 2n m. Although fast constructions exist for the two-party case [9], the existing
multiparty implementations (e.g., FairPlayMP [10]) are not practical for large n.

2.2 Homomorphic Encryption
In general, a cryptosystem supports the encryption Ek (·) and decryption Dk (·)
operations such that Dk (Ek (x)) = x. A homomorphic encryption system has an
additional property:

Ek (x) · Ek (y) = Ek (x
where

y)

(2.2)

is a binary operator, such as addition or multiplication. By the definition

of multiplication, we can observe that the following property also holds:
Ek (x)c = Ek (x · c)

(2.3)

In this thesis, we consider Paillier’s cryptosystem [11], where the homomorphic
operation

is additive.
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3 GAME THEORY BACKGROUND
In this chapter, we review the necessary game theoretic concepts required for the
proofs of security for the two-party and multiparty frameworks presented in Chapters
6 and 7, and the incentive compatibility argument for the Walrasian Auction Market
presented in Chapter 5. Katz gives an excellent summary of basic game theory notions
and their applications to cryptography [12].

3.1 Equilibrium Concepts
We now review the equilibrium concepts and game settings considered by existing
work. Our goal is to demonstrate the shortcomings of equilibrium concepts considered
by existing work, and to motivate our choice of perfect Bayesian equilibrium as the
solution concept for our framework.

3.1.1 Normal Form Games
We begin by introducing normal form, or strategic, games. Normal form representation of games is ideal for modeling simultaneous interaction, rather than sequential
moves. We review the formal definition from Osborne [13]:
Definition 3.1.1 A normal form game

consists of:

1. A finite set N of players.
2. A nonempty set Ai of actions available for each player i 2 N .
3. A preference relation -i on A = ⇥j2N Aj for each player i.
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Frequently, the preference relation -i is represented by a utility function µi : A !

R, such that µi (a)

µi (b) when b -i a. The normal form game is then denoted by

= hN, (Ai ), (µi )i.

Normal form games are well-suited to modeling one-shot protocols where players

move simultaneously1 . In a computational setting, this is equivalent to assuming the
existence of a broadcast channel. However, it is desirable to remove the assumption of
simultaneous moves (and, thus, the assumption of a broadcast channel) so that players
may move sequentially. We will return to this goal when we consider extensive-form
dynamic games.

Nash Equilibrium
We first review the standard solution concept in game theory, the Nash equilibrium [14]. The definition does not account for players in a computational setting.
Frequently, a deterministic choice of an action ai 2 Ai will not yield a Nash equilibrium. Thus, we allow players to choose a strategy

i,

a probability distribution over

Ai .
Definition 3.1.2 A Nash equilibrium of a normal form game
is a strategy profile ~ such that for every player i 2 N :
µi ( i )
where

µi ( i0 ,

= hN, (Ai ), (µi )i

(3.1)

0
i )8 i

def
i

= ( j )j2N \{i}

Intuitively, no player i has an incentive to deviate from strategy
every other player j selects their equilibrium strategy

j.

i

given that

We now consider Nash

equilibria in the computational setting.
1

Technically, the notion of simultaneity only requires that players commit to their strategies before
moving. However, this is still an assumption we would like to remove.
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Computational Nash Equilibrium
The computational Nash equilibrium is the most widely used solution concept for
rational cryptography [15–19]. The intuition is to account for strategies that, although
optimal, occur with only negligible probability. In a cryptographic setting, an optimal
strategy may be to break the underlying cryptosystem. However, for players bound
to PPT, this strategy succeeds with only negligible probability. Consequently, Nash
equilibrium has been refined into a computational variant that states players only
switch strategies if the gain is not negligible with respect to the security parameter
. The original definition of a computational Nash equilibrium was given by Dodis
et al. [16]:
Definition 3.1.3 A computational Nash equilibrium of a two-party extensiveform game
1. both

is an independent strategy profile ( 1⇤ ,
⇤
1,

⇤
2

⇤
2 ),

such that

are PPT computable.

2. for any other PPT computable strategies

0
1,

0
2,

we have

µ1 ( 10 ,

⇤
2)

 µ1 ( 1⇤ ,

⇤
2)

+ negl( )

(3.2)

µ2 ( 1⇤ ,

0
2)

 µ2 ( 1⇤ ,

⇤
2)

+ negl( )

(3.3)

and

Nash equilibria are well-suited to normal form games, where players move simultaneously and have full knowledge of the game state and payoﬀs. However, in the
computational setting we must consider extensive form dynamic games of imperfect
information, where players move sequentially and may be unaware of the game state
or the payoﬀs of other players. Nash equilibria are known to be diﬃcult to compute,
and the problem is in PPAD [20, 21].
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Strict Nash Equilibrium
A common refinement of Nash equilibria is to require the equilibrium to be strict,
where the optimal strategy yields strictly greater utility than the alternative strategies. The computational variant of strict Nash equilibrium requires the introduction
of a non-negligible gain in utility. This is necessary, as the computational Nash equilibrium assumes players will not switch strategies for a negligible gain, despite the
alternate strategy yielding more (although negligible) utility. For example, a player
bound to PPT succeeds in breaking a cryptographic primitive with at most negligible probability. Thus, the computational variant of the equilibrium concept assumes
rational players will not switch strategies for this negligible utility gain. We use the
definition of a strict computational Nash equilibrium from Fuchsbauer et al. [22].
Let k be the security parameter. The function ✏ : N ! R is negligible if for all

c > 0 there is an Nc > 0 such that ✏(k) < 1/k c for all k > Nc . Let ⇢i be the Turing
machine that implements strategy

i

in the protocol ⇧. We write ⇢i 6⇡ ⇧ if ⇢i does

not yield equivalent play with respect to ⇧.

Definition 3.1.4 Protocol ⇧ induces a computational strict Nash equilibrium if
1. ⇧ induces a computational Nash equilibrium
2. For any PPT strategy
µ1 ( 10 ,

2 ) + 1/k

c

0
1

with

0
1

6⇡ ⇧, there is a c > 0 such that µ1 ( 1 ,

2)

for infinitely many values of k (with an analogous requirement

for a deviating player P2 ).
Kol and Naor [17] argue that the requirement of a strict (i.e., unique) equilibrium is
problematic in the computational setting.

Iterated Deletion of Weakly Dominated Strategies
Refining the Nash equilibrium concept through the iterative deletion of weakly
dominated strategies has been proposed to select a strategy when multiple Nash
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equilibria exist [23–25]. The intuition is that if a given strategy
or greater utility than a strategy

j, j

6= i, the strategy

j

i

always yields equal

can be removed from

consideration. Stated more formally, we follow the definition given by Katz [24]:
Definition 3.1.5 Given a game

= ({Ai }, {µi }), we say that action ai 2 Ai is

weakly dominated with respect to A i (A
strategy

i

2 (Ai ) such that:

1. µi ( i , a~ i )
2. 9a~ i 2 A

µi (ai , a~ i )8a~ i 2 A
i

def

i

= ⇥j6=i Aj ) if there exists a randomized

i

such that µi ( i , a~ i ) > µi (ai , a~ i )

Definition 3.1.6 Given a game

= ({Ai }, {µi }) and Â ✓ A, let DOMi (Â) denote

the set of strategies in Âi that are weakly dominated with respect to Â i . For k
def

set Aki = Aki

1

def

k
\ DOMi (Ak 1 ). Set A1
i = \k Ai . A Nash equilibrium ~ of

iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies if

i

1,

survives

2 (A1
i ) for all i.

The primary issue with using iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies to
refine Nash equilibria is that the order of deletion crucially aﬀects the result. That
is, diﬀerent equilibria may result depending on the order in which strategies are
deleted [17, 26].

Stability with respect to Trembles
Fuchsbauer et al. [22] extend their definition of computational Nash equilibrium
for the refinement of stability with respect to trembles. Informally, a tremble is the
unlikely event where a rational agent chooses a strategy
strategy

i.

0
i

rather than the optimal

By accounting for trembles, nodes in the game tree that are oﬀ the equi-

librium path may be dealt with more appropriately. Following the formal definition
by Fuchsbauer et al., we say that ⇢i is -close to
with probability 1
PPT strategy

0
i.

party i plays

i,

i

if ⇢i takes the following form:

while with probability

Thus, i will play the optimal strategy

an arbitrary strategy

0
i

with some small probability .

i,

it follows an arbitrary

but may deviate and play
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Definition 3.1.7 Protocol ⇧ induces a computational Nash equilibrium that is stable
with respect to trembles if
1. ⇧ induces a computational Nash equilibrium
2. There is a noticeable function
to

2,

such that for any PPT strategy ⇢2 that is -close

and any PPT strategy ⇢1 , there exists a PPT strategy

0
1

⇡ ⇧ such that

µ1 (⇢1 , ⇢2 )  µ1 ( 10 , ⇢2 ) + negl(k) (with an analogous requirement for the case of
deviations by player P2 )

A primary concern with the concept of resiliency to trembles is that there may be
multiple alternatives to the optimal strategy. How

is divided amongst these sub-

optimal strategies aﬀects the final equilibrium. However, the notion of trembles can
accurately model the case where a player is able to break the underlying cryptographic primitive. This is assumed to happen only with negligible probability, and is
considered oﬀ the equilibrium path as a non-credible threat.

Correlated Equilibrium
A strong case for the use of correlated equilibrium can be made from the fact that
a mediator is able to “recommend” a set of actions to the players. Thus, the action
set follows a joint probability distribution, where each player learns the conditional
distribution over the actions of other players. Correlated equilibria are commonly
used in signaling games, where the ideal equilibrium is induced by an external signal
available to all players. The standard example is the game of chicken, where a player
may choose from ai 2 {fast, slow}. The mediator may be a traﬃc light, which signals
a recommended strategy to all players. This equilibrium may be outside the convex
hull of (mixed) Nash equilibria, which yields greater expected utility for players.
By recommending actions to players, greater utility may be achieved when players
follow the mediator’s advice. Further, correlated equilibria are computationally less
expensive (in strategic games) to compute than general Nash equilibrium. That is,
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computing Nash equilibria is NP-Hard, while computing correlated equilibria can
be done in polynomial time by solving a linear program [27]. Correlated equilibria
were considered in a computational setting by Urbano et al. [28], and specifically
in the context of rational cryptography by Dodis et al. [16], Atallah et al. [29], and
Gradwohl et al. [30]. Our objection to correlated equilibria is that they are defined
only for strategic form games, rather than the more expressive extensive form games.
The extension of correlated equilibria to extensive form games was considered by von
Stengel et al. [31], but they demonstrated finding the optimal equilibria is NP-Hard.
We give the definition for a correlated equilibrium of Dodis et al. [16]:
Definition 3.1.8 A correlated equilibrium is a strategy profile s⇤ = s⇤ (A1 ⇥ A2 ) =

(s⇤1 , s⇤2 ), such that for any (a⇤1 , a⇤2 ) in the support of s⇤ , any a1 2 A1 and any a2 2 A2 ,
we have µ1 (a⇤1 , s⇤2 |a⇤1 )

µ1 (a1 , s⇤2 |a⇤1 ) and µ2 (s⇤1 , a⇤2 |a⇤2 )

µ2 (s⇤1 , a2 |a⇤2 ).

Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) consider uncertainty with respect to a player’s
type, chosen by the fictitious player Nature. Thus, the optimal strategy for a player
is conditioned on the probability of the other players’ types. Bayesian Nash equilibria result in implausible equilibria in extensive form dynamic games as non-credible
threats are not accounted for. The rational secret sharing problem was considered
by Groce et al. [32] without assuming broadcast channels, using BNE as the solution
concept. As BNE requires players fix their strategies before the game, they are unable
to update their strategies based on information observed throughout the game.
Definition 3.1.9 A Bayesian game consists of:
1. A finite set N of players.
2. A finite set ⌦ of states.
3. A set Ai of actions available to player i.
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4. A finite set Ti of types for player i, and a function ⌧i : ⌦ ! Ti that assigns
types to players.

5. A probability measure pi on ⌦ for which pi (⌧i 1 (ti )) > 08ti 2 Ti .
6. A preference relation -i on the set of probability measures over A ⇥ ⌦, where
A = ⇥j2N Aj .

From this, we are able to define a Bayesian Nash equilibrium:
Definition 3.1.10 A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a game
= hN, ⌦, (Ai ), (Ti ), (⌧i ), (pi ), (µi )i for player i is an action set ai 2 Ai such that:
E[µi ( i |
where

i

i , ti )]

E[µi ( i0 |

i , ti )]

(3.4)

: Ti ! Ai is the strategy mapping type space to action space.

Bayesian Nash equilibria are suﬃcient for strategic games, but lack the notion of
sequential rationality necessary for application in extensive form games. We introduce
the refinement of Bayesian Nash equilibria, namely perfect Bayesian equilibria, in
Section 3.1.2.

3.1.2 Extensive Form Games
We now leave the setting of normal form games, and consider extensive form
dynamic games where players move sequentially. Extensive form games are defined
by Osborne et al. [13] as follows:
Definition 3.1.11 An extensive form game

consists of:

1. A finite set N of players.
2. A (finite) set of sequences H. The empty sequence ; is a member of H. We
let k denote the current decision node. If (ak )k=1,...,K 2 H and L < K then

22
k
(ak )k=1,...,L 2 H. If an infinite sequence (ak )1
k=1 satisfies (a )k=1,...,L 2 H for

k
every positive integer L then (ak )1
k=1 2 H. A history (a )k=1,...,K 2 H is a

terminal history if it is infinite or if there is no aK+1 such that (ak )k=1,...,K+1 2

H. The set of actions available after the nonterminal history h is denoted

A(h) = {a : (h, a) 2 H} and the set of terminal histories is denoted Z. We let
Hk denote the history through round k.

3. A player function P that assigns to each nonterminal history (each member
of H \ Z) a member of N [ {Nature}. When P (h) = Nature, then Nature
determines the action taken after history h.

4. For each player i 2 N a partition Ii of {h 2 H : P (h) = i} with the property

that A(h) = A(h0 ) whenever h and h0 are in the same member of the partition.
For Ii 2 Ii we denote by A(Ii ) the set A(h) and by P (Ii ) the player P (h) for any
h 2 Ii . Thus, Ii is the information partition of player i, while the set Ii 2 Ii is
an information set of player i.

5. For each player i 2 N a preference relation -i on lotteries2 over Z that can be
represented as the expected value of a payoﬀ function defined on Z.

Throughout, we replace the preference relation -i by a utility function µi : A ! R,

such that µi (a)

µi (b) when b -i a.

Information
In an extensive-form game, the notion of an information set Ii in an information
partition Ii is used to describe the information available to player pi at round k.

If all players observe all moves by every other player, then the current node in the
game tree is known with probability 1 and all information sets are called singleton,
as they apply to one specific node in the tree. If some moves are unobserved, then
2

Even if all actions are deterministic, moves by Nature can induce a probability distribution over
the set of terminal histories.

23
players may only know they are in a set of possible game tree nodes. In this case,
the information set is non-singleton, as the information set applies to more than one
game tree node.
The degree of information available to a player in a game is characterized as perfect
vs. imperfect:
1. Games of perfect information reveal the moves made by all players, and contain
only singleton information sets; all players observe the actions of others.
2. Games of imperfect information have non-singleton information sets, where
players do not observe a non-empty subset of the moves by other players.
From a cryptographic perspective, it is often the case that players in the protocol are unaware of the actions of other parties. Thus, such protocols are games of
imperfect information3 , and any equilibrium concept used to model cryptographic
protocols must address this uncertainty. As noted by Halpern et. al. [34], current
frameworks (including their own) must incorporate an equilibrium concept that incorporates a player’s beliefs about the computational abilities of other players. The
perfect Bayesian equilibrium seems well-suited for addressing the uncertainties about
the current game state, as well as the computational abilities of the other players,
which we discuss further in Section 6.4.
Cryptographic protocols usually consider players with some private information
that serves as their input to the protocol. The game theoretic literature views such
inputs as a random move by Nature that determines the player’s type:
Definition 3.1.12 Let ti denote the type of player pi , where T = T1 ⇥ · · · ⇥ Tn is

the type space. Nature makes an initial move by sampling the type space distribution
(T ) and assigning a type to each player. Player pi ’s utility function is now defined
as µi : (~s, ~t), where ~s = {si }1in is the strategy profile and ~t = {ti }1in is the type
profile.
3

The well-known Harsanyi transformation [33] allows any game of incomplete information to be
transformed into a game of complete and imperfect information by introducing an initial move by
Nature that assigns a type to each player.
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Sequential Equilibrium
Sequential equilibrium was considered by Gradwohl et al. [30], and to a more full
extent by Zhang et al. [35]. We use the definition of sequential equilibrium from
Osborne et al. [13]:
Definition 3.1.13 An assessment ( , µ) is a sequential equilibrium of an extensive
game

= hN, H, P, fc , (Ii ), f (Ui )i, if it satisfies the following two conditions:

1. ( , µ) is sequentially rational: For every player i 2 N and every information
set Ii 2 Ii , there holds: Ui ( , µ|Ii )
of player i, where (
strategy

i,

0
i)

Ui ((

0
i ), µ|Ii )

i,

for every strategy

0
i

is a strategy profiles that all players stick to the

except that player i turns to the strategy

0
i,

and Ui ((

i,

0
i ), µ|Ii )

denotes player i’s utility induced by this strategy profile and the belief system µ
conditional on Ii being reached.
2. ( , µ) is consistent: There exists a sequence ((

n

, µn ))1
n=1 of assessments that

converges to ( , µ) in Euclidian space and has the properties that each strategy
profile

n

is completely mixed and that each belief system µn is derived from

n

using Bayes’ rule.
In the case of Zhang et al. [35], the authors consider extensive-form games with
simultaneous moves. Specifically, they assume the existence of a broadcast channel.
In this work, we make no such assumption and allow players to move sequentially.
Sequential equilibria were originally proposed by Kreps and Wilson [36], and are
a refinement of perfect Bayesian equilibria. However, the consistency requirement
requires any assessment where an action is assigned zero probability to approximate
an assessment where all actions have non-zero probability, and the definition has been
considered overly stringent [13].
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Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Formal definitions of perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) are usually not generalizable to all extensive form games, and contain the vague requirement that beliefs be
updated according to Bayes’ rule “whenever possible”. Bonanno [37] gives a definition
of PBE that is applicable for general extensive form games, but we will use the definition by Diaz et al. [38], as they go further by extending to general extensive form
games as well as clarifying the ambiguous “whenever possible” updating requirement.
We first require that, for player i 2 N , their assessment ( i ,

strategy

i

and a belief

i

i)

consisting of a

about the game state, be sequentially rational:

Definition 3.1.14 An assessment ( i ,

i)

is (computationally) sequentially ratio-

nal if, for every player i 2 N and every information set Ii 2 Ii , there holds:
i |Ii )

µi ( i ,
for every strategy

0
i,

+ ✏( )

µi ((

i,

0
i ),

i |Ii )

a probability distribution over actions, of player i, where (

(3.5)
i,

0
i)

is a strategy profile where all players select strategy ~ except that player i selects
strategy

0
i,

and µi ((

i,

0
i ),

profile and the belief system

i |Ii )

i,

denotes player i’s utility induced by this strategy

a probability distribution over game states, conditional

on Ii being reached. The term ✏( ) denotes a negligible utility gain with respect to
the security parameter , and

i

is an eﬃciently computable strategy for player i with

complexity C .
Next, we give the definition of a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which we build
on to construct the final equilibrium concept that applies to general extensive form
games:
Definition 3.1.15 Let

be an extensive form game. An assessment ( , ) is a weak

perfect Bayesian equilibrium if it is sequentially rational and, on the path of ,
is derived from

from Bayes’ rule.
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Building on the definition of a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium, we reach the
definition of a C -simple perfect Bayesian equilibrium:
Definition 3.1.16 Let

be an extensive form game. An assessment ( , ) is a C -

simple perfect Bayesian equilibrium if, for each regular information set Iik , the
restriction of ( , ) to

Iik (

, ) is sequentially rational and

tional updating from

(i.e., the restriction of ( , ) to

Bayesian equilibrium), where

Iik (

is obtained by condi, ) is a weak perfect

is eﬃciently computable by an interactive Turing ma-

chine (ITM) with complexity C .
For a proper introduction to game theory, Katz [12] describes the current eﬀort to
combine game theoretic and cryptographic concepts, while Osborne et al. [13], Nisan
et. al. [39], and Fudenberg et. al. [40] give a complete introduction to game theory.
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4 RATIONALITY APPLIED TO NON-CRYPTOGRAPHIC DOMAINS
Before applying game theory to a cryptographic setting, we first demonstrate the
utility of a game theoretic approach to adversarial settings outside of a cryptographic
context. Specifically, we consider adversarial machine learning, where a defender
deploys a machine learning algorithm against an active adversary, whose strategy
reacts to the presence of the algorithm. Adversarial machine learning covers a broad
set of real world scenarios. For example, both spam and fraud detection consider
adversaries that react adaptively to the presence of a machine learning algorithm.
In our setting we consider spam detection, where a rational adversary (spammer)
has full knowledge of a defender’s utility function and strategy. This choice is to give
the adversary the best possible advantage against the defender, and to demonstrate
that a solution exists yielding an advantage for the defender even in this extreme
case. We model the interaction as a Stackelberg game, where the defender moves first
by deploying the machine learning algorithm. We stress that Stackelberg games are
a subset of those games expressible under our frameworks presented in Chapters 6
and 7, and the simplifying assumption that the adversary has full knowledge of the
defender’s strategy is to consider the worst possible scenario.

4.1 Introduction
Classical supervised learning assumes that training data is representative of the
data expected to be observed in the future. This assumption is clearly violated when
an intelligent adversary actively tries to deceive the learner by generating instances
very diﬀerent from those previously seen. The literature on adversarial machine learning aims to address this problem, but often assumes constraints that sophisticated
and determined adversaries need not abide by. We model the adversarial machine
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learning problem by considering an unconstrained, but utility-maximizing, adversary.
In addition, rather than modifying the learning algorithm to increase its robustness
to adversarial manipulation, we use an output of an arbitrary probabilistic classifier (such as Naïve Bayes) in a linear optimization program that computes optimal
randomized operational decisions based on machine learning predictions, operational
constraints, and our adversarial model. Our approach is simpler than its predecessors,
highly scalable, and we experimentally demonstrate that it outperforms the state of
the art on several metrics.

4.2 Motivation
In a classical supervised learning setting one starts with a data set of instances generated according to some fixed distribution, and learns a function which (one hopes)
eﬀectively evaluates new instances generated from the same distribution. While this
assumption is often reasonable, it is clearly violated in adversarial settings. For
example, if machine learning is used for network intrusion detection, an intelligent
adversary will try to avoid detection by deliberately changing behavior to appear
benign.
We study the problem of adversarial machine learning, which we view as a game
between a defender (learner ), who uses past data to predict and respond to potential
threats, and a collection of attackers who aim to bypass defensive response to their
activities while achieving some malicious end. The issue of learning in adversarial
environments has been addressed from a variety of angles, ranging from robustness
to data corruption [41], to analysis of the problem of manipulating a learning algorithm [42]. The perspective we take here is that the training data accurately reflects
current threats (i.e., has not been tampered with by an adversary), but the way we
discriminate between benign and malicious behavior will influence the adversary to
change its future actions. A classic example of this is spam detection, where it is
quite clear that spammers deliberately manipulate email templates that they use in
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order to circumvent filters. Indeed, spam detection has been the prime motivator for
the progress in adversarial machine learning, in large part because there is abundant
public email data on which algorithms can be evaluated. However, spam, while a
nuisance, is hardly the most pernicious of adversarial activities. Spear phishing, or
sending targeted emails to groups of individuals in a specific organization in order to
either exfiltrate information or introduce malware, is both more malicious than typical spam, and qualitatively diﬀerent. Regular spam is untargeted, and it is, perhaps,
reasonable to posit an adversarial model in this context where the attacker (spammer) manipulates the distribution of future instances in some relatively limited way
(a common assumption is that the spammer chooses a linear transformation) [43–46].
Such a model, however, is clearly too limited when an attacker deliberately targets
an organization: in this case, the attacker will go to great lengths to circumvent
detection systems, and as long as machine learning is not perfect (which it never
is), it is in all likelihood vulnerable. Additionally, while the adversary may well be
constrained, it is highly unlikely that it is constrained in precisely the way modeled;
indeed, it seems more reasonable that the attacker faces a cost-benefit tradeoﬀ in a
given attack setting, rather than hard constraints.
There is another important feature of most of the literature on machine learning techniques aimed at adversarial settings, such as network anomaly and intrusion
detection. Almost universally, the predictions produced by the application of learning are conflated with operational decisions based on these predictions, even though
these are conceptually distinct [43–49]. This has important consequences. First, the
adversary does not respond to predictions per se, but to operational actions based on
these. For example, even if the prediction identified an input as malicious, as long as
this prediction is not actualized in operations, the adversary would have no reason to
change behavior. Second, learned predictions typically do not account for operational
costs and constraints (although the literature on cost-sensitive learning attempts to
do so to some degree [50]). For example, even if an input is identified as malicious, it
may not be worth the cost to act on it if the damage is minimal (say, if an input is a
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Windows virus and you have only Linux machines). Third, machine learning is best
suited for the task of prediction, and in that sense we should focus on trying to develop the most predictive algorithm given the available data. Operational decisions,
on the other hand, are most meaningfully an outcome of an optimization problem
under uncertainty, and the adversary’s response is naturally captured in this context
(unless there is specific data about how an adversary may respond to operational
decisions, which there rarely is).
The main conceptual contribution of this work is to separate the problem of prediction, for which machine learning is used, and the problem of computing optimal
operational decisions based on such predictions in the face of a sophisticated adversary. To this end, we introduce a linear optimization problem in which the objective
is the defender’s expected utility, balancing the value of good traﬃc that is allowed
(e.g., non-malicious or non-spam email), and the cost due to missed malicious activity, as well as constraints on the fraction of all traﬃc that can be operationally acted
on. We assume that “acting” on a particular observed input (e.g., a suspicious email
or network packet) is inherently costly, representing, for example, deep packet inspection, or in-depth investigation by cyber security professionals prompted by an alert.
Throughout, we use the word inspect to mean any costly operational activity on a
suspected malicious input. Overall, we presume a two-stage process: first, a machine
learning tool is trained on historical data, and second, the linear program is solved to
compute an optimal operational policy, using the predictions produced by the learning algorithm. In our context, it is especially significant to use highly informative
learning methods, i.e., those which produce, for each input x, a probability that x
is malicious. As a direct consequence of our approach, operational decisions are in
general randomized, unless it is either too costly to inspect anything, or inspection is
cheap so that everything plausibly malicious is inspected. Thus, our approach can be
viewed as a principled instance of moving target (or dynamic) defense in the context
of intrusion detection, which is also where such randomized defensive methods may be
relatively easy to deploy. Finally, because our model amounts to solving a linear pro-
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gram, the approach we present is very simple, and highly scalable. Nevertheless, we
show experimentally that it outperforms current art in adversarial machine learning
on public spam data, as well as data generated using an artificial utility-maximizing
adversary.

4.3 Model
We consider the problem of adversarial binary classification over a space X of

inputs, where each input feature vector ~x 2 X can be categorized as benign or ma-

licious. The defender, D, starts with a data set of labeled instances, I, such that

I = {(~x1 , y1 ), . . . , (~xm , ym )}. We assume to accurately represent the current distribution of input instances and corresponding categories.1 D then uses an algorithm of

choice, such as Naive Bayes, to obtain a probabilistic classifier p(~x) which assigns to
an arbitrary input vector a probability that it (or, rather, a producer of it) is malicious. In traditional application of machine learning, adversarial or not, one would
then use a threshold, ✓, and classify an instance ~x as malicious if p(~x)

✓, and

benign otherwise, with adversarial aspects of the problem folded into the algorithm
that derives the function p(·). It is on this point that our approach diverges from
current art. Specifically, we introduce a function q(~x, p(·)) 2 [0, 1] which prescribes a

possibly randomized operational decision (e.g., the probability of filtering an email or
manually investigating an observed network access pattern) for an instance ~x given a
prediction p(~x). Clearly, the threshold function typically used is a special case, but we
will productively consider alternative possibilities. To simplify notation, where p(·) is
clear from context, we use instead q(~x), keeping in mind its implicit dependence on
the prediction made by the learning algorithm.
We model the adversarial machine learning setting as a Stackelberg game between a defender and a population of attackers. In this game, the defender moves
first, choosing q(·). Next, the attackers learn q(·) (for example, through extensive
1

The problem of adversarial tampering of such training data is outside the scope of our work, and
can be viewed as an extension of our setup.
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probing), and each attacker subsequently chooses an input vector ~x (e.g., a phishing
email) so as to maximize their expected return (a combination of bypassing defensive
countermeasures and achieving a desired outcome upon successfully penetrating the
defense, such as a high response rate to a phishing attack). Our assumption that the
operational policy q(·) is known to attackers reflects threats that have significant time
and/or resources to probe and respond to defensive measures, a feature characteristic
of advanced cyber criminals [51].
We view the data set I of labeled malware instances as representing revealed

preferences of a sample of attackers, that is, their preference for input vectors ~x

(if an attacker prefered another input ~x0 , we assume that this attacker would have
chosen ~x0 instead of ~x). To appreciate this modeling choice, it is worth noting that
much variation in malware is due either to diﬀerences in perpetrators themselves,
or diﬀerences in their goals (even for the same attackers), and labeled data provides
information, albeit indirectly, about these diﬀerences. Therefore, in our framework
p(~x) takes on a dual-meaning: first, it is the probability that ~x reflects a malicious
action, and second, if malicious, ~x represents an attacker’s “type”, or ideal method of
attack. Insofar as we view an attack ~x as ideal for an attacker, it is just as natural
to posit that an attacker would prefer attack patterns that are close to ~x in feature
space to those distant from it. For example, a model in which an attacker would
minimize the number of feature values to alter in order to bypass defensive activities
has this characteristic, as do models which use a regularization term to reduce the
scale of attack manipulation of data [43, 45, 46, 52, 53].
Suppose that if an attack ~x, succeeds, the attacker gains V (~x), which is also the
value lost to the defender. On the other hand, if an attack is filtered or caught by the
defender, both receive 0. Finally, if the attacker with a preference for ~x chooses an
alternative attack vector ~x0 , his utility from successfully bypassing defenses becomes
V (~x)Q(~x, ~x0 ), where
Q(~x, ~x0 ) = e

||~
x ~
x0 ||

,

(4.1)

33
with || · || a norm (we use Hamming distance, as our feature vector is binary), and

corresponding to importance of being close to the preferred ~x. Observe that when

= 0, the attacker is indiﬀerent among attack vectors, and all that matters is success
at bypassing defensive action, while

! 1 results in an attacker who does not react

to defensive action at all, either because it is too costly to change, or because this

attacker simply does not have the capability of doing so (e.g., someone who merely
reuses attack templates previously developed by others). The full utility function of
an attacker with type ~x for choosing another input x~0 when the defense strategy is
q(·) is then
µ(~x, x~0 ; q) = V (~x)Q(~x, x~0 )(1
since 1

q(x~0 )),

(4.2)

q(·) is the probability that the attacker successfully bypasses the defensive

action.
While the above attacker model admits considerable generality, we assume that
attackers fall into two classes: adaptive, as described above, and static, corresponding
to the limiting case of

! 1. Let vt (~x; q) be the value function of an attacker with

class (type) t and preference for ~x, when the defender chooses a policy q. vt (~x; q)

represents the maximum utility that the attacker with type t can achieve given q. For
a static attacker, the value function is
vS (~x; q) = V (~x)(1

q(~x)),

(4.3)

that is, a static attacker always uses his preferred input ~x, and receives his corresponding value for it whenever the defender (operator) does not take action upon
observing ~x. For an adaptive attacker, the value function is
vA (~x; q) = max µ(~x, ~x0 ; q),
x~0 2X

(4.4)

that is, the maximum utility that the attacker obtains from using an arbitrary input
~x0 (that is, we assume that the adaptive attacker is unconstrained). Finally, let PA
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be the probability that an arbitrary malicious input was generated by an adaptive
adversary; the probability that the adversary was static is then PS = 1

PA .

Having described in some detail our model of the adversarial response to defensive
choice of q(·), we now turn to the objective of the defender. At the high level, a
natural goal for the defender is to maximize expected value of benign traﬃc that is
classified as benign, less the expected losses due to attacks that successfully bypass
the operator (i.e., incorrectly classified as benign). Presently, we show that a special
case of this is equivalent to maximizing accuracy or minimizing loss. To formalize,
we make two assumptions. First, we assume that the set of all possible instances
X is finite, and use ~q and p~ as vectors corresponding to q(~x) and p(~x) respectively,

using some fixed arbitrary ordering over X . This assumption is clearly unrealistic

(even if X is technically finite, it will typically be intractably large), but will help

with exposition below. We subsequently (in Section 4.4) describe how to apply our
approach in practice, when this assumption will not hold. Second, we assume that
the defender gains a positive value G(~x) from a benign input ~x only if it is not
inspected. In the case of email traﬃc, this is certainly sensible if our action is to filter
a suspected email. More generally, inspection can be a lengthy process, in which
case we can interpret G(~x) as the value of time lost if ~x is, in fact, benign, but is
carefully screened before it can have its beneficial impact. Formally, we suppose that
the defender maximizes UD (~q , p~, X ), defined as
UD (~q , p~, X ) =

X

[(1

q(~x))G(~x)(1

p(~x))

~
x2X

p(~x)(PS vS (~x; q) + PA vA (~x; q))] .

(4.5)
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To appreciate that this formal definition of the defender’s objective is sensible, let us
first rewrite it for a special case when V (~x) = G(~x) = 1 and PS = 1, reducing the
utility function to
X

(1

q(~x))(1

p(~x))

p(~x)(1

q(~x)).

(4.6)

~
x2X

Since p(x) is constant, this is equivalent to minimizing
X

q(~x)(1

p(~x)) + p(~x)(1

q(~x)),

(4.7)

~
x2X

or, for each ~x, the sum of probability that it is benign and misclassified as malicious,
and probability that it is malicious but misclassified as benign; which is to say, the
expected loss.
The final aspect of our model is a resource constraint on the defender. Sommer
and Paxson [48] identify the cost of false positives and the gap between the output of
machine learning algorithms and its use in operational decisions as two of the crucial
gaps that prevent widespread use of machine learning in network intrusion detection.
Our framework directly addresses the latter point, and we now turn focus to the
former. False positives are quite costly because following up on an alert is a very
expensive proposition, involving the use of a scarce resource, a security expert’s time
understanding the nature of the alert. In practice, it is simply not feasible to follow
up on every alert, and there is a need for a principled approach that accounts for
such budget constraints. An additional cost of false positives comes from the fact
that, depending on the nature of operational decision, it results in some loss of value,
either because a valuable email gets filtered, or because important communication
is delayed due to deeper inspection it needs to undergo. In fact, G(~x) in our model
already serves to quantify this loss of value. We handle the typically harder constraint
on defensive resources by introducing a budget constraint, where we ensure that our
solution inspects at most a fraction c of events, on average.
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4.4 Computing Optimal Operational Decisions
Now that we have described our model of adversarial machine learning, the natural next question is: how do we solve it? Since our objective and constraints are
linear (using the assumption that the attacker’s gains translate directly into defender’s
losses), we can formulate our optimization problem as the following linear program
(LP):
max

UD (~q , p~, X )

s.t. :

0  q(~x)  1

q~

vA (~x; q)

(4.8a)

µ(~x, x~0 ; q)

vS (~x; q) = V (~x)(1
X
q(~x)  c|X |.

q(~x))

8 ~x 2 X

(4.8b)

8 ~x, x~0 2 X

(4.8c)

8 ~x 2 X

(4.8d)
(4.8e)

~
x

Since the number of variables in this LP is linear in |X |, while the number of con-

straints is quadratic in this quantity, clearly we cannot hope to use this when the
space of all possible inputs is large (let alone infinite). Note, however, that we only
need to compute the decisions q(~x) for inputs ~x we actually see in reality. Therefore,
in practice we can batch observations into manageable sets X̄ ⇢ X , and solve this
optimization program using inputs restricted to X̄ .2

A natural sanity check that our formulation is reasonable is that the solution is

particularly intuitive when there is no budget constraint or adaptive adversary. We
now show that in this case, the policy q(~x) which uses a simple threshold on p(~x) (as
commonly done) is, in fact optimal.
2

It may seem that this setup violates our assumption that the attacker observes q(~x). However,
our assumption amounts to an attacker observing many instances of solutions to this optimization
problem, allowing the attacker to infer q(~x) for an arbitrary input ~x under consideration. Thus, it
is still accurate to characterize an attacker as responding to the policy q(~x).
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Proposition 4.4.1 Suppose that PA = 0 and c = 1 (i.e., no budget constraint).
Then the optimal policy is

q(~x) =

8
>
<1
>
:0

if p(~x)

G(~
x)
G(~
x)+V (~
x)

(4.9)

o.w.

Proof Since we consider only static adversaries and there is no budget constraint,
the objective becomes
max
q~

X

[(1

q(~x))G(~x)(1

p(~x))

p(~x)vS (~x)] ,

(4.10)

~
x2X

and the only remaining constraint is that q(~x) 2 [0, 1] for all ~x. Since now the objective

function is entirely decoupled for each ~x, we can optimize each q(~x) in isolation
for each ~x 2 X . Rewriting, maximizing the objective for a given ~x is equivalent
to minimizing q(~x)[G(~x)

p(~x)(G(~x) + V (~x))]. Whenever the right multiplicand is

negative, the quantity is minimized when q(~x) = 1, and when it is positive, the
quantity is minimized when q(~x) = 0. Since p(~x)

G(~
x)
G(~
x)+V (~
x)

implies that the right

multiplicand is negative (more accurately, non-positive), the result follows.
While traditional approaches threshold an odds ratio (or log-odds) rather than the
probability p(~x), the two are, in fact equivalent. To see this, let us consider the generalized (cost-sensitive) threshold on odds ratio used by the Dalvi et al. [52] model. In
their notation, UC (+, +), UC (+, ), UC ( , +), and UC ( , ) denote the utility of the
defender (classifier) when he correctly identifies a malicious input, incorrectly identifies a benign input, incorrectly identifies a malicious input, and correctly identifies
a benign input, respectively. In our setting, we have UC (+, +) = 0 (i.e., no loss),
UC (+, ) = 0 (and capture the costs of false positives as operational constraints instead), UC ( , +) =

V (~x), and UC ( , ) = G(~x) (note that we augment the utility
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functions to depend on input vector ~x). The odds-ratio test used by Dalvi et al.
therefore checks
p(~x)
1 p(~x)

UC ( , )
UC (+, +)

UC (+, )
G(x)
=
.
UC ( , +)
V (x)

(4.11)

and it is easy to verify that inequality 4.11 is equivalent to the threshold test in
Proposition 4.4.1.
Consider now a more general setting where PA = 0, but now with a budget
constraint. In this context, we now show that the optimal policy is to first set q(~x) = 0
for all ~x with p(~x) below the threshold described in Proposition 4.4.1, then rank the
remainder in descending order of p(~x), and assign q(~x) = 1 in this order until the
budget is exhausted.
Proposition 4.4.2 Suppose that PA = 0 and c|X | is an integer. Then the optimal
policy is to let q(~x) = 0 for all ~x with

p(~x) <

G(~x)
.
G(~x) + V (~x)

(4.12)

Rank the remaining ~x in descending order of p(~x) and set q(~x) = 1 for the top c|X |
inputs, with q(~x) = 0 for the rest.

Proof The LP can be rewritten so as to minimize
X

q(~x)[G(~x)

p(~x)(G(~x) + V (~x))]

(4.13)

~
x

subject to the budget constraint. By the same argument as above, whenever p(~x) is
below the threshold, the optimal q(~x) = 0. Removing the corresponding ~x from the
objective, we obtain a special knapsack problem in which the above greedy solution
is optimal, since the coeﬃcient on the budget constraint is 1.
In a nutshell, Proposition 4.4.2 suggests an intuitive policy that whenever the budget
constraint binds, we should simply inspect the highest priority items. Therefore, ran-
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domization becomes important only when there is an adversary actively responding
to our inspection eﬀorts.

4.5 Experiments
Experimentally validating a scheme for adversarial machine learning is inherently
diﬃcult using publicly available data, such as spam. The reason is that insofar as
this data captures evolution of spam, it is in response to the ecology of spam filters,
and, in addition, the precise nature of the actually deployed filters is not a part
of such public databases. In addition, spam is in itself a rather benign attack, as
compared to, say, a spear phish aimed at stealing intellectual property. The latter
is clearly much more targeted, much more costly to the organizations, and involves
far more sophisticated and adaptive adversaries. All of the previous attempts to
address machine learning in adversarial settings struggled with this problem, and
evaluation is typically either (a) nevertheless involving public spam data [43–46],
or (b) generating synthetic data according to their model of the adversary [46, 52].
We do both: evaluate our approach on actual public spam data (Section 4.5.2), and
using synthetically generated attacks (Section 4.5.3). There is a clear limitation of
using one’s own model for validation: it naturally favors the proposed approach if the
model is assumed to be an accurate description of attacker’s behavior. We address this
limitation by evaluating the robustness of our approach to errors in the adversarial
model it uses (Section 4.5.4).

4.5.1 Setup
In all our experiments we use the TREC spam corpora from 2005

2008. In

Section 4.5.2, we use this data as is to compare the performance of our approach
in a spam filtering task, compared to state-of-the-art alternatives. In Sections 4.5.3
and 4.5.4 we use this data only for training, and simulate adversarial behavior according to our model (as done, for example, by Dalvi et al. [52]). Throughout, we
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performed 10-fold cross-validation and analyzed the results using the approach outlined by Demšar [54]. We compare our approach against using a classifier it is based
upon (i.e., p(~x)) directly using pairs of the form {C, E[OP T (C)]}, where C is the
classifier providing p(~x) for our model, and E[OP T (C)] denotes our approach using

C. We use Friedman’s test to compute the p-values, using N = 4 data sets and k = 2

classifiers, as we are only concerned with the performance of our approach with respect to the corresponding classifier. We use the post-hoc Bonferroni test, which does
not alter ↵ as ↵/(k

1) = ↵ when k = 2, as in all of our comparisons. As detailed by

Salzberg [55], the feature criteria were chosen to optimize the performance of Naïve
Bayes on the TREC 2005 spam corpus. Feature vectors were generated from the raw
emails, and the same criteria were used for each corpus. None of the algorithms have
been optimized or tuned on future data. In Section 4.5.2, we train on a fold of the
TREC 2005 data, evaluate the performance over the test fold for the TREC 2005
corpus, and test over the entire set of future corpora.
Our approach uses predictions p(~x) obtained using three existing classifiers: Naïve
Bayes (our non-adversarial baseline), and the adversarial classifiers developed by
Bruckner and Scheﬀer [45] and Dalvi [52], which are state-of-the-art alternatives.3
We denote the expected utility of our approach as E[OP T (·)], where the argument is
an existing classifier that provides p(~x). We solve the LP (Equations 4.8a-4.8e) using
CPLEX version 12.2.
Our optimization approach explicitly bounds the number of instances that can
be inspected. We consider two principled ways of imposing the same restriction on
existing classifiers:
1. Let X̄ be all ~x with p(~x) above a threshold from Proposition 4.4.1. Then set
q(~x) = 1 if |X̄ |  c|X |, while q(~x) = c otherwise. This policy is optimal when

there are only stationary attackers and p(~x) 2 {0, 1}. We use this as the default.
2. Rank the instances in descending order of p(~x), and set q(~x) = 1 for the first
3

c|X | of these (as long as p(~x) exceeds the threshold from Proposition 4.4.1).

We use the variant of Bruckner and Scheﬀer’s classifier with the linear loss function.
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This policy is optimal when there are only stationary attackers, as we showed
in Proposition 4.4.2. We call this “Naïve Ranking”.
We used the ifile tool by Rennie [47] to select tokens for the feature vectors. Many
of the desirable tokens for the TREC 2005 corpus are specific to the company where
the emails were collected. Since our experiments evaluate performance on future
TREC data which includes emails collected from diﬀerent sources, we selected a
subset of tokens that are environment invariant. Specifically, we restricted attention
to the 14 tokens shown in Figure 4.1, and created a binary feature for each that
indicates its presence in an email.

~x = { f ont, td, http, nbsp, span, color, content,
div, f ace, net, src, www, charset, strong }
Figure 4.1.: The Boolean Feature Vector Tokens

We compare the algorithms below using an empirical utility function, which we
normalize to facilitate comparison across diﬀerent cost settings (this utility is a generalization of accuracy that accounts for costs V (~x) and G(~x)). Specifically, given data
with true labels, y(~x), we can express total accuracy on training/test data, weighted
with the corresponding costs of false positives and false negatives, as
X
~
x

(1

y(~x))(1

q(~x))G(x) +

X

y(~x)q(~x)V (~x).

(4.14)

~
x

In our experiments, we fix G(~x) = G, and V (~x) = V for all ~x. Let |XT N | denote the
P
number of true negatives, |XT P | be the number of true positives, |X | = ~x y(~x)(1
P
q(~x)) be the expected number of false negatives, and |X + | = ~x (1 y(~x))q(~x) be the

expected number of false positives. After dropping the terms that do not depend on
q(~x), we can rewrite Equation 4.14 as UD = w(|XT N |
w =

G
V

|X + |) + (|XT P |

|X |), where

(note that when w = 1, this measure becomes exactly the total expected
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accuracy achieved by q(~x)). In the reported results, we normalize this by the total
utility of a perfect classifier, obtaining the empirical normalized utility
ŨD = 1

w|X + | + |X |
.
w|XT N | + |XT P |

(4.15)

4.5.2 Performance on Public Spam Data
Our first set of experiments is a direct comparison of the performance of our model
as compared to state-of-the-art alternatives described above evaluated on public spam
data. In this experiment, we use TREC 2005 data to train the classifiers, compute
the optimal q(~x) for our approach while using the other alternatives as prescribed,
and evaluate (by computing the expected normalized utility shown in Equation 4.15)
on TREC data for years 2005-2008. As in all past evaluations of adversarial machine
learning algorithms [43–46] we do not retrain the classifiers, since our intent is not
merely to demonstrate value on spam data, but to anticipate far more actively adversarial environments in which attackers adapt to defense decisions quickly, and the
defender wishes to have success in anticipating adversarial response.
Our first set of results, shown in Figure 4.2, compares our optimization-based
approach to alternatives when V (~x) = G(~x) = 1 for all ~x and PA = 0.5 (this choice
was made somewhat arbitrarily and not optimized to data), under a variety of budget
constraints. Since our optimization can take as input an arbitrary p(~x), we compare
the results of using the alternative machine learning approaches as input. From
considering the four plots in Figure 4.2, each corresponding to a diﬀerent budget
constraint, it is apparent that the relative advantage of our approach (using any of
the alternative p(~x) in the optimization problem) is pronounced (exhibiting 10-20%
improvement over baseline) when the budget is relatively tight. Additionally, as we
would intuitively expect, our approach performs better than alternatives as we move
further into the future (giving the spammers more time to react to countermeasures
from 2005). With a suﬃciently generous budget constraint, it is also interesting to
observe the tradeoﬀ one would expect: the accuracy of our approaches is inferior
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 4.2.: Comparison of algorithms on TREC data, trained on year 2005, and
tested on years 2005-2008. Our approach is labeled as E[OP T (·)], where the parameter is the classifier that serves as our p(~x). We use the following parameters: = 1,
V (x) = G(x) = 1, PA = 0.5. (a) c = 0.1; (b) c = 0.3; (c) c = 0.5; (d) c = 0.9.

to alternatives on training data, but the decisions are more robust to adversarial
manipulation embedded in future data.
In Figure 4.3, our second set of results demonstrate that even after retraining the
classifier on all years prior to and including the current year, we typically outperform
the alternatives.
In Figure 4.4, we consider a higher cost of malware relative to benign instances,
fixing G(x) = 1 and considering V (x) = 2 and 10. Perhaps the most surprising finding in these plots is that here Naïve Bayes outperforms Dalvi et al. and Bruckner
and Scheﬀer in several instances, even though these are specifically tailored to adversarial situations. Our approaches, however, perform consistently better than the
alternatives.
We performed a statistical comparison between our approach and a corresponding
classifier p(~x) on which it is based using Friedman’s test with the post-hoc Bon-
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 4.3.: Comparison of algorithms on TREC data, trained on all years prior
to and including the test year. Our approach is labeled as E[OP T (·)], where the
parameter is the classifier that serves as our p(~x). We use the following parameters:
= 1, V (x) = G(x) = 1, PA = 0.5. (a) c = 0.1; (b) c = 0.3; (c) c = 0.5; (d) c = 0.9.

ferroni correction [54].

For all classifier pairs of the form {C, E[OP T (C)]} with

C 2 {Naïve Bayes, Bruckner, Dalvi} and for c 2 {0.1, 0.3}, V (x) 2 {1, 2, 10}, our
approach is statistically better than the alternative at the ↵ = 0.05 confidence level.

4.5.3 Performance with an Optimizing Attacker
Evaluating performance on future TREC data as done above is fundamentally
limited since this data set represents spam, where adversaries generally do not target
a specific classifier or organization but a relatively large population of spam filters.
In contrast, our approach is tailored to highly sophisticated and targeted attacks.
The problem is that data of this nature is highly sensitive and not publicly available.
Indeed, the ideal, infeasible, experiment is to observe adversarial response to our
model as well as other alternatives and evaluate the approaches with respect to such
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 4.4.: Comparison of algorithms on TREC data, trained on year 2005, and
tested on years 2005-2008. Our approach is labeled as E[OP T (·)], where the parameter is the classifier that serves as our p(~x). We fix = 1, G(x) = 1, PA = 0.5, and vary
V (x) and c. (a) V (x) = 2, c = 0.1; (b) V (x) = 10, c = 0.1; (c) V (x) = 2, c = 0.3; (d)
V (x) = 10, c = 0.3.

adversarial response. As the next best alternative which has become relatively standard [46,52], we complement the spam evaluation in Section 4.5.2 with an alternative
set of experiments aimed at modeling highly adaptive adversaries who maximize their
expected utility in response to operational decisions q(~x). Specifically, we assume that
a machine learning algorithm provides an accurate assessment of current or near-term
threats, p(~x), and that all of the attackers are adaptive (i.e., that PA = 1). Moreover,
we assume that the learner/defender has correct knowledge of these parameters, as
well as the parameter of the adaptive attacker’s objective function,

(we relax this

assumption in Section 4.5.4). Finally, we let V (x) = G(x) = 1 for all ~x. For each
year Y in the TREC data set (e.g., Y = 2005), we perform 10-fold cross-validation.
However, rather than computing the utility directly using the test fold, we compute
the expected utility, assuming the adaptive attacker described in Section 4.3. Equiv-
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alently, we can think of this as the following exercise: for each ~x in the test fold,
we assign it a benign label with probability 1

p(~x), assign a malicious label with

probability p(~x)PS , and with probability p(~x)PA generate a new malicious input ~x0
that maximizes the attacker’s expected utility given q(~x) computed by our algorithm.
In the first set of experiments, we choose p(~x) as generated by each alternative
learning model that we consider (i.e., Naïve Bayes, Dalvi et al., and Bruckner and
Scheﬀer). Figure 4.5 shows the results comparing the direct use of the three classifiers,
and as a part of our optimization program, when B = c|X | with c = 0.1 and c = 0.3.
This figure exhibits several findings. First, all three alternatives, including the two

Figure 4.5.: The expected utilities, assuming PA = 1 and that our attacker model is
correct; top: c = 0.1; bottom: c = 0.3.

state-of-the-art approaches to adversarial classification, are exploitable by a sophisticated adversary. By comparison, all three of our optimization-based counterparts
are more robust and beat their respective classifiers in paired comparisons. Second,
the classifier of Dalvi et al. is in all cases far more robust to adversarial manipulation
than the one derived from Bruckner and Scheﬀer. Finally, we did not display the
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results of using Naïve Ranking here, as it performs far worse; clearly, randomization
is crucial when facing a sophisticated adversary.
In another set of experiments, we use Naïve Bayes as p(~x), and evaluate the
quality of Dalvi et al., Bruckner and Scheﬀer, and our optimized approach (still
using a synthetic attacker). Figure 4.6 shows the results. As in the previous set of

Figure 4.6.: The expected utilities, assuming PA = 1 and that our attacker model is
correct, where p(x) is provided by Naïve Bayes; top: c = 0.1; bottom: c = 0.3.

experiments, our model outperforms all of the alternatives. Surprisingly, however,
Dalvi et al. and Bruckner and Scheﬀer do not improve much upon the baseline Naïve
Bayes in this setting, and in some cases are even slightly worse.
In our final set of experiments in this section, we consider the impact of varying
V (x). The results are shown in Figure 4.7. Again, our model consistently outperforms
alternatives in paired comparisons, at times by a considerable margin (up to 50%
improvement). In all experiments in this section, we verified that our approach is
statistically better than alternatives at the ↵ = 0.05 confidence level.
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Figure 4.7.: The expected utilities, assuming PA = 1 and that our attacker model is
correct. Top: V (x) = 2; bottom: V (x) = 10. c = 0.3.

4.5.4 Robustness to Modeling Errors
A clear limitation of our evaluation in Section 4.5.3 is that the comparison which
simulates attacker behavior according to our modeling assumptions unduly favors our
approach. In this section, we relax this restriction in two ways: first, we introduce
a significant error into the attacker model used in the LP that our approach solves,
and evaluate by simulating attacker’s response according to the “correct” model; and
second, we solve the LP as before, but simulate the attacker’s response according to
an entirely diﬀerent utility model. These experiments evaluate the sensitivity of our
approach to parameter selection and model correctness. Below, we observe that our
model is highly robust to both of these manipulations.
In our first set of robustness tests, we introduce an error ⌘ 2 [ 1, 1] into the

estimate of PA and the parameter of the adversarial objective function . Specifically,
given the true value of a parameter

T

= {PA , }, we add the error as

=

T

+ ⌘. We
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train our optimization problem using the erroneous parameter values, and evaluate
the results by simulating attacker’s response using the correct parameters.
Figure 4.8 displays the expected utility of the algorithms, using the error ⌘ = 0.3
which changes the true parameters PA⇤ = 1,

⇤

= 1 to erroneous PA = 0.7,

= 0.7

estimates. While our approach is certainly harmed by the inaccuracy in the parameter

Figure 4.8.: The expected utilities, assuming PA = 1 and that our attacker model is
correct, but allowing for errors in parameter estimates; top: c = 0.1; bottom: c = 0.3.

estimates, it is surprisingly robust to it, and we still outperform the state-of-the-art
alternatives even in this rather unfavorable context. Next we consider the expected
defender’s utility when p(x) is determined by Naïve Bayes, and q(x) is determined by
the classifier, and introduce the error of ⌘ = 0.3 into our estimates of PA , as before.
The results, shown in Figure 4.9, again demonstrate that our model is relatively
robust to parametric errors, and still outperforms the competition.
In the next set of experiments, presented in Figure 4.10, we vary V (x) to consider
its eﬀect on the defender’s utility in the context of modeling errors (⌘ = 0.3). Yet
again, despite the errors, our model outperforms alternative approaches.
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Figure 4.9.: The expected utilities, assuming PA = 1, that our attacker model is
correct, but allowing for errors in parameter estimates, and p(x) is provided by Naïve
Bayes; top: c = 0.1; bottom: c = 0.3.

Figure 4.10.: The expected utilities, assuming PA = 1 and that our attacker model
is correct, but allowing for errors in parameter estimates. Top: V (x) = 2; bottom:
V (x) = 10. c = 0.3.

51
In the final set of experiments in this section, we verify robustness of our very
model of the adversary’s utility. Arguably the most fundamental component of our
model is exponential decay of the adversary’s utility for using any but the most
preferred input ~x. To check robustness to this construction, we solve our model (the
LP) as before, but evaluate the solutions q(~x) by simulating an adversary whose utility
actually decays polynomially, i.e.,
Qpoly (~x, x~0 ) =

1
1 + ||~x

x~0 ||

.

(4.16)

The results are shown in Figure 4.11, and demonstrate that our model is quite robust

Figure 4.11.: The expected utilities, assuming PA = 1 and that our attacker utility model is incorrect, and the actual utility decays for non-preferred input vectors
according to Equation 4.16; top: c = 0.1; bottom: c = 0.3.

even when the assumption about the attackers’ utility functions is fundamentally
incorrect, and handily outperforms the alternatives.
In all experiments in this section, we verified that our approach is statistically
better than the alternatives at the ↵ = 0.05 confidence level.
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4.6 Related Work
There have been a number of related methods that apply game theoretic reasoning
in the context of network security in general, as well as specifically to harden a
machine learning algorithm against adversarial manipulation [43–46, 52]. Dalvi et
al. [52] consider an adaptive utility-maximizing adversary who is unaware of the
data miner’s strategy and reacts to the presence of a baseline (i.e., not hardened)
classifier. The adversary’s utility function is defined with respect to the minimum
cost camouflage (MCC) of a given feature vector, which represents the least costly
modification that allows a true positive feature vector to be classified as benign. This
model of an adversary thus bears close similarity to ours. The defender therefore
designs a classifier that is a best response to such attacks. The authors evaluate their
algorithm by synthetically generating an adversarial response according to their model
using public spam corpus as “original” data (i.e., prior to adversarial response). We
perform a similar evaluation in a subset of our experiments. Bruckner and Scheﬀer [43,
45] consider building a classifier against future records generated by an adaptive
adversary. Similar to our approach, they formalize this interaction first as a one-shot
game [43], and in a later eﬀort as a Stackelberg game in which the learner (defender)
moves first, choosing a classification algorithm, and an adversary optimally responds
to it by applying an optimal linear transformation to future data [45]. In both of
these eﬀorts, the goal of the defender is to minimize loss, and the attacker’s goal is
to maximize defender’s loss, although the two players may weigh the loss diﬀerently
(and, thus, the game need not be zero-sum). The evaluation in this work consists
training on past spam records and testing on future records, just as we do in the first
set of experiments we report. In a similar vein, Liu and Chawla [44] and Colbaugh
and Glass [46] consider a constant-sum game between an adversary and a data miner,
where the adversary aims to maximize loss on test data incurred by the learner by
adding a fixed vector to every input, with a regularization term aimed to minimize the
norm of the manipulation vector. The regularization term in the adversary’s objective
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common to all of these captures, like our approach, that the adversary wishes to
minimally manipulate the data to achieve his goal. Lowd and Meek [53] study the
classifier manipulation problem in isolation, and using a model very similar to ours in
which an adversary strives to choose a single input vector ~x that is misclassified by the
learner (rather than, say, expected loss as in many other approaches described above),
but with the objective of minimizing weighted l1 distance to the base instance ~xa (in
our terminology, the attacker’s preferred method of attack). In a more recent work,
Huang et al. [42] give a taxonomy of attacks against machine learning algorithms.
Biggio et al. [56] are among the first to consider adding randomness to a classifier in an
eﬀort to harden it against adversarial manipulation, but only propose adding a small
amount of noise, rather than a computational framework for optimal randomization.
Colbaugh and Glass [46] propose a uniform randomization scheme among several
equally good classifiers, showing that this scheme is more robust to manipulation than
a solution to a zero-sum game between the learner and manipulator which is similar
in structure to the model of Liu and Chawla [44]. Using a somewhat diﬀerent model,
Kantarcioglu et al. [49] consider a Stackelberg game in which the adversary moves first,
followed by the data miner. The authors give conditions under which an equilibrium
exists in this game, and present stochastic search methods for approximating it. A
number of related approaches exist that aim to make learning robust to specific data
manipulations. For example, Globerson et al. [41] use quadratic programming to
ensure robustness against feature deletion.
Game theory has been proposed for use in network security settings more broadly
[57–61], but without considering specifically the adversarial aspects in machine learning. Most of this work considers variations on the problem of a defender trying to
block attack paths, for example, by inspecting packets at a subset of nodes.
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4.7 Conclusion
We have presented a general approach for finding the optimal inspection policy
against both static and adaptive adversaries. We showed that in the special case when
an adversary is static and with no operational budget constraints, our model is equivalent to traditional likelihood ratio approaches (equivalently, using a threshold on the
probability of malware/spam). Our experiments demonstrated that our model consistently outperforms both a baseline, non-adversarial machine learning approach, as
well as several state-of-the-art adversarial classification alternatives. Overall, our approach demonstrates a clear advantage when inspection is costly, events have weighted
importance, and when there are sophisticated, adaptive attackers. From a practical
perspective, our approach is very simple, highly scalable (it involves solving a linear
program), and can use an arbitrary classifier as input (indeed, a better classifier would
improve the performance of our optimization method). Our model is, of course, a
severe simplification of reality, and in future work one could consider attackers that
strategically manipulate training data, and/or multi-stage games in which defender
and attackers move in sequence. Despite the apparent simplificity of our model, however, we demonstrate that it outperforms alternatives on actual data and, thus, is a
good starting point for future, more complex, modeling advances, which would need
to demonstrate suﬃcient added value to compensate for additional complexity.
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5 APPLYING CRYPTOGRAPHY TO GAME THEORY
After demonstrating the utility of a game theoretic approach to adversarial problems
in Chapter 4, we now demonstrate the utility of applying cryptography to solve a game
theoretic problem. We consider the theoretical Walrasian Auction Model [1], where
equilibrium is reached through a process called tâtonnement. The market presents
a paradoxical scenario where trade cannot occur until equilibrium is reached, yet it
is trade that determines excess demand. Secure multiparty computation is capable
of acting as a fictitious mediator, handling pseudo-trades between buyers and sellers
consistent with their private utility functions until equilibrium is reached. When the
protocol is finished, the final equilibrium price is revealed to all players, thus avoiding
the aforementioned conundrum.
After constructing a cryptographic protocol capable of realizing the Walrasian
Auction Market in practice, we demonstrate that the protocol is designed to destabilize coalitions. As we will demonstrate through our multiparty framework in Chapter
7, applying game theory to cryptographic protocol design yields properties that cannot be achieved under the standard model. Destabilizing player coalitions is one such
powerful property, which we demonstrate concretely in this chapter.

5.1 Introduction
Léon Walras’ theory of general equilibrium put forth the notion of tâtonnement
as a process by which equilibrium prices are determined [1]. Recently, Cole and Fleischer provided tâtonnement algorithms for both the classic One-Time and Ongoing
Markets with guaranteed bounds for convergence to equilibrium prices. However, in
order to reach equilibrium, trade must occur outside of equilibrium prices, which violates the underlying Walrasian Auction model. We propose a cryptographic solution
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to this game theoretic problem, and demonstrate that a secure multiparty computation protocol for the One-Time Market allows buyers and sellers to jointly compute
equilibrium prices by simulating trade outside of equilibrium. This approach keeps
the utility functions of all parties private, revealing only the final equilibrium price.
Our approach has a real world application, as a similar market exists in the Tokyo
Commodity Exchange where a trusted third party is employed. We prove that the
protocol is inherently incentive compatible, such that no party has an incentive to use
a dishonest utility function. We demonstrate security under the standard semi-honest
model, as well as an extension to the stronger Accountable Computing framework.

5.2 Motivation
Open markets balance supply and demand by converging to a price where the
two are equal. For example, oil is a commodity where increasing supply becomes
progressively more expensive, and increasing price reduces demand. Absent other
disturbing factors, oil supply and demand would eventually stabilize. However, this
takes time, and in the meantime prices rise and fall, leading to unnecessary investment
in uneconomical production based on an expectation of high prices, or investment in
consumption based on expectation of low prices. Faster convergence or lower volatility
in prices can have significant benefits.
Economic models generally accepted as valid representations of real-world market
behavior tend to have underlying computationally tractable algorithms. It follows
naturally to propose that these algorithms could be evaluated by parties to arrive at
the result deemed to accurately reflect the outcome of a given market phenomenon.
The work of Cole and Fleischer studies the market equilibrium problem from an
algorithmic perspective, and they give tractable price update algorithms that do not
rely on global information [62].
The algorithms of Cole and Fleischer [62] follow the Walrasian Auction model:
prices are adjusted according to a tâtonnement process, where prices iteratively rise
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or fall in response to changes in demand [1]. In the Walrasian Auction model, trade
occurs only once equilibrium has been established. In real-world markets, it is trade
that dictates demand and, thus, how prices are adjusted to converge toward equilibrium. However, Cole and Fleischer’s algorithms allow trade outside of equilibrium.
As specified, the Walrasian Auction model is limited to the theoretical domain
unless a trusted third party is invoked to serve as a mediator between the buyers and
sellers. Not only must the mediator be trusted to faithfully represent the interests of
all parties involved, it must be trusted with substantial information about each party’s
private utility function. As a utility function defines a party’s preferences over goods
with respect to both quantity and price, it reveals valuable information that parties
would prefer to keep private. Further, there are no guarantees that the parties will
truthfully report their valuations of the good. This problem becomes particularly
pronounced when independent buyers collude to reduce the final equilibrium price.
The recent work of Dodis et al. [16] considered a similar game theoretic problem:
implementing the mediator for rational players to arrive at a correlated equilibrium.
In game theory, a correlated equilibrium is selected when a mediator recommends
a strategy to each player such that, given the recommended strategy, no player can
improve their utility1 by choosing a diﬀerent strategy. Further, the payoﬀ may exist
outside the convex hull of standard Nash equilibria, yielding more utility than when a
mediator is not present. Dodis et al. demonstrate that secure multiparty computation
(SMPC) can replace the mediator with a protocol among the players, removing the
necessity of a trusted third party. In this work, we use SMPC to find Walrasian
equilibria without invoking a mediator or allowing trade to occur prior to arriving at
a stable price.
Further, we are able to make strong claims of incentive compatibility. In the standard security model, a monolithic adversary A corrupts a subset of the participants.
In rational cryptography, each player acts solely in their own self-interest, and thus
have an associated local adversary controlling their deviations [63]. The move to lo1

A utility function describes an agent’s preferences over outcomes, and can informally be considered
a mapping between events and agent happiness.
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cal adversaries has important consequences on the stability of coalitions for rational
players. Not even protocols secure in the malicious model cannot guarantee that a
malicious party will not manipulate its input to the protocol, as a monolithic adversary may force the equilibrium price to be deflated through centralized control of
corrupted parties. We demonstrate that our protocols are resilient against this behavior in the presence of local, independent rational adversaries seeking to maximize
their utility.

5.3 Our Contribution
Drawing on recent work from both the cryptographic and game theoretic literature
[12, 15, 26, 30, 34, 64, 65], we propose a privacy preserving protocol that allows buyers
and sellers to arrive at an equilibrium price using the tâtonnement process without
trade occurring outside of equilibrium. This approach has the auxiliary benefit of
keeping the utility functions of all parties private; only the final equilibrium price is
revealed. Further, we show that our construction is incentive compatible: the strategy
of reporting truthful private valuations weakly dominates all other strategies for both
buyers and seller.
A protocol that arrives at the equilibrium price for a good is beneficial to both the
buyers and sellers involved. A participant’s utility function must be evaluated many
times throughout the tâtonnement process in order for appropriate price updates to
occur. This is a potential disincentive to engaging in the protocol, as the participant’s
utility function contains their preferences for a good, and many individual points from
their utility function are evaluated and publicly disclosed. A malicious agent could
use this information to alter their behavior for personal gain. SMPC allows two or
more mutually distrustful parties to engage in a collaborative protocol to compute
the result of a function securely [3, 4]. Our approach allows the tâtonnement process
to be evaluated privately, revealing only the final equilibrium price.
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SMPC has had real-world use, very much in the scenario we suggest. Bogetoft et
al. [66] deploy a privacy preserving protocol to evaluate a double auction model for
Danish commodity trading. However, they assume that all parties behave honestly
in using the system, and do not explore the possibility that a malicious party could
manipulate the equilibrium price to its advantage. In fact, they state “we did not
explicitly implement any security against cheating bidders”, although they were only
discussing semi-honest vs. malicious behavior in the traditional sense. Further, the
authors surveyed the farmers’ views on the privacy of their utility functions, and
found that nearly all preferred that information to remain private.
We go well beyond this, exploring lying about the input to the protocol itself : a
behavior that even the malicious model does not prevent. Previous work has demonstrated this idea, although the authors only consider a two-party protocol, and showed
incentive compatibility only for an approximation of the real-world problem [67]. We
show that this approach can be used to enable SMPC to address the full range of
malicious behavior in a real-world, multiparty problem.
As another example, the Tokyo Commodity Exchange uses the itayose mechanism,
similar to tâtonnement, to reach equilibrium. In fact, this existing market circumvents
the restriction of disallowed trade until equilibrium is reached by invoking a trusted
third party: an auctioneer that adjusts prices based on excess demand [68]. Our
approach requires no trusted third party, resulting in the minimum possible disclosure
of information regarding each party’s utility function. Thus, there is clear real-world
application and tangible benefit from our results, similar to those of Bogetoft et
al. [66].
Note that our model makes a stronger statement than that of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, where participants have an incentive to be truthful if and only if others are
acting truthfully as well. We show that acting honestly is the dominant strategy in
our protocol regardless of the actions of the other players. The work by Eaves et
al. [68] provides further evidence for our claims of incentive compatibility, based on
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the fact that agents engage in the protocol repeatedly. However, our results hold
without the assumption of repeated interaction.
To ensure parties deviating from the protocol will be caught, it is secure under the
accountable computing (AC) framework proposed by Jiang and Clifton [69]. Note that
we first show security under the standard semi-honest model, and then extend this
to the AC-framework. The AC-framework provides the ability to verify that a party
correctly followed the protocol; contractual penalties can then be used to ensure that
correctly following the protocol is incentive compatible. Typical semi-honest protocols
provide no such guarantee; a malicious party may be able to manipulate the protocol
to their benefit. Protocols secure under the malicious model (forcing participants to
correctly follow the protocol) typically have much greater computational cost. By
demonstrating security under the AC-framework, detected deviations are punishable
by other participants forcing the minmax utility 2 on the deviating parties [16]. We
also use commitments to ensure that parties use their true utility function with the
protocol; this prevents parties from supplying one input to the protocol (e.g., a low
demand) to give an artificially beneficial price, then purchasing greater quantities at
the resulting price.
We show that the utility functions and actions of all agents remain private, with
the equilibrium price revealed to all agents at the conclusion of the protocol. The
knowledge gain is only the information that can be derived from the result of the
function, and knowledge of the function itself. This satisfies the standard definition
of semi-honest security in that the protocol emulates the existence of a trusted third
party, without actually requiring such an entity [5]. This property is ideal, as a
universally trusted third party rarely exists for a given set of parties. Our work
considers only the case of the oblivious One-Time Market setting. That is, we consider
the market where all parameters are assumed not to be global information. Rather,
agents compute the price updates based solely on local information.
2

The minmax punishment approach forces the outcome yielding the minimum utility to the deviator,
while maximizing the utility of the other participants.
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We begin by defining the market problem and reviewing the oblivious One-Time
Market algorithm in Section 5.4. We review the cryptographic primitives used in
Section 5.5, and give a construction3 based on an additively homomorphic cryptosystem in Section 5.6. Finally, we demonstrate that the resulting protocol is incentive
compatible in Section 5.7. All proofs are provided in Section 5.9.

5.4 The Market Problem
Our SMPC protocol computes the equilibrium for a single seller oﬀering a single
good to a set of buyers, which we extend to the general definition of the problem
following the notation from Cole and Fleischer [62]. The market under consideration
contains a set of infinitely divisible goods G, where |G| = n, and a set of agents A,
where |A| = m. Agent l has quantity wil of good i at the start of the protocol and
has a corresponding utility function µl (x1l , . . . , xnl ) that gives their preferences for

all goods i 2 G. Note that the initial allocation wil may consist solely of currency;

it is a measure of the agent’s wealth. We make the simplifying assumption that
µl (x1l , . . . , xnl ) = ⌃ni=1 µ(xil ); the utility of a basket of goods is the sum of the utility
of each individual good. Each good i has a collection of prices pi , 1  i  n. Each

agent l selects a basket with xil units of good i so that ul is a maximum and is
P
P
aﬀordable given their initial allocation. That is: ni=1 xil pi  m
i=1 wil pi . The prices
p = (p1 , p2 , . . . , pn ) are in equilibrium if the demand for all goods i 2 G is bounded
P
Pm
by the supply for good i: m
l=1 xil 
l=1 wil .
P
P
We define wi =
l wil to be the supply of good i, and xi =
l xil to be the
corresponding demand. We define zi = xi

wi to be the excess demand of good i.
P
At a given set of prices p, the wealth of agent l is vl (p) = i wil pi . By definition, w
is from the market specification while v, x and z are computed with respect to the

vector of prices. The wealth of an agent l is computed directly from a given price
3

Our protocol can also be implemented using frameworks for the GMW protocol [4], such as FairPlayMP [10], VIFF [70] or SEPIA [71].

62
vector p, whereas x and z are computed by agents maximizing their utility functions
under the constraints imposed by v.
The model put forth by Cole and Fleischer is based upon a series of iterative price
and demand updates. We omit discussion of the proofs of bounded convergence time
and refer the reader to their original work [62]. In each iteration r, the price of a good
i 2 Gr is updated by its price setter using knowledge of only pi , zi , and their history.
Here, a price setter is a virtual entity that governs the price adjustments. However,
the price adjustments are governed by changes in demand in the algorithms. After
the price setters have released the new prices pr , the buying agents compute the set
of goods that maximizes their utility under the constraint of their wealth given the
current prices, vl (p). We consider only the oblivious One-Time Market price update
rule, which is as follows:

pi

pi · (1 +

1
2dlog4 ri e

· min{1,

zi
})
wi

(5.1)

The current round r is bounded prior to the start of the protocol by fixing the
terminal round r⇤ . At the conclusion of the protocol, we will have computed the
equilibrium price and demand, p⇤ and x⇤ , respectively.
To construct a privacy preserving protocol, we show how buyers compute their
demand based on the current price pi , and how sellers compute the price update given
the demand xi from the buyers. In our privacy preserving protocol, the buyers compute the update for each round locally to prevent the seller from learning intermediate
prices. Symmetrically, neither the price nor the demand is known to either the buyers
or seller until the conclusion of the protocol. Finally, we must account for the fact
that

zi
wi

may be less than 1, which cannot be represented properly in the field Zn .

To handle this, prices are represented in integer units corresponding to the minimum
increment (e.g., cents). We use the division protocol
zi
,
wi

of Dahl et al. [72] to compute

which we discuss further in Section 5.5.1. As the degree of Walrasian auction

utility functions is 1 with overwhelming probability [1], all buyers are modeled as
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having Cobb-Doublas4 utility functions. As noted by Cole and Fleischer, under these
conditions the price update rule converges in a single round [62], so r⇤

1.

Our work is certainly not the first to apply SMPC principles to economic and
game theory. Previous work has shown that SMPC removes potential disincentives
from bartering to auctions [73,74]. Additionally, recent work has shown the potential
of combining cryptography with game theoretic principles [12, 15, 26, 30, 34, 64, 65].
However, no attempt has been made to remedy the paradox of the Walrasian Auction
model using SMPC techniques. In this way, we not only remove disincentives from
engaging in the protocol, we allow the model to exist in reality. That is, our protocol
allows the participants to evaluate the iterative price update function on the basis of
the buyers’ demand without actually revealing the demand through trade or invoking
a trusted third party. Additionally, we show that our construction constitutes an
incentive compatible market with respect to both buyers and sellers.
We review the One-Time Market Oblivious tâtonnement algorithm proposed by
Cole and Fleischer [62]. The original algorithm is a protocol between a set of buyers
bl 2 B and a set of sellers sl 2 S. We assume that for each buyer bl 2 B they have an

associated utility function µbl (i), where i is the good oﬀered for sale from S. Recall
that the seller S has knowledge of their supply of i, given by wi . The task of the set
of buyers B is to compute the excess demand for good i, given by zi = xi

wi , where

xi = ⌃l xil is the sum of the demand of all buyers bl 2 B. The original protocol by
Cole and Fleischer is given formally by Algorithm 1.

The algorithm fixes a price pi for the good, uses the utility functions of the buyers
to determine the excess demand xi at that price, and sets the price for the next
round. The key contribution of Cole and Fleischer is to prove that the given update
rule gives a guaranteed convergence rate. Beyond simply bounding the number of
required rounds, as Walrasian markets typically have Cobb-Douglas utility functions,
the algorithm converges in one round [62].
4

That is, a utility function whose parameter is an exponential function of the quantity of a good
received.
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Algorithm 1 Model by Cole and Fleischer
for ri = 0; ri < r; + + ni do
for sl 2 S do
pi
pi + 2dlog14 ri e pi · min{1, wzii }
end for
for all bl 2 B do
xi
xi + µbl (pi )
end for
zi
xi w i
end for
p⇤ = pi
x⇤ = xi
return (p⇤ , x⇤ )
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5.5 Building Blocks
To build the privacy preserving protocol, we build on a collection of cryptographic
primitives.
We require an additively homomorphic public-key encryption scheme E, with the

additional property of semantic security [75]. Such a scheme was proposed by Paillier

[11]. We denote the encryption of some plaintext x with Bob’s public key as Eb (x),
and the decryption of some ciphertext c = Eb (x) as Db (c). We require that our
cryptosystem’s homomorphic property is additive, which means that the following
operations are supported:

Eb (x) · Eb (y) = Eb (x + y),

(Eb (x))c ⌘ Eb (x)c = Eb (x · c)

(5.2)

Here, c is an unencrypted plaintext constant. Note that we omit the enclosing parentheses and treat Eb (x) as a distinct term. The construction of the additively homomorphic encryption scheme allows mathematical operations over encrypted data to
be performed, and provides the foundation for our protocol.

5.5.1 Division Protocol
The price update rule requires computing the quotient of the excess demand and
the supply,

xi w i
.
wi

Dahl et al. give a protocol for securely computing integer division

under the Paillier cryptosystem without requiring a bit-decomposition [72]. For lbit values, the constant round protocol requires O(l) arithmetic operations in O(1)
rounds.

5.6 Protocol Construction
We consider a set of k buyers bl 2 B interacting with a single seller S of a good

i. The protocol ⇡ securely implements the functionality f (µ1 , · · · , µk , pS ) 7! hp⇤ , x⇤ i.
Here, µl is the utility function of buyer bl 2 B. The full Walrasian Market (composed
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of more than a single seller and good) is modeled by instantiating an instance of
Protocol 5.6.1 for each pair of seller and good (S, i), and the associated set of buyers.
Note that our protocol centers around specific utility functions known as Marshallian
or Walrasian demand functions. That is, the participant’s utility function is modeled
as a polynomial, and defines the quantity demanded for a single good over all possible
prices. Overwhelmingly, the degree of a Walrasian demand function will be one [1].
Thus, a buyer’s utility function µbi has the form µbi (pi ) = cpi where the coeﬃcient c
is a constant, satisfying the definition of a Cobb-Douglas utility function. The final
argument to the functionality is the initial price pi specified by the seller. A Paillierbased algorithm for computing the Walrasian equilibrium is given by Protocol 5.6.1.
This protocol could also be implemented using a state-of-the-art framework for the
GMW protocol [4], such as FairPlayMP [10], VIFF [70] or SEPIA [71].We defer the
proof of security to Section 5.9.
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Buyers 1  l  k:
Seller S:
Buyer 1 :

Buyers 1 < l  k:
Buyer k:

Seller S:

All buyers issue commitments (e.g., Pedersen [76]) to their
private utility function coeﬃcients. This is necessary for the
verification stage of the AC-Framework [69].
Set pi as the Seller’s initial price for good i.
Set wi as the supply of good i.
Send ES (pi ) to all buyers.
The first buyer computes the initial demand as ES (xi )
µb1 (ES (pi ))§ , where µb1 is the initial buyer’s utility function.
The first buyer forwards ES (xi ) to the next buyer, so that
they can update the demand xi based on their utility function.
Each buyer updates the demand at the current price pi
based on their utility function µbl by computing ES (xi )
µbl (ES (pi ))§ .
The final buyer bk must perform additional updates before
sending the results of the current round to either buyer 1
(if r < r⇤ ) or the seller (if the terminal round r⇤ has been
reached).
The final buyer updates the excess demand zi by computing
ES (zi )
ES (xi ) · ES (wi ) 1 .
The final buyer computes the price update coeﬃcient yi ..=
zi
, the fraction of excess demand to supply, using the division
wi
protocol of Dahl et al. [72]: yi
(ES (zi ), ES (wi )).
The final buyer updates the current round price pri to pr+1
by
i
r
computing ES (pr+1
)
E
(p
)
·
E
(y
).
S i
S i
i
If r = r⇤ , where r⇤ is the final round, buyer bk sends
hES (pi ), ES (xi )i to the seller. Otherwise, this tuple is forwarded to buyer 1 and the next round begins.
After receiving hES (pi ), ES (xi )i in the final round, the seller
computes the equilibrium price p⇤
DS (ES (pi )) and the
⇤
final demand x
DS (ES (xi )).
The seller forwards p⇤ to all of the buyers.

Protocol 5.6.1: Additively Homomorphic Encryption Algorithm for Tâtonnement

In the next section, we prove that if a player is unable to deviate from the protocol without being caught (e.g., a protocol secure in the AC-Framework), then the
dominant strategy is for parties to provide their true utility functions.
§

Here, we evaluate µbl (ES (pi )) as ES (pi ) · ES (c), where c is the buyer’s coeﬃcient term in µbl .
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b1
b1

ES (xi ) ← µb1 (ES ( pi )) = ES ( pi )ci
Initial Price pi
S
Supply w i

b2

b2

ES ( pi )
S

Initial Price pi
Supply w i

b3

b3

bk
bk

(a) Seller S broadcasts the encrypted initial price ES (pi ) to all buyers.

(b) The first buyer b1 computes their initial demand based on their utility function.

b1

b1

ES (xi )

b2

S

Initial Price pi

b2
ES (xi ) ← ES (xi )⋅ µbℓ (ES ( pi )) S

Supply w i

b3

Initial Price pi
Supply w i

b3
bk

bk

(c) The first buyer forwards the updated
demand to the next buyer.

(d) Buyers b2 , b3 update the demand
based on their utility functions.

b1
−1
b2 ES (zi ) ← ES (xi )⋅ ES (wi )
z
yi ← δ (ES (zi ), ES (wi )) = i S
wi
b3 E ( p r+1 ) ← E ( p r )⋅ E (y )
S

i

S

i

S

b1
Initial Price pi
Supply w i

i

bk

b2

DS (ES ( pi ))

S

Initial Price pi
Supply w i

b3
bk

(e) The final buyer bk uses the demand
to calculate the final price, which is forwarded to the seller for decryption.

(f) The seller S distributes the final price
to all buyers.

Figure 5.1.: Illustrated Homomorphic Tâtonnement Protocol
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5.7 Incentive Compatibility
We claim that Protocol 5.6.1 is inherently incentive compatible with respect to
protocol inputs from the perspectives of both buyers and sellers. That is, each player
has no incentive to maliciously modify their actual input (utility function). We assume
that malicious buyers have the option to either inflate or deflate their demand for a
given price relative to their actual utility function. We show that while this can
influence the price, it works to their detriment. We demonstrate that a seller only
sets the initial price, and that their choice does not aﬀect the final equilibrium price,
so deviating provides no utility gain.

5.7.1 Utility Function Assumptions
In order to simplify the game theoretic analysis of the protocol, we write µ+
to denote positive utility, µ

to denote negative utility, and µ0 to denote neutral

utility gain. We assume that the magnitude of preference for all µi are equal (i.e.,
µ+ + µ = µ0 ). Similarly, we assume that µ✏ represents only a marginal utility gain.
That is, µ+ > µ✏ > µ0 .
Additionally, we assume that (pi

p⇤i ) 2 {µ+ , µ , µ✏ }, although this value depends

on how much the reported utility function µ⇤l diﬀers from an agent bl ’s actual utility
function µl . Clearly there is an inverse relationship between how much an agent
can under-inflate µ⇤l (which subsequently reduces the equilibrium price p⇤i ), and the
likelihood of a trade occurring between the agent and the seller. As the agent is
involved in the protocol, we assume that they prefer a trade occur. If not, they would
have abstained from the protocol entirely. Thus, it is natural to assume the agent’s
utility function assigns the same range to both of these preferences. This assumption
does not aﬀect our analysis, and is solely to ease the exposition.
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Definition 5.7.1 Let rl be the reward that a buyer bl gains by reporting µ⇤l in lieu
of their actual utility function µl . Where p⇤i (resp. pi ) is the resulting equilibrium
price when µ⇤l (resp. µl ) is reported, bl ’s reward is given by:
8
>
>
(pi
>
>
<
rl =
0
>
>
>
>
: (pi

p⇤i ) < 0 : µ⇤l > µl
: µ⇤l = µl

(5.3)

p⇤i ) > 0 : µ⇤l < µl

We make the natural assumption that each buyer prefers some (possibly large)
quantity of the seller’s good to their initial allocation, otherwise they would not engage
in the protocol.
Definition 5.7.2 Define the utility gained through trade as µ⌧ :

µ⌧ =

8
>
< µ+
⌧
>
: µ⌧

: trade occurs
: trade does not occur

(5.4)

Similarly, a buyer oﬀering a higher price has increased control over the quantity
of the good they can demand, subject to the seller’s supply wi . That is, the seller
prefers to sell to the set of buyers {bl |pli

pm
i , l 6= m} oﬀering the highest price. Thus,

a highest price buyer bm can command min(wi , wm ) units of good i, where wi is the
seller’s supply and wm is the initial allocation of resources for buyer bm .
Definition 5.7.3 Define buyer bl ’s utility gained from control over quantity received,
µq,l , as follows:

µq,l

8
>
< µ+ : 8j, pi > pj , j =
6 i
q,l
=
>
: µq,l : 8j, pi  pj , j =
6 i

(5.5)

That is, bl receives µ+
q if bl is oﬀering the highest price pi , and µq otherwise.
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Definition 5.7.4 Let rl be the reward for buyer bl , let µ⌧,l be bl ’s trade utility, and
let µq,l be bl ’s quantity control utility. We define bl ’s total reward ⇢l as follows:
(5.6)

⇢l = rl + µ⌧,l + µq,l

Without loss of generality, consider a coalition of buyers with utility functions
satisfying the above constraints. Let al = {au , at , ao } denote bl ’s action set, where
au denotes under-inflating, ao denotes over-inflating, and at denotes reporting the
buyer’s true utility function ul rather than a modified utility function u⇤l .
We assume that a rational seller will agree to sell their entire allocation of goods
to the buyer whose utility function ub gives the highest valuation for the good, thus
maximizing their profit. Thus, for all buyers bk 2
/ {bl |pli

pm
i , l 6= m}, we have that

µ⌧,k = µq,k = µ . Note the following:
• A buyer playing au in the presence of a buyer playing {at , ao } does not have
quantity control
• A buyer playing au in the presence of a buyer playing {at , ao } does not receive
any goods
• A unique buyer playing {at , ao } in the presence of buyers playing only au has
quantity control
We begin by reviewing the formal definition for weakly dominated strategies as
given by Katz [12], where a player can never increase their utility by playing a weakly
dominated strategy.
Definition 5.7.5 Given a game

= ({Al }kl=1 , {ul }kl=1 ), where A = A1 ⇥ · · · ⇥ Ak

is a set of actions, with a = (a1 , . . . , ak ) 2 A being a strategy and {µl } is a set of
utility functions, we say that action a0l 2 Al is weakly dominated by al 2 Al if
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µl (al )

µl (a0l ). That is, player Pl never improves their payoﬀ by playing a0l , but can

sometimes improve their payoﬀ by playing al .
To show that our construction is incentive compatible, we iteratively delete weakly
dominated strategies to arrive at the stable Nash equilibrium [14]. The process of
iteratively deleting weakly dominated strategies is criticized because, in some cases,
the order of deletion aﬀects the final result [26]. In this analysis, weakly dominated
strategies can be removed in an arbitrary order without aﬀecting the result.
We present a simplified payoﬀ matrix in Table 5.1. The strategy ao of overinflating the utility function is removed for clarity, as au , the strategy of underinflating, is a much more intuitive deviation for maximizing utility. However, we
formally demonstrate that ao is weakly dominated in lemma 5.7.1.
Table 5.1: Total Payoﬀ Matrix

au
at

a0u
(µ+ ,µ+ )
(2µ+ ,µ )

a0t
(µ ,2µ+ )
(µ+ ,µ+ )

Lemma 5.7.1 The strategy ao of reporting an over-inflated utility function u⇤i is
weakly dominated by at .
Proof We show that the action of over-inflating the buyer’s true utility function
is weakly dominated by truthfully reporting the utility function, demonstrating that
ao is weakly dominated by at . Recall that buyer bl ’s total reward is defined as ⇢l =
rl +µ⌧,l +µq,l . For convenience, we will parameterize ⇢l (·) with the action being played.
This notation is convenient for comparing the total payoﬀ yielded from diﬀerent
actions.
We begin by deriving the maximum utility that could be gained by playing ao ,
the action of over-inflating the true utility function. As buyer bl is playing ao , we
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have that µ⇤l > µl . From Equation 5.3, we have ⇢l (ao ) = (pi
(pi

p⇤i ) < 0, we write µ

p⇤i ) + µ⌧,l + µq,l . As

for concreteness. Given that bl is over-inflating their

true utility function µl , they are more likely to eﬀect a trade. Clearly the seller S
prefers the higher price p⇤i to bl ’s true valuation, pi . By Equation 5.7.2, we have that
⇢l (ao ) = µ + µ+
⌧,l + µq,l . Similarly, by over-inflating their true utility function, bl is
more likely to have control over the quantity of the good they receive, as they are
+
+
oﬀering a higher price. By Equation 5.7.3, we have that: ⇢l (ao ) = µ +µ+
⌧,l +µq,l = µ .

Thus, we have that max(µl (ao )) = µ+ . We now derive the maximum utility that
could be gained by playing at , where buyer bl reports the true utility function µl . By
Equation 5.3, we have that ⇢l (at ) = µ0 + µ⌧,l + µq,l as pi = p⇤i so (pi

p⇤i ) = µ0 . Buyer

bl maximizes their utility when a trade occurs, and they can control the quantity of
the good they receive. Following the same derivation that was used for ao , we have
from Equation 5.7.2 that ⇢l (at ) = µ0 + µ+
⌧,l + µq,l . Similarly, by Equation 5.7.3 we
+
+
+
have that ⇢l (at ) = µ0 + µ+
⌧,l + µq,l = 2µ . We have that max(µl (at )) = 2µ , and it

follows that max(µl (at )) > max(µl (ao )). Thus, a buyer always does at least as well or
better by playing at , and we say that at weakly dominates strategy ao .
Lemma 5.7.2 The strategy au of reporting an under-inflated utility function u⇤l is
weakly dominated by at .
Proof We demonstrate that the action au is weakly dominated by at when considering both individual buyers and members of a buyer coalition that collude to lower
the equilibrium price p⇤ .
Consider an individual buyer bl that is not a member of a coalition. As bl reports
µ⇤l , µ⇤l < µl , by Equation 5.3 we have that ⇢l (au ) = (pi
(pi

p⇤i ) > 0, we assume (pi

p⇤i ) + µ⌧,l + µq,l . Again, as

p⇤i ) = µ+ for concreteness. Similarly, we assume that

under-inflating µl reduces the chances of bl eﬀecting a trade with S, as bl is oﬀering a
lower price. By Equation 5.7.2, we have that ⇢l (au ) = µ+ µ⌧,l + µq,l . Playing action au
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also reduces the chances of bl having control over the quantity of the good received,
if any is received at all. By Equation 5.7.3, we have that ⇢l (au ) = µ+ µ⌧,l + µq,l = µ .
Thus, max(µl (au )) = µ , and it follows that max(µl (at )) > max(µl (au )). Thus, a
(non-coalition) buyer always does at least as well or better by playing at , and we say
that at weakly dominates strategy au .
We now consider a coalition of unique buyers under-reporting µl as µ⇤l < µl ,
colluding to decrease the resulting equilibrium price p⇤ of the good. That is, the
coalition is not controlled by a monolithic adversary as is common in the standard
security model: they are independent buyers in competition, modeled under the local
adversary framework of Canetti [63]. In the game theoretic literature, this is referred
to as the cartel problem. Note that the best response of any member of the coalition
is to report µ⇤l + ✏ for any positive ✏. In doing so, they receive the goods at a price
p0 < p⇤ while the other coalition members receive no goods. Applying backward
induction, we demonstrate that the best response of all buyers in a coalition is to
report µl , as µ⇤l + ✏ converges to their true utility function µl .
Suppose all coalition members agree to collude by reporting µ⇤l < µl , and all
members play this strategy. For any buyer bl in the coalition, we have that µ⇤l < µl
and by Equation 5.3 we have that ⇢l (au ) = (pi
we set (pi

p⇤i ) + µ⌧,l + µq,l . As (pi

p⇤i ) > 0,

p⇤i ) = µ+ to denote a positive utility gain. As the coalition consists

of more than a single buyer, all members of the coalition are more likely to eﬀect
a trade. From Equation 5.7.2, we have that ⇢l (au ) = µ+ + µ+
⌧,l + µq,l . However,
as all members of the coalition are oﬀering the same price for the good, they have
no control over the quantity of the good they receive. By Equation 5.7.3, we have
+
+
that ⇢l (au ) = µ+ + µ+
for all coalition
⌧,l + µq,l = µ . Thus, max(µl (au )) = µ

members. However, consider the case where a coalition member reports a utility
function µ0l = µ⇤l + ✏, ✏ > 0. That is, some bl in the coalition increases the price they
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are willing to pay for the good by any positive amount ✏. From Equation 5.3, we have
that
(p⇤i + ✏)) + µ⌧,l + µq,l = µ(+)

⇢l (au + ✏) = ((pi

✏

+ µ⌧,l + µq,l

(5.7)

However, now bl is more likely to eﬀect a trade, as p⇤i + ✏ > p⇤i . By Equation 5.7.2, we
have that ⇢l (au + ✏) = µ(+)

✏

+ µ+
⌧,l + µq,l . Similarly, bl has control over the quantity of

the good received as bl is oﬀering ✏ more than the coalition members. From Equation
5.7.3, we have
⇢l (au + ✏) = µ(+)

✏

+
+
+ µ+
⌧,l + µq,l > 2µ > max(µl (au ))

Thus, max(µl (au + ✏)) > max(µl (au )), as µ(+)

✏

= µ+ + µ

✏

(5.8)

> µ0 . However, all

coalition members are aware of this fact. Applying backward induction, it is not
diﬃcult to see that action au converges to at by increasing ✏ until µ⇤l = µl , and that
at weakly dominates au .
Corollary 5.7.3 The strategy at of reporting the true utility function ul weakly dominates {au , ao } for all buyers.
Proof A buyer’s action set is defined as al 2 {au , at , ao }. By lemma 5.7.1, we have
that ao is a weakly dominated strategy, and can be eliminated. By lemma 5.7.2, we
have that au is a weakly dominated strategy, and can be eliminated. Thus, reporting
the true utility function µl as denoted by action at is a stable Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 5.7.4 The strategy at of reporting the true utility function ul weakly dominates {au , ao } for the seller.
Proof As noted in the original paper, the update protocol converges on the equilibrium price p⇤ from any arbitrary initial price pi [62]. Given that the seller’s only
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influence on the equilibrium price is through setting the initial price pi , there is no
incentive to report some p0i 6= pi , as p⇤ is unaﬀected in doing so.
5.8 Semi-Honest Proof of Security
The proof of security under the semi-honest model is the first step in demonstrating security under the AC-Framework. We formally prove that Algorithm 5.6.1
is secure under the standard semi-honest model in Section 5.9, when demonstrating
that the Basic Security condition holds for the AC-Framework.

5.9 Security under the AC-Framework
The Accountable Computing (AC) -framework [69] considers adversaries in the
gap between the semi-honest and malicious models. The AC-framework guarantees
that an honest party can catch malicious behavior (unlike Aumann’s covert model,
which requires that such behavior be caught); honest parties can choose not to verify
that behavior is correct (thus saving computation), verify if they do not trust the
results, or probabilistically verify suﬃciently often to ensure incentives for correct
behavior. We now show that our protocol satisfies the conditions necessary under the
AC-framework. As part of this, we formally prove that the protocol is secure under
the semi-honest model (Theorem 5.9.1), as security under the standard semi-honest
model is a requirement for satisfying security under the AC-Framework.
The definition as given by Jiang and Clifton [69] is as follows:
Definition 5.9.1 (AC-protocol) An AC-protocol
requirements:

must satisfy the following three
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1. Basic Security: Without consideration of the verification process,

satisfies

the security requirements of a SSMC-protocol (a SMC-protocol secure under the
semi-honest model).
2. Basic Structure: The execution of

consists of two phases:

• Computation phase: Compute the prescribed functionality and store information needed for the verification process.
• Verification phase: An honest party (we name such a party as a prover
hereafter) can succeed in verifying an accountable behavior.
3. Sound Verification:

is sound providing that the verification phase cannot

be fabricated by a malicious party.
We now demonstrate that

satisfies all requirements of the AC-framework.

Theorem 5.9.1 Basic Security Given an adversary A’s private inputs IA and output OA , A’s view of the protocol can be eﬃciently simulated.
Proof We follow the simulation proof of semi-honest security characterized by Goldreich [5]. Consider the case where A is a buyer. With the exception of A’s private
input and the result of , all messages are encrypted with the seller’s public key of an
additively homomorphic encryption scheme E. It follows naturally that a simulator
could generate and send a series of random elements in Z⇤n2 to A. The encryption
scheme E is semantically secure, which implies that A is unable to distinguish the
random elements of Z⇤n2 from true encryptions. Thus, A’s view of

is eﬃciently sim-

ulatable. Consider next the case where A is the seller. A sees only the final message
ES (pi ), which is the output of the protocol. Thus, OA = ES (pi ) can be eﬃciently
simulated by encrypting the final result pi with the seller’s public key (known to the
seller/simulator) to get ES (pi ). Thus,
to A through the intermediary messages.

does not reveal any additional information
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Lemma 5.9.2 (Basic Structure: Computation)

stores suﬃcient information to

support the verification phase.
Proof In the case of the seller S, the initial price pinitial as well as all internal coin
tosses used for encryption are stored. In the case of a buyer, the committed (e.g.,
Pedersen’s scheme [76]) coeﬃcients, all encrypted price updates, as well as all internal
coin tosses are stored.
Lemma 5.9.3 (Basic Structure: Verification) An honest party in

can succeed in

verifying an accountable behavior while revealing only that information in .
Proof Let T represent the entire protocol transcript. Consider the case where an
honest buyer bl wishes to demonstrate accountable behavior. In this case, all intermediate prices pi are revealed. A verifier uses the internal coin tosses of bl to reconstruct ES (µbl (pi )). For each committed coeﬃcient cl , we reconstruct ES (µbl (pi )) 2 T
by computing ⇧tj=1 ES (cl )pi using the internal coin tosses of bl . The encryptions of
ES (µbl (pi )) will have identical representations in Z⇤n2 , as they were generated with the
same randomness. Thus, the encrypted elements can be compared bitwise for equality. If the price updates of bl 2 T match the reconstructed values, bl demonstrates
accountable behavior. Consider the case of the seller S. A seller needs to demonstrate that the final decrypted price pr = DS (ES (pr )) in the final round is equal
to the reported final price p⇤r . Any verifier can compute a seller verification value
VS = ES (R2 · (R1

pr )) = (ES (pr ) · ES ( R1 ))R2 , where R1 , R2 are chosen uniformly

at random from Zn , and ask S to decrypt the value. If R2 · (R1

pr ) = R2 · (R1

p⇤r ),

the seller demonstrates accountable behavior. Each buyer signs ES (pr ) to prevent a
dishonest buyer from recanting in order to falsely implicate an honest seller.
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Theorem 5.9.4

satisfies the sound verification phase.

Proof Consider the case of a malicious buyer bm . If any of bm ’s price updates were
not computed using the committed coeﬃcients of bm ’s utility function, the reconstructed encrypted update will not match the update in T . Further, there does not
exist a series of coin tosses that allow bm to represent an altered update ES (µ⇤bm (pi ))
as the actual update ES (µbm (pi )) 2 T , as this would prevent deterministic decryption. Thus, no malicious buyer bm can forge a legitimate verification. In the case of a
malicious seller Sm , the blinded value of pr prevents Sm from constructing a response
VS0 6= VS such that some p⇤r can be reported in lieu of the actual equilibrium price pr .

Theorem 5.9.5 Basic Structure (buyer) Let

represent Protocol 5.6.1 for the

Walrasian Auction problem. Assuming an honest majority, an honest buyer can be
verified by any honest party (including an independent verifier) other than the seller.
Proof The verifier is provided with the commitment of coeﬃcients by all buyers
(with the majority agreeing). The buyer bl being verified provides their input and
output values of each round; the following buyer bl+1 also provides their input for
each round. bl also provides the random value used in encryption during each round.
The verifier can then duplicate the calculations of bl , ensuring that the output of each
round is consistent with the committed coeﬃcients. If not, bl is dishonest.
If the output reported by bl does not match the input reported by bl+1 , then either
bl is dishonest, or bl+1 is reporting an incorrect value to the verifier. In the latter case,
bl+1 can be required to verify, if it succeeds, then bl is dishonest.
Theorem 5.9.6 Sound Verification (buyer) A rational malicious buyer bl cannot
fabricate verification provided bl+1 is honest.
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Proof If bl+1 correctly reports the value received from bl , then bl must provide the
same value to the verifier, and this must be the value generated from bl ’s input.
Generating this input from the output violates the assumption that the encryption
is semantically secure. If bl uses an incorrect input in the protocol (thus generating a
matching output, but not following the protocol), the actual value and thus the impact
on the outcome is completely unpredictable due to the security of the encryption,
violating the assumption of a rational party.
Lemma 5.9.7

computes the equilibrium value of the Walrasian Auction model and

stores suﬃcient information for verification to occur.
Proof Note that given the set V = {ES (pinitial ), ES (winitial )} and the seller S’s private decryption key DS , the entire protocol can be executed by a participating-party.
By revealing DS , the seller only exposes the verification set V and no other private
data. Given this, the participating-party can verify the correctness of the output
of

by retrieving the demand xi

xp from the remaining buyers through a trivial

protocol (where xp is the demand of the participating-party performing the verification). The participating-party is thus able to execute

to verify the correctness of

the equilibrium price p⇤ .
Theorem 5.9.8 Accountability (seller) A rational seller S will not behave dishonestly in

.

Proof This follows from the proof of Theorem 5.7.4, as the seller’s input has no
eﬀect on the final equilibrium price.
Given the previous two lemma’s, we can conclude that

satisfies the Basic Structure

condition.
Theorem 5.9.9 Sound Verification The verification phase of
cated by a malicious party.

cannot be fabri-
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Proof At the beginning of

, the seller S distributes the set V , such that V =

{ES (pinitial ), ES (winitial )} to all buyers b 2 B. It follows naturally that once this
commitment is made, the seller is unable to alter the commitments. Should the seller
provide an erroneous decryption key DS⇤ 6= DS , the commitments will decrypt to
⇤
values p⇤initial 6= pinitial and winitial
6= winitial which defeats the seller’s intention to

fabricate the verification. Thus, we can conclude that the seller cannot succeed in
fabricating the result of the verification process.
With this, we can conclude that our protocol is secure under the AC-framework,
thus enabling malicious behaviour to be caught and contractual incentives put into
place to ensure that semi-honest behavior is incentive compatible.

5.10 Conclusion
We have presented a privacy preserving, incentive compatible market construction
that is secure against malicious parties, going beyond the standard security model to
protect against malicious input to the protocol. To do this, we demonstrated that
by securely computing the Oblivious One-Time Market protocol given by Cole and
Fleischer [62], no agent has an incentive to report false valuations of the goods in the
market. Thus, SMPC solves a long-standing problem in economic theory, as it allows
Léon Walras’ tâtonnement process for arriving at equilibrium to be computed while
conforming to the constraints of the Walrasian Auction model. In this way, trade
does not occur outside of equilibrium, and yet the final equilibrium price is computed
and made available to all agents in the market.
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6 APPLYING GAME THEORY TO CRYPTOGRAPHY
In Chapter 4, we demonstrated the utility of a game theoretic approach to adversarial
settings. Chapter 5 demonstrated the utility of applying cryptographic primitives to
classic game theoretic problems. In this chapter, we will merge cryptography and
game theory to construct a two-party framework for reasoning about the security of
cryptographic protocols. Our framework presents the standard notions of security
through equivalent game theoretic concepts.
We build upon previous results to strengthen the equilibrium concept for rational two-party computation. Only rational players acting to maximize their utility
functions are considered. Games are analyzed as extensive form dynamic games of
imperfect information, using a computational variant of perfect Bayesian equilibrium
as the solution concept. We argue that the perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a more
appropriate solution concept than current solutions, as in cryptographic protocols
information is often imperfect by design. Further, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium
concept is able to address dynamic games, where players move sequentially rather
than simultaneously. By considering players that move sequentially, we are able to
remove the assumption of a broadcast channel. Finally, we give novel definitions of
privacy, correctness and fairness solely in terms of game theoretic constructs.

6.1 Introduction
A recent focus of the cryptographic literature has been to formulate a framework
for analyzing the security of protocols from a game theoretic perspective. The notion
of rational multiparty computation considers only a single class of players: those that
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are rational, seeking to maximize their utility functions. A survey of the intersection
of cryptography and game theory is given by Katz [12].
Most previous work towards a general game theoretic framework for reasoning
about security in rational multiparty computation has been limited to those functions
that are non-cooperatively computable (NCC), as defined by Shoham et al. [77]. In
addition to being restricted to NCC, most existing work uses computational variants
of Nash, Correlated or Bayesian equilibrium [15, 16, 23, 39, 65] as the solution concept
for games. The exception is work by Gradwohl et al. [30], where the authors consider
a relaxed version of computational sequential rationality that removes non-credible
threats, called threat-free Nash equilibrium. However, all of these solution concepts
consider only games of perfect information. We argue that the notion of perfect
Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), a solution concept for extensive form dynamic games of
imperfect information, is preferable for modeling cryptographic protocols. As players
commonly cannot observe the moves made by others in cryptographic protocols, PBE
oﬀers a natural method for modeling this uncertainty. Further, it formally models
observable actions and auxiliary information available to players that aﬀects their
strategy selection. As extensive form games may contain non-credible threats, we give
a modified version of Gradwohl et al.’s [30] definition that is intuitive for games in the
computational setting. Finally, we give novel definitions capturing the cryptographic
concepts of privacy, correctness and fairness in terms of game theoretic constructs
and prove the necessary and suﬃcient conditions under which they hold.
The goal of a rational multiparty computation framework is to relax the requirements of the malicious and semi-honest models in secure multiparty computation.
The malicious model must protect against all deviations from the protocol specification, including actions that do not give an adversary an advantage. Protocols secure
in the semi-honest model achieve greater eﬃciency, but suﬀer from the strong assump-
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tion that parties will not deviate from the protocol even if they benefit from doing
so. As we describe in Section 6.6, our framework requires only that parties follow
the protocol if such action constitutes rational behavior. We argue that the assumption of rationality is far weaker than the blind obedience required in the semi-honest
model, and the resulting protocols will be more eﬃcient than their malicious model
counterparts that must prevent arbitrary (i.e., non-rational ) actions. Perhaps most
critically, even protocols secure under the malicious model do not prevent a party
from lying about their input. Rational behavior provides a means to incorporate this
into the discussion through incentive compatibility, ensuring that results reflect the
true data.
First we review existing work applying game theory to cryptographic protocols.
Section 6.3 discusses limitations with prior work, in particular showing that existing approaches do not fully model the rational secret sharing problem. We argue
that modeling imperfect information, beliefs about the game state, and non-credible
threats are desirable qualities of a candidate equilibrium concept for rational multiparty computation. From the game theory background of Section 3.1, we move
to the computational setting in Section 6.4. A computational variant of the perfect
Bayesian solution concept is defined in Section 6.5, and finally our new game theoretic
framework for analyzing cryptographic protocols is presented in Section 6.6.

6.2 Related Work
The impetus for this work is largely due to a recent survey by Katz describing
ongoing research into potential links between cryptographic and game theoretic notions [12]. We attempt to formulate our definitions in the same manner with the hope
of consensus.
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Many of the current frameworks for rational multiparty computation are limited
in scope to functions that are non-cooperatively computable (NCC) [15, 16, 23, 39, 65].
Such a restriction is necessarily imposed under the assumption that parties desire
exclusivity of the function output. That is, they prefer to learn1 the correct result of
the function, while preventing other parties from learning the result. This assumption
is not necessarily valid for all games. In market scenarios, at least two parties must
learn the result of the function in order to complete a trade. That is, an adversary
needs the result of the function to be known to other participants in order to achieve
their goal. Thus, the functions in NCC are a proper subset of those supported in this
framework.
Halpern and Teague study rational multiparty computation under the assumptions
of correctness and exclusivity [23]. They show the impossibility of secret sharing and
general multiparty computation for any deterministic mechanism under these assumptions. However, they give randomized algorithms that terminate in expected constant
time for both problems, and show that they satisfy their framework. We note that we
remove the exclusivity requirement from our general framework, although this can be
modeled through a natural extension. Further, we do not consider the notion of iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies, as this equilibrium concept is sensitive to
the order of strategy deletion [26]. Kol and Naor expand on the work of Halpern and
Teague to give protocols that are not susceptible to backward induction, even in the
presence of exponentially many iterations [26]. These solutions assume the existence
of a broadcast channel, and they give solutions for both the non-simultaneous and
simultaneous cases. The authors choose the notion of a computational Nash equilibrium, and leave extensions to subgame perfection open. Subgame perfection requires
1

That is, each party prefers to have the ability to derive the correct result of the function. This
may require additional computation after the function output is revealed to the party. This occurs
when, for example, the party provides any input x0 that diﬀers from the party’s true input x.
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optimal play at each decision node in the game tree, and thus refines Nash equilibria
in games of perfect information in the same manner that PBE refines Nash equilibria
in games of imperfect information. We argue that even the extension to subgame perfection is inadequate, as it assumes players are aware of the moves made by others.
The goal of cryptographic interactions is often to prevent learning others’ information
or actions. Instead, we consider extensive form dynamic games of imperfect information, where players’ information sets are not guaranteed to be singleton nodes and
players move sequentially rather than simultaneously. Nojoumian et al. [78] introduced socio-rational secret sharing, where rational and malicious players engage in
the same protocol more than once. A public trust network is assumed, which stores
a player’s believed honesty based on past protocol interactions. We go beyond this
model by modeling all players as rational, rather than creating a separate class of
malicious players. Further, we do not assume the existence of a public trust network,
nor do we assume that players necessarily value future interaction.
This work is not the first to attempt a game theoretic framework for constructing rational multiparty computation protocols. Our goal is to unify the existing
frameworks by providing a stronger equilibrium solution concept well-suited for cryptographic protocols, while introducing notions of privacy, correctness, and fairness
defined in game theoretic terms.
The first framework to consider players’ motivations was given by Aumann et
al. [79]. Although the framework does not explicitly consider rationality, the authors
assume that adversaries are covert. That is, they are willing to cheat so long as they
will not be caught doing so. Implicitly, an adversary is assumed to have a utility function defined solely with respect to their aversion to detection. The authors give three
protocol constructions that provide security gradients between the standard semihonest and malicious models of secure multiparty computation. The recent direction
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in the literature is towards a game theoretic framework for constructing protocols
with weaker security guarantees than the standard multiparty computation frameworks. The most complete game theoretic framework to date was given by Halpern et
al. [34]. They consider how agents play games when computation has an associated
cost and aﬀects agents’ utility functions directly. The authors formalize the notion of
a computational Nash equilibrium, and demonstrate that mixed computational Nash
equilibria are guaranteed to exist for the set of computational games where randomization is free. However, the framework considers only Bayesian games of perfect
information. Bayesian Nash equilibrium can result in implausible equilibria, as it
does not exclude non-credible threats. In the setting of cryptography, threatening to
break the underlying cryptosystem would constitute a non-credible threat for a player
bound to probabilistic polynomial time (PPT), despite the action’s optimality for an
unbounded player. We build on their framework to provide a computational model
of extensive form dynamic games of imperfect information.
The most complete framework from a cryptographic perspective that integrates
game theoretic concepts was given by Groce et al. [32], which builds on the framework by Asharov et al. [15]. Asharov et al. demonstrate how standard cryptographic
notions of security can be framed in a game theoretic view when considering malicious fail-stop adversaries. The authors demonstrate that privacy, correctness and
fairness can be met using a game theoretic simulation-based framework. However, the
framework only considers computational Nash equilibrium in extensive-form games
of perfect information. We argue that a computational variant of PBE is preferable
for constructing cryptographic protocols in a game theoretic framework, where players may not know the actions of other players when their computational abilities are
bounded. The authors limit a player’s strategy set to {
node to follow

continue

continue

,

abort

}, where at each

requires following the protocol specified by the mechanism
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designer precisely. From this the authors argue that non-credible threats in fail-stop
games are meaningless, as a party that aborts cannot be punished. The work of
Groce et al. [32] demonstrates that fairness can be achieved for a much broader class
of utility functions than those specified by Asharov et al. [15]. Further, Groce et al.
consider the byzantine case, where deviations are not limited to the fail-stop model.
However, the equilibrium concept considered by Groce et al., namely Bayesian strict
Nash equilibrium, does not explicitly model players’ beliefs about the game state.
Rather, this concept captures only uncertainty about the types of the other players.
However, the players’ beliefs about the current game state are modeled exogenously
in Groce et al.’s setting. In cryptographic settings, a player’s uncertainty about the
current state is of critical importance, and we demonstrate the shortcomings of other
equilibria concepts in Section 6.3. Our framework builds directly on Asharov et al.’s
work, and as in Groce et al.’s setting, we allow for arbitrary deviation from the
protocol beyond simple aborts.

6.3 Motivation
We motivate our approach by demonstrating cryptographic interactions where
players’ information is imperfect, and their beliefs must be formally modeled. Specifically, we show that a simple change to the rational secret sharing protocol used in
the Groce et al. [32] framework results in a protocol where a rational player would
cheat, but existing work predicts the player behaves honestly.
Cryptographic protocols proceed in a series of rounds, where at each round some
subset of the parties select and play an action. Game theory models such interactions
as extensive form dynamic games, where players move sequentially through a series
of rounds, rather than normal form static games that model a single simultaneous
interaction.
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6.3.1 Imperfect Information
The information available to a player in a cryptographic protocol is of critical
importance. The notion of computational security relies on the fact that players
can be modeled as asymptotically bounded algorithms, and are only able to gain
certain information with negligible probability. Consider for instance the ciphertext
indistinguishability (IND-CPA) game [80]. In this game, an adversary A bound to
probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) has two plaintext messages {m0 , m1 : |m0 | =
|m1 |}, and the challenger C has an asymmetric key pair {EC , DC } from a public key
cryptosystem. C publicizes EC , and A performs up to polynomially many encryptions
before sending {m0 , m1 } to C. C selects a bit b 2 {0, 1} uniformly at random, and
returns EC (mb ) to A. After performing at most polynomially many operations, A
outputs a guess b0 2 {0, 1}, and succeeds when b0 = b. The cryptosystem is said to
be IND-CPA secure if, for all PPT adversaries A
|P r[A(EC (mb )) = 1]

P r[A(EC (m1 b )) = 1]|  ✏( )

where ✏(·) is a negligible function and

(6.1)

is the security parameter. Clearly this

property reflects the inability of a computationally bounded adversary to distinguish
between two cases. From a game theoretic perspective, we argue that this lack of
knowledge is properly modeled as an extensive form dynamic game of imperfect information. When some player p0 does not observe a previous action by another player
p1 , we say that the game has imperfect information and p0 ’s information set is nonsingleton. That is, p0 only knows that p1 has moved, and does not know which action
was played.
In the IND-CPA ciphertext indistinguishability game, A has imperfect information
as it does not observe C’s action b 7! {0, 1}. Thus, C’s information set contains both
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the left (b 7! 0) and right (b 7! 1) nodes of the game tree

under the assumption that

C is bound to PPT. Current rational multiparty computation frameworks consider
solution concepts that require perfect information, and do not formally model players’
information and beliefs. For instance, if A had some auxiliary information (e.g., C’s
random seed), it may be able to predict C’s choice for b with probability non-negligibly
greater than 12 . Thus, any solution concept must explicitly model the fact that moves
in cryptographic interactions are frequently unobserved, and also that players may
have auxiliary information or beliefs that influence their strategy selection.

6.3.2 Updating Beliefs
Additionally, players typically update their beliefs throughout cryptographic protocols based on observed events. Consider the case of interactive zero-knowledge proof
systems [6]. This game is an interaction between a prover P in possession of a secret,
and a verifier V that is to learn only whether or not P does, in fact, know the secret. In each round, a prover not in possession of the secret succeeds with probability
0 < p < 1. Thus, V must interact with P through k rounds until 1

pk is acceptably

close to 1. If at any round P fails the test, then V knows with certainty that P does
not possess the secret and the game terminates. However, the likelihood that P does
know the secret approaches 1 as k ! 1. Thus, V is consistently updating a belief
about P throughout the protocol.
6.3.3 Dynamic Games
In game theory, games may be either static or dynamic. In the former, actions
are played simultaneously, while in the latter actions may be played sequentially. In
a computational setting, this is equivalent to deciding between whether or not to
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assume the existence of a broadcast channel. As broadcast channels are a relaxation
of real world interactions, removing this assumption is desirable as it allows players to
act in a specified order. This introduces non-trivial issues into protocols that may be
very basic in the semi-honest model, such as the recovery protocol for secret sharing.
This protocol was modeled as an extensive form dynamic game by Groce et al. [32],
who give a solution when players must move sequentially in a known order.

6.3.4 Non-credible Threats
Recently, Halpern et al. [34] showed that a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to
exist for all finite machine games under the assumption that randomization is free.
However, their framework considers only Bayesian Nash equilibrium: an equilibrium
concept susceptible to implausible equilibria through non-credible threats. A threat
is not considered credible if it is “oﬀ the equilibrium path” for a player. That is, action
a is not credible if player i receives a greater expected utility by playing action a0 6= a.
We consider a computational non-credible threat to be any action a where there exists
another action a0 that yields negligibly less utility and is computable subject to the
player’s complexity bound C . Our definition assumes that a player will choose the
optimal strategy whenever their complexity C allows such action to be performed.

6.3.5 Rational Secret Sharing
The necessity of modeling imperfect information, and the diﬃculty imposed when
broadcast channels cannot be assumed, is easily illustrated using the most common example of rational cryptographic protocols to date: rational secret sharing
[22, 24, 25, 32, 35, 81]. First introduced by Halpern and Teague [23], the authors consider a set of purely rational players, seeking only to maximize their respective utility
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functions. This departs from the standard security models in cryptography, which
assume two distinct types: semi-honest players that follow the protocol specification
while possibly analyzing the protocol transcript in an attempt to learn more information, and malicious players that may deviate arbitrarily. The goal of general secret
sharing is to split a secret among n parties such that any k shares are suﬃcient to
recover the secret value, using a scheme such as the polynomial interpolation approach proposed by Shamir [82]. Rational secret sharing, introduced by Halpern and
Teague [23], is particularly concerned with the process of recovering the secret from
the shares. As noted by Halpern et al. [23], rational players’ utility functions are
assumed to value exclusivity, where preference is given to learning the output of the
function while preventing other players from doing so. Assume that a player’s strategy set

is limited to

2 {H, ?}, where H denotes the honest strategy of revealing

the player’s share, and ? denotes the action of not revealing the share. Without loss
of generality, assume µ+ denotes positive utility, µ denotes negative utility, and µ0
denotes no net change in utility. We formally define a utility function µf ( 0 ,

1)

for

fairness where exclusivity is valued in Definition 6.3.1:
Definition 6.3.1 Let ⇡ be a two-party protocol, f be a two-party function, and

2

{H, ?}. Then, for every x0 , x1 as above the utility function for fairness valuing
f
exclusivity for party
8 pi , denoted µi , is defined as:
>
>
µ+ : output⇡,0 = f (x0 , x1 ) ^ output⇡,1 =
6 f (x0 , x1 )
>
>
<
µf0 ( 0 , 1 ) 7!
µ0 : output⇡,0 = f (x0 , x1 ) ^ output⇡,1 = f (x0 , x1 )
>
>
>
>
: µ
: output⇡,0 6= f (x0 , x1 )

Under this assumption, no party has any incentive to distribute their share to the
other parties. Rather, the equilibrium is to wait for other players to distribute their
shares, as this is the only action that increases a player’s utility function. The authors
demonstrate that this implies no deterministic protocol exists where rational parties

93

Figure 6.1.: Imperfect Information Sets in the Rational Secret Sharing Game

are willing to disseminate their shares to other players. However, their randomized
protocol relies on the fact that parties are unaware whether the current state is
terminal (allowing the secret to be recovered), or merely a “test” state (where the
secret cannot be recovered, but players who do not distribute shares are caught as
cheaters).
This fundamental lack of information constitutes an extensive form game of imperfect information, for which the Nash equilibrium (and computational variants thereof)
are insuﬃcient equilibria concepts.
Figure 6.1 illustrates the two-party rational secret sharing game , which proceeds
in a series of rounds. At round i, player p0 ’s share xi0 may be a legitimate share, such
that combined with p1 ’s share the secret may be recovered. However, p0 ’s share may
also be illegitimate, such that the shares combine to a pre-determined test value
that is not the original secret. Players are not aware whether the given round i
is the terminal round i⇤ where the secret may be recovered, or a test round i 6=
i⇤ where no information may be learned from the shares. Assume that a player’s
strategy set

is limited to

2 {H, ?}, where H denotes the honest strategy of

revealing the player’s share, and ? denotes the action of not revealing the share. By
choosing i⇤ from a geometric distribution, as in Groce et al. [32], cheating players
that choose strategy

=? when i 6= i⇤ are caught and the game may be terminated.
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Thus, players now have an incentive to distribute their share, as playing ? only
yields µ+ when i = i⇤ . When the perfect Bayesian equilibrium was proposed for
modeling extensive form games of imperfect information by Harsanyi [33], the author
specifically cautioned against using the standard Nash equilibrium concept. This
view was echoed by Estevez-Tapiador et al. [83], specifically in the context of rational
exchange. The presence of non-singleton information sets in the rational secret sharing
game is illustrated by the dashed line between the two possible game states in Figure
6.1.
The diﬀerence between the Bayesian strict Nash equilibrium (BNE), used in the
rational secret sharing setting of Groce et al. [32], and the perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(PBE) concept we consider in our setting, bears clarification. If all moves were
simultaneous, BNE and PBE would yield the same equilibria. However, in extensive
form games of imperfect information, a player may not be able to observe all moves
by other players. This results in non-singleton information sets, which BNE is unable
to model, as it only considers uncertainty about players’ types. Consequently, this
uncertainty about the game state should be explicitly modeled into their expected
utility. The PBE concept is able to “cut through” the non-singleton information sets
present in the rational secret sharing game, as it considers players’ beliefs about the
type of other players as well as beliefs about the current game state. Thus, PBE avoids
implausible equilibria that result from the presence of non-singleton information sets.

H0
?0

H1
(a0 , a1 )
(b0 , c1 )

?1
(c0 , b1 )
(d0 , d1 )

Figure 6.2.: The Payoﬀ Table for the Rational Secret Sharing Game
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As in the setting of Groce et al. [32], assume that exclusivity holds. Thus, each
player orders their preferences according to bi > ai
to learn the correct result while p1

i

di

ci , so that player pi prefers

learns an erroneous result.

We review the share distribution and reconstruction phase considered by Groce
et al. [32].
Share Generation:
• A value i⇤ 2 {1, . . . } is chosen according to a geometric distribution, and represents the iteration (unknown to the parties) in which both parties will learn
the correct output.
• Values r10 , r11 , . . . , rn0 , rn1 are chosen, with the {ri0 }ni=1 intended for p0 and the
{ri1 }ni=1 intended for p1 . For i

i⇤ , we have ri0 = f0 (x0 , x1 ) and ri1 = f1 (x0 , x1 ),

while for i < i⇤ the {ri0 } (resp., {ri1 }) values depend on p0 ’s (resp. p1 ’s) input
only.
• Each rib value is randomly shared as sbi and tbi (with rib = sbi

tbi ), where sbi is

given to p0 and tbi is given to p1 .
Share Recovery: For n iterations, do as follows:
• p1 sends t0i to p0 , enabling p0 to learn ri0
• p0 sends t1i to p1 , enabling p1 to learn ri1
When the protocol ends, a party outputs the most recently learned value of ri .
We now review the guessing strategies employed by Groce et al. [32], which players
use when the other player aborts the protocol prematurely. The guessing distribution
Wi are chosen such that the strategy vector {(cooperate, W0 ), (cooperate, W1 )} is a
Bayesian strict Nash Equilibrium. For all i < i⇤ , the rij values are chosen from Wj ,
which is assumed to assign non-zero probability to all elements in the range of f . The
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critical issue with the Groce et al. [32] approach is that the expectation for utility
?

exogenously considers the probability that i = i⇤ , rather than making this belief
explicit in the equilibrium concept. Thus, they restrict a player to fix their strategy
at the start of the game for consistency with BNE, even as a mediator introduces
auxiliary information.
?

Consider a game where p0 is given auxiliary information about whether i = i⇤ after
the game has started. Suppose the share generator reveals to p0 that the current round
i is, in fact, the terminal round i⇤ . This information crucially aﬀects p0 ’s expected
utility function under PBE, as p0 ’s beliefs about i⇤ have changed from the start
of the game. This information should be explicitly factored into the calculation of
expected utility, but the definition of Bayesian Nash equilibria ignores this, focusing
on uncertainty only about the player’s types. Thus, even in the case where p0 knows
the correct value of i⇤ at some round k, the BNE for the above game predicts that the
player will play honestly and reveal their share. However, PBE allows p0 to update
their belief about i⇤ as the game progresses, and requires that all subsequent play be
optimal with respect to their beliefs. Thus, PBE predicts that p0 should not reveal
their share, and instead collect p1 ’s share to recover the secret. Given p0 ’s beliefs
about the game state, this clearly maximizes p0 ’s expected utility. The equilibrium
predicted by BNE, namely for p0 to distribute their share, is implausible given the
auxiliary information provided to p0 and the fact that p0 values exclusivity. This
implausible equilibrium is avoided when the PBE concept is used.
Formally, assume that players have reached round i of the rational secret sharing
recovery game . There are at most n > i rounds in , and the terminal round i⇤
is chosen from a geometric distribution. In the setting of Groce et al. [32], incentive
compatibility must hold for all players a priori. To accomplish this, we must set the
parameter ↵, the probability of success. Since in each round i there are two distinct
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possibilities (namely, i = i⇤ and i 6= i⇤ ), we must set ↵ such that no party has an
incentive to abort during the game. Groce et al. [32] show that such an ↵ exists.
All that remains to be shown is that the uncertainty of a player about the types
of the other players does not provide an incentive to abort. Assume that a player
type ti 2 {continue, abort}. The fact that uncertainty about types does not induce
a player to abort follows from the assumption of incentive compatibility. That is,
all players know i is chosen from a geometric distribution parameterized by ↵, so
no player has an incentive to abort. At round i, each player has observed all other
players continue the protocol, otherwise the game would have terminated. Thus, all
players are convinced that the remaining players are of type continue. This is the
BNE equilibrium for , even when uncertainty about the game state is introduced, as
the BNE concept does not consider game state beliefs.
The PBE equilibrium concept weights strategies according to a player’s beliefs
about other players’ types and the current game state. These beliefs are updated
throughout the game based on observed actions and auxiliary information provided
to the player. Recall that player pi receives payoﬀ bi when pi selects abort (?) while
all other players select continue (H). The payoﬀ bi > ai , where ai denotes the case
where all players select H. The probability that i = i⇤ is given by the CDF for a
geometric distribution parameterized with ↵:

P r[i = i⇤ ] = 1

(1

(6.2)

↵)i

Thus, in PBE players would weight bi by P r[i = i⇤ ] and ai by 1

P r[i = i⇤ ].

As Groce et al. have demonstrated, ↵ can be chosen to guarantee that ai (1
bi (1

(1

↵)i >

↵)i ), so BNE and PBE yield the same equilibrium for . However, if we

introduce auxiliary information about i⇤ to player pi , then the equilibriums diverge.
Assume at round i a mediator informs pi that i = i⇤ . Now, we have:
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µi (abort) = P r[i = i⇤ ]bi

(6.3)

= (1)bi

(6.4)

> P r[i 6= i⇤ ]ai

(6.5)

= (0)ai

(6.6)

= µi (continue)

(6.7)

Thus, the auxiliary information provided to pi concerning the game state aﬀects
µi such that abort provides greater utility than continue. This is intuitive, as pi values
exclusivity, so knowing i⇤ induces a decision to abort. However, BNE does not weight
strategies by uncertainty about the game state. Even though pi is aware i = i⇤ , BNE
ranks µi (continue) > µi (abort), which is an implausible equilibrium.
Given these observations, we will argue that the notion of PBE is a more appropriate solution concept than those previously proposed, as it explicitly models games
of imperfect information.

6.4 Computational Setting
Cryptographic protocol construction necessarily requires the computational ability
of players to be explicitly modeled. Game theory makes no such assumptions; the
computational abilities of the players are considered unlimited, and do not aﬀect their
utility functions. Thus, any game theoretic framework for building cryptographic
protocols requires that computational limitations be taken into account.
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Interactive Turing Machines
In order to transform the standard game theoretic definitions to the computational
setting, we must redefine functionalities to be computable by an interactive Turing
machine (ITM)2 , and explicitly model the complexity of players’ ITMs following the
work of Halpern et al. [34].
~ = M1 ⇥· · ·⇥Mn denote the set of ITMs that terminate with
Definition 6.4.1 Let M
~ , we have that M consists of a finite read-only input tape MI ,
probability 1. 8M 2 M
a finite read-only random tape MR with elements drawn uniformly at random from
{0, 1}⇤ , a finite read-write work tape MW , a finite read-only communication tape MC ,
and a finite write-only output tape MO .
As players are now modeled as ITMs, actions and types are represented as elements
drawn from {0, 1}⇤ and correspond to M ’s input and output.
Following Halpern et al.’s [34] definitions, we define a view as the pair v = (t, r) 2
({0, 1}⇤ , {0, 1}⇤ ), where t is the type of the player read from MI , and r is the finite
bit string M reads from MR . We define M (v) to be the finite output written to MO .
~ ⇥
Each player’s ITM is bounded by an associated complexity function C : M
{0, 1}⇤ ! N. When considering our framework’s application to cryptography, it is
useful to define the complexity in terms of a globally known security parameter , as
in Asharov et al.’s work [15]. For any machine M with C (M, ) = 0, we require that
M =?, where ? denotes the ITM that does not read MI , write to MO , or change
states.
2

Modeling players as ITMs is the approach taken by Halpern et al. [34] and Asharov et al. [15], as
this is a foundational model in the cryptographic literature [5, 6].
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6.5 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Formal definitions of perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) are usually not generalizable to general extensive form games, and contain the vague requirement that beliefs
be updated according to Bayes’ rule “whenever possible”. Bonanno [37] gives a definition of PBE that is applicable for general extensive form games, but we will use the
definition by Diaz et al. [38], as they go further by extending to general extensive form
games as well as clarifying the ambiguous “whenever possible” updating requirement.
We first require that, for player i 2 N , their assessment ( i ,
strategy

i

and a belief

i

i)

consisting of a

about the game state, be sequentially rational:

Definition 6.5.1 An assessment ( i ,

i)

is (computationally) sequentially ratio-

nal if, for every player i 2 N and every information set Ii 2 Ii , there holds:
i |Ii )

µi ( i ,
for every strategy

0
i,

+ ✏( )

µi ((

i,

0
i ),

i |Ii )

a probability distribution over actions, of player i, where (

(6.8)

i,

0
i)

is a strategy profiles that all players stick to the strategy ~ except that player i turns to
the strategy

0
i,

and µi ((

i,

profile and the belief system

0
i ),
i,

i |Ii )

denotes player i’s utility induced by this strategy

a probability distribution over game states, conditional

on Ii being reached. The term ✏( ) denotes a negligible utility gain with respect to
the security parameter , and

i

is an eﬃciently computable strategy for player i with

complexity C .
Next, we give the definition of a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which we build
on to construct the final equilibrium concept that applies to general extensive form
games:

101
Definition 6.5.2 Let

be an extensive form game. An assessment ( , ) is a weak

perfect Bayesian equilibrium if it is sequentially rational and, on the path of ,
is derived from

from Bayes’ rule.

With this, we reach the definition of a C -simple perfect Bayesian equilibrium:
Definition 6.5.3 Let

be an extensive form game. An assessment ( , ) is a C -

simple perfect Bayesian equilibrium if, for each regular information set Iik , the
restriction of ( , ) to

Iik (

tional updating from

(i.e., the restriction of ( , ) to

is obtained by condi-

, ) is sequentially rational and

Bayesian equilibrium), where

Iik (

, ) is a weak perfect

is eﬃciently computable by an interactive Turing ma-

chine (ITM) with complexity C .

6.6 Framework
In order to show the application of game theoretic models to cryptography, a
proper security model must be introduced. Thus, we consider appropriate game
theoretic definitions of privacy, correctness and fairness.
Our framework is an extension of Asharov et al.’s [15] model of security under
fail-stop games. The original work considered two players with action sets limited
to {

abort

,

continue

}, where

abort

implied that the ITM output a special signal ?

observed by all players and stopped playing the game, and

continue

is the strategy of

following the game specification without deviation. Thus, the only deviating strategy
is to abort the protocol, which is similar to the standard semi-honest security model.
We extend this model to assume that

continue

is precisely the vector of strategies

of not aborting, regardless of whether or not the chosen action is the honest choice.
Similarly,

deviate

dishonest, taking

={
U

U

/{

honest

,

abort

}} is the set of all possible strategies that are

to be the universe of strategies. That is,

deviate

corresponds to
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choosing a strategy

that deviates from the prescribed protocol. Without loss of

generality, we assume that

continue

={

honest

,

deviate

}, where

honest

is equivalent to

following the prescribed protocol. As multiparty computation players are assumed to
be mutually distrustful in the cryptographic literature, we assume they are risk-averse
in the game theoretic sense. Thus, when an honest player cannot distinguish between
the probability of A selecting

deviate
A

or

honest
,
A

the honest party assumes that

deviate
A

was selected. We consider only the two-party case, as the extension to multiple parties
requires modeling player collusion. Throughout, we let µ+ represents positive utility
gain, µ

represent negative utility, and µ0 represents neutral utility. We now give

novel definitions of privacy, correctness and fairness in purely game theoretic terms,
considering a more expressive model where players may deviate arbitrarily from the
protocol beyond simply aborting.

6.6.1 Privacy
We follow Asharov et al.’s [15] intuition and require that parties’ utility functions
reflect the loss of privacy with negative utility. This requires no assumptions about
other players’ utility functions with respect to the gain of information; the burden
is player specific and known, as we assume players are aware of their own utility
functions. Thus, players may choose to require that any subset of privacy, correctness
and fairness are satisfied by the protocol.
We first introduce a new notion of indistinguishability defined in terms of a C bounded distinguisher D’s ability to diﬀerentiate between information sets. We first
introduce notation for an ITM’s local history:
Definition 6.6.1 Let ⇡ = (M0 , M1 ) be a two-party protocol between a pair of ITMs
(M0 , M1 ). Then we write
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(6.9)

k
H⇡,i
(x0 , x1 , ) = (xi , MR , mi1 , . . . , mik )

to denote the local history of Mi at round k, with input xi , random tape MR ,
security parameter

and mij represents the j th message.

We consider the set of infinitely many input tuples (x0 , x01 , x11 , ) where we have
that |x0 | = |x01 | = |x11 | = , and party p0 ’s input is fixed at x0 while p1 ’s input is in
the set {x01 , x11 }.
Definition 6.6.2 We say that a finite extensive form computational game

has

indistinguishable initial information sets in the presence of C -bounded adversaries if:
0
|P r[(H⇡,D
(x0 , x01 , ) 2 I0 ) = 1]

0
P r[(H⇡,D
(x0 , x11 , ) 2 I0 ) = 1]|  ✏( )

(6.10)

for some negligible function ✏(·).
That is, no C -bounded distinguisher D can distinguish the type (i.e., private input)
of party p1 with probability non-negligibly greater than 12 . With this notion formally
defined, we now give a definition for players’ utility functions with respect to privacy:
Definition 6.6.3 Let ⇡ be a two-party protocol and f be a two-party function. Then,
for every x00 , x10 , x1 such that f (x00 , x1 ) = f (x10 , x1 ), and for every C -bounded distinguisher D, the utility function for privacy µp for party pi , on input x0 2 {x00 , x10 },
is defined by
?
• µp0 (H⇡,i
) = 0 when p0 aborts immediately
8
>
< µ : guess ((Hk (xb , x1 , ) 2 ID )) = b0 , xb = xb0
⇡
0
0
⇡,D 0
p
k
• µ0 (H⇡,0
(xb0 , x1 , )) 7!
>
: µ+
: otherwise
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where we write guess : H ! Ti to denote a function mapping a player’s history to
other players’ types.
Initially ⇡ is run, then D is given as input the local state of ⇡ w.r.t. pi and two
auxiliary values (x00 , x10 ). D outputs a guess b0 2 {0, 1}, where D succeeds whenever
0

xb0 = xb0 .
For all rational players with utility functions µ 2 µp , we have that µ(
µ(

abort

continue

)>

) iﬀ :

k
P r[guess⇡ ((H⇡,D
(xb0 , x1 , ) 2 ID )) = 1] =

1
+ ✏( )
2

(6.11)

That is, a rational party with a utility function preferring privacy (µ 2 µp ) only
continues participating in the protocol (i.e., by selecting a strategy in

continue

) if for

all C -bounded adversaries, the probability of success is at most negligibly greater
than 12 . We let

deviate

imply that

k
P r[guess⇡ ((H⇡,D
(xb0 , x1 , ) 2 ID )) = 1] >

That is, by playing

deviate

1
+ ✏( )
2

(6.12)

the adversary has an advantage at breaking the privacy

of the protocol with probability non-negligibly greater than 12 . Any other strategy
62

deviate

will not aﬀect privacy under this assumption, although it may aﬀect

correctness or fairness. We restrict our attention to privacy at the moment.
Definition 6.6.4 Let f and ⇡ be as above. Then, ⇡ is C -Game-Theoretic Private
for party pi if µi (

honest
,
0

honest
)
1

is a C -PBE with respect to µpi,i2{0,1} ,

i,i2{0,1}

and all

C -bounded distinguishers D.
Our next theorem proves how to define a protocol ⇡ such that ⇡ will satisfy
Definition 6.6.4:
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Theorem 6.6.1 Let f be a deterministic two-party function, and let ⇡ be a two-party
protocol that computes f correctly. Then, ⇡ is C -Game-Theoretic Private w.r.t.
p0 (resp. p1 ) iﬀ ⇡ has indistinguishable initial information sets in the presence of
C -bounded adversaries.
Proof [Theorem 6.6.1] We first demonstrate that if ⇡ is C -Game-Theoretic Private
w.r.t. p0 , then ⇡ has indistinguishable initial information sets w.r.t. p0 in the presence
of C -bounded adversaries.
If ⇡ is C -Game-Theoretic Private w.r.t. p0 , then by definition we have that:

µ0 (

honest
| 0 , H0 )
0

+ ✏( )

µ0 ( 00 ,

¬honest
| 0 , H0 )
0

(6.13)

That is, if ⇡ is C -Game-Theoretic Private, then players receive more utility by playing
strategy

honest

than any other strategy

¬honest

={

U

/

honest

}. Assume by contradic-

tion that ⇡ does not have indistinguishable initial information sets w.r.t. p0 . Without
loss of generality, we assume A corrupts p1 . Then a C -bounded adversary A is able
to choose a strategy in the set

deviate
,
1

where A invokes a C -bounded distinguisher D

which succeeds in diﬀerentiating p0 ’s information set with probability
k
P r[guess⇡ ((H⇡,D
(xb0 , x1 , ) 2 ID )) = 1] >

1
+ ✏( )
2

(6.14)

as given by Equation 6.12, which is a non-negligible advantage. Thus, we have that:

µ0 (

honest
,
0

deviate
)
1

k
= P r[guess⇡ ((H⇡,D
(xb0 , x1 , ) 2 ID )) = 1] · µ

(6.15)

k
+ P r[guess⇡ ((H⇡,D
(xb0 , x1 , ) 2 ID )) = 0] · µ+

(6.16)

< µ0 < µ0 (

(6.17)

abort
,
0

deviate
)
1

= µ0
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thus contradicting the assumption that

honest
0

is a C -PBE w.r.t. p0 , and that ⇡

is C -Game-Theoretic Private by Definition 6.6.4, as
than

honest

yields more utility for p0

abort

.

Next, we show that if ⇡ has indistinguishable initial information sets w.r.t. p0 ,
then ⇡ is C -Game-Theoretic Private. By definition, if ⇡ has indistinguishable initial
information sets w.r.t. p0 , then there does not exist a strategy in the set

deviate
A

such

that, for any C -bounded distinguisher D invoked by A
k
P r[guess⇡ ((H⇡,D
(xb0 , x1 , ) 2 ID )) = 1] >

Assume by contradiction that

honest
0

1
+ ✏( )
2

(6.18)

is not a C -PBE w.r.t. p0 . Then, we must have

that:
µ0 (

abort
,
0

¬deviate
)
1

> µ0 (

honest
,
0

Clearly we have that A’s strategies are limited to

(6.19)

¬deviate
)
1

¬deviate
1

={

honest
,
1

abort
},
1

as by

assumption ⇡ has indistinguishable initial information sets w.r.t. p0 , so no strategy in
the set

deviate
1

exists by Equation 6.12. Consider first the strategy pair (

µ0 (
Thus,

honest
0

abort
,
0

µ0 (
honest
0

abort
)
1

= µ0 = µ0 (

honest
,
0

abort
)
1

abort
):
1

(6.20)

is a C -PBE w.r.t. p0 , contradicting the assumption. Similarly, consider

the strategy pair (

Thus,

abort
,
0

abort
,
0

honest
):
1

abort
,
0

honest
)
1

= µ0 < µ0 (

honest
,
0

honest
)
1

= µ+

is a C -PBE w.r.t. p0 , contradicting the assumption.

(6.21)
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6.6.2 Correctness
Asharov et al.’s [15] notion of correctness is similar to their notion of privacy:
party pi prefers to learn the correct output of the function f to learning an incorrect
output. We modify their definition with respect to the utility gained from aborting
?
before the protocol starts. Rather than specify this utility as µci (H⇡,i
) = µ+ , we say
?
that a party that does not participate in the protocol receives µci (H⇡,i
) = µ0 , so that

parties prefer to participate in the protocol. As defined in the original work, players
receive the same utility for not participating as they do for receiving the correct
output of the function. As we assume computation is costly, it seems more natural
to assign greater utility to receiving the correct output of the function.
As previously specified when considering privacy, we consider the set of infinitely
many input tuples (x0 , x01 , x11 , ) where we have that |x0 | = |x01 | = |x11 | = , and party
p0 ’s input is fixed at x0 while p1 ’s input is in the set {x01 , x11 }.
Definition 6.6.5 Let f be a deterministic two-party function, and let ⇡ be a twoparty protocol that computes f correctly. Then, for every x0 , x1 as above the utility
function for correctness for party pi , denoted µci , is defined as:
?
• µci (H⇡,i
) = µ0

8
>
< µ+ : output = f (x0 , x1 )
⇡,i
c
• µi (output⇡,i , x0 , x1 ) 7!
>
: µ
: otherwise
We consider

honest

to represent the strategy that follows the protocol specification

of ⇡, which by definition computes f correctly. Similarly, any other strategy
{

deviate

,

abort

} is assumed to compute f incorrectly. That is, we limit

deviate

2

to those

strategies that yield an incorrect output. Other strategies certainly exist in

deviate

that will not alter the result, but these are handled when privacy and fairness are
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required. To satisfy the correctness condition, we need only consider those strategies
in

deviate

that yield incorrect outputs of f .

Definition 6.6.6 Let f and ⇡ be as above. Then, ⇡ is C -Game-Theoretic Correct
for party pi if µci (

honest
,
0

honest
)
1

is a C -PBE with respect to µci,i2{0,1} ,

i,i2{0,1}

and all

C -bounded adversaries A.
We now prove a theorem defining how protocol ⇡ may satisfy Definition 6.6.6:
Theorem 6.6.2 Let f be a deterministic two-party function, and let ⇡ be a two-party
protocol that computes f correctly. Then, ⇡ is C -Game-Theoretic Correct w.r.t.
p0 (resp. p1 ) if

8 0,

deviate
1

2 I0 (Hk ) =) I0 (Hk ) = {

That is, all information sets containing strategy

deviate
}
1

deviate
1

(6.22)

are singleton nodes, dis-

tinguishable by any distinguisher D of bounded complexity C .
Proof [Theorem 6.6.2] We demonstrate that if ⇡ is C -Game-Theoretic Correct w.r.t.
p0 , then 8 0 ,

deviate
1

2 I0 (Hk ) =) I0 (Hk ) = {

deviate
}.
1

Intuitively, this means that

if ⇡ satisfies Definition 6.6.6, then p0 must be able to diﬀerentiate p1 selecting
rather than

¬deviate

deviate

.

If ⇡ is C -Game-Theoretic Correct w.r.t. p0 , then by definition we have that:
µc0 (

honest
| 0 , H0 )
0

+ ✏( )

µc0 ( 00 ,

¬honest
| 0 , H0 )
0

(6.23)
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That is, if ⇡ is C -Game-Theoretic Correct, then players receive greater utility by
playing strategy

honest

than any other strategy

¬honest

={

U

/

honest

}. Assume by

contradiction that

8 0,

deviate
1

2 I0 (Hk ) 6) I0 (Hk ) = {

: 9I0 (Hk ) = {
That is,

deviate
1

abort
,
1

honest
,
1

deviate
}
1

(6.24)

deviate
}
1

(6.25)

exists in non-singleton information sets for p0 . Thus, for some previous

history H0j , j < k, we have that p0 cannot distinguish between Hj = {
Hj = {

honest
},
1

where we do not consider Hj = {

abort
}
1

deviate
}
1

and

as p1 would output ?, and

p0 would know with probability 1 that this strategy was used. Recall that risk-averse
participants assume
µc0 (

deviate

honest
,
0

when information sets are non-singletons. We have that
deviate
)
1

= µ < µc0 (

which contradicts the assumption that

honest
0

abort
,
0

deviate
)
1

= µ0

(6.26)

is a C -PBE, as aborting yields more

utility than engaging in the protocol, and that ⇡ is C -Game-Theoretic Correct w.r.t.
p0 by Definition 6.6.6.

6.6.3 Fairness
In Asharov et al.’s [15] original definitions for fairness, players are implicitly assumed to abide by the exclusivity property: a player prefers to be the only party to
learn the output over a fair distribution of the function result. We argue that this
assumption does not always hold.
Any framework constructed under the assumption of exclusivity is limited to the
set of non-cooperatively computable (NCC) [77] functions. Let f (·, ·) be a two-party
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function, with party pi holding input xi , i 2 {0, 1}. If party pi provides an alternate
input x0i 6= xi to f , a fair protocol outputs f (x0i , x1 i ) to all parties. However, if pi can
compute g(f (x0i , x1 i ), xi ) = f (xi , x1 i ), then pi has no rational incentive to provide
their true input xi as pi alone can now deduce the correct output of the function
f (xi , x1 i ) from the output f (x0i , x1 i ). Thus, any framework requiring the exclusivity
requirement is limited to functions for which the correct output cannot be produced
given knowledge of the function and its output on a diﬀerent input.
As an example, consider auction scenarios. Clearly, any adversary requires that
all parties learn the output of the protocol even if it is not the correct output, as the
result induces others to perform the actual goal of the protocol: distributing goods
or services to the winner. If an adversary was the only party to receive the output,
no distribution occurs and the eﬀort was pointless.
We modify Asharov et al.’s [15] original utility function for fairness to reflect the
fact that the exclusivity assumption does not always hold. Let E denote the set of
players whose utility functions for fairness µf value exclusivity:
Definition 6.6.7 Let ⇡ be a two-party protocol and f be a two-party function. Then,
for every x0 , x1 as above the utility function for fairness for party pi , denoted µfi ,
is defined as:

µf0 ( 0 ,

1)

7!

We consider

8
>
>
µ+ : output⇡,0 = f (x0 , x1 ) ^ output⇡,1 =
6 f (x0 , x1 ) ^ p0 2 E
>
>
>
>
>
>
µ+ : output⇡,0 = f (x0 , x1 ) ^ output⇡,1 = f (x0 , x1 ) ^ p0 62 E
>
>
<
µ
>
>
>
>
>
µ
>
>
>
>
>
: µ0

honest

: output⇡,0 = f (x0 , x1 ) ^ output⇡,1 6= f (x0 , x1 ) ^ p0 62 E
: output⇡,0 6= f (x0 , x1 ) ^ output⇡,1 = f (x0 , x1 )
: otherwise

to represent the strategy that follows the protocol specification

of ⇡. Similarly, fairness is only compromised when a party selects
deprives other players of information necessary to compute the output.

abort

, which
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Definition 6.6.8 Let f and ⇡ be as above. Then, ⇡ is C -Game-Theoretic Fair
for party pi if µfi (

honest
,
0

honest
)
1

is a C -PBE with respect to µfi,i2{0,1} ,

i,i2{0,1}

and all

C -bounded adversaries A.
We now prove a theorem defining how protocol ⇡ may satisfy Definition 6.6.8:
Theorem 6.6.3 Let f be a deterministic two-party function, and let ⇡ be a two-party
protocol that computes f correctly. Then, ⇡ is C -Game-Theoretic Fair w.r.t. p0
(resp. p1 ) iﬀ 8Hk

|P r[output⇡,0 (Hk ) = f (x0 , x1 )]

P r[output⇡,1 (Hk ) = f (x0 , x1 )]|  ✏( )

That is, at any round k, the strategy

abort

(6.27)

yields a player at most a negligible

advantage over other players at determining the correct function output f (x0 , x1 ).
Proof [Theorem 6.6.3] We first demonstrate that if ⇡ is C -Game-Theoretic Fair
w.r.t. p0 , then p1 has a negligible advantage over p0 at determining the correct
function output f (x0 , x1 ) when playing strategy

abort
.
1

If ⇡ is C -Game-Theoretic Fair w.r.t. p0 , then by definition we have that:

µ0 (

honest
| 0 , H0 )
0

+ ✏( )

µ0 ( 00 ,

abort
| 0 , H0 )
0

(6.28)

That is, if ⇡ is C -Game-Theoretic Fair, then players receive more utility by playing
strategy

honest

than aborting and attempting to recover f (x0 , x1 ) on their own. As-

sume by contradiction that p1 has a non-negligible advantage over p0 at determining
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the correct function output f (x0 , x1 ) when playing strategy

abort
.
1

Without loss of

generality, we assume A corrupts p1 . Then we have that
P r[output⇡,1 (Hk ) = f (x0 , x1 )] >

1
+ ✏( )
2

(6.29)

which is a non-negligible advantage. Thus, we have that:

µ0 (

honest
,
0

abort
)
1

= P r[output⇡,1 (Hk ) = f (x0 , x1 )] · µ

(6.30)

+ P r[output⇡,0 (Hk ) = f (x0 , x1 )] · µ+

(6.31)

< µ0 < µ0 (

(6.32)

thus contradicting the assumption that

abort
,
0

honest
0

is C -Game-Theoretic Fair by Definition 6.6.8, as
honest

abort
)
1

= µ0

is a C -PBE w.r.t. p0 , and that ⇡
abort

yields more utility for p0 than

.

Next, we show that if p1 has at most a negligible advantage over p0 at determining
the correct function output f (x0 , x1 ) when playing strategy

abort
,
1

then ⇡ is C -Game-

Theoretic Fair. By definition, we have that
|P r[output⇡,0 (Hk ) = f (x0 , x1 )]
Assume by contradiction that

P r[output⇡,1 (Hk ) = f (x0 , x1 )]|  ✏( )

honest
0

(6.33)

is not a C -PBE w.r.t. p0 . Then, we must have

that:
µ0 (

abort
,
0

Consider first the strategy pair (

µ0 (

abort
,
0

abort
)
1
abort
,
0

abort
)
1

> µ0 (

honest
,
0

abort
)
1

(6.34)

abort
):
1

= µ0 = µ0 (

honest
,
0

abort
)
1

(6.35)
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Thus,

honest
0

is a C -PBE w.r.t. p0 , contradicting the assumption. Similarly, consider

the strategy pair (

abort
,
0

µ0 (
Thus,

honest
0

honest
):
1

abort
,
0

honest
)
1

= µ0 < µ0 (

honest
,
0

honest
)
1

= µ+

(6.36)

is a C -PBE w.r.t. p0 , contradicting the assumption.

6.7 Conclusion
We have presented an expressive two-party framework for reasoning about the security of cryptographic protocols in game theoretic terms, where all players are only
assumed to be rational. We have demonstrated the ability of the perfect Bayesian
equilibrium concept to model the inherent uncertainty and auxiliary information in
cryptographic protocols, and translated this into the computational domain. Finally,
we have provided novel definitions of privacy, correctness, and fairness in game theoretic terms, and demonstrated the conditions under which they hold.
We expand this two-party framework to the multiparty setting in Chapter 7. Using
the multiparty model, we apply our framework to a series of classic games from the
game theoretic literature. Additionally, we apply our framework to rational secret
sharing, the most commonly examined rational cryptographic protocol.
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7 REALIZING RATIONAL MULTIPARTY PROTOCOLS
We continue by building on the two-party rational framework of Chapter 6, and extend
these results into the multiparty setting. A core diﬃculty when considering more than
two players is the issue of collusion: players forming a coalition to undermine the ideal
goal of the protocol. Collusion is enabled through a player’s ability to communicate
with others, both within and outside of the protocol. Thus, existing frameworks all
impose restrictions on the communication interface in order to prevent players from
colluding, and to preserve equilibria between game descriptions and realized protocols.
In this work, we approach the issue of collusion from the opposite direction, asking if
a meaningful notion of rational security can be achieved when players have access to
point-to-point communication channels. We will demonstrate how to realize rational
cryptographic protocols in practice from abstract game specifications. We argue that
for real world protocols, it must be assumed that players have access to point-topoint communication channels. Thus, allowing signaling and strategy correlation
becomes unavoidable. We argue that ideal world game descriptions of realizable
protocols should include such communication resources as well, in order to facilitate
the design of protocols in the real world. Our results specify a modified ideal and real
world model that account for the presence of point-to-point communication channels
between players, where security is achieved through the simulation paradigm.

7.1 Introduction
The field of rational cryptography departs from modeling players as either honest
or malicious, and instead models all players as rational utility-maximizing agents:
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each player chooses those actions that maximize their utility function µ(·), which
expresses their preferences over outcomes. All players may arbitrarily depart from
the protocol specification if doing so is a utility-maximizing strategy. This approach
to modeling removes the strong assumption of the semi-honest model: that honest
players follow the protocol specification, regardless of whether or not it is in their
best interest. By considering all players as rational agents, the standard properties of
cryptographic protocols (e.g., privacy, correctness and fairness) are modeled through
the utility functions of the players. Security of the protocol is then deduced from
whether or not the stable equilibrium of the original game specification is reachable
given the players’ utility functions.
In secure multiparty computation (SMPC), the security of protocols are demonstrated through the simulation paradigm. Define an ideal protocol for computing
a functionality f that invokes an incorruptible and universally trusted third party
(TTP). Similarly, define a real protocol ⇡ for computing f where no TTP exists.
Security is established if an adversary A in the real model has no advantage over a
simulator S in the ideal model [4].
A major obstacle when defining security for rational multiparty protocols is the
potential for players to form coalitions, colluding to undermine the security of the
protocol. The strongest result, by Izmalkov et al. [64], allows any function to be computed securely by rational players using the approach of Goldreich et al. [4]. Although
a universal result, it relies on strong assumptions including forced actions and physical primitives. A weaker notion, referred to as collusion-free computation [84–86],
removes the ability of players to communicate additional information subliminally
through the protocol communication resources. The result relies on a trusted mediator at the center of a star network topology, where all messages pass through
the mediator and are re-randomized in order to prevent steganographic communi-
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cation between the players. This result relies on adversarial independence, where
simulators and adversaries are disallowed communication in the protocol. However,
a collusion-free protocol may still cause issues when executed as part of a larger protocol. For example, the collusion-free protocols of Izmalkov et al. [64, 86] provide
no guarantees when all players are malicious. This observation led to the work of
Alwen et al. [87], where communication restrictions are further weakened to achieve
collusion-preserving computation, which preserves any potential for collusion present
in the original game specification. Although this result removes the requirement of a
trusted mediator, it rules out a large class of communication resources (e.g., point-topoint and broadcast channels). Kamara et al. [88] consider a setting where adversaries
have the capability to communicate additional information during protocol execution,
yet choose to be non-colluding. Fuchsbauer et al. [22] give constructions under standard communication channels by forcing parties to send only unique messages as part
of the protocol. Thus, collusion within the protocol is avoided, but communication
outside of the protocol execution still facilitates collusion.
From this collection of work, addressing the issue of collusion appears to require
strong limitations on the type of communication resources granted to players. As the
general goal of rational cryptography is to provide a more realistic view of how players
behave in cryptographic protocols, we consider what can be achieved when players
have access to point-to-point communication channels - an unavoidable aspect in real
world applications. Thus, in this work we define a security model where players may
communicate information over point-to-point channels both inside and outside the
protocol execution.
Our work proposes a new security framework for rational agents that models player
access to point-to-point communication channels in the ideal world model. From this,
we describe how to demonstrate the security of protocols in a real world model that
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implements games specified in our modified ideal world model. We note that imposing
restrictions on the ideal world to capture unavoidable behavior exists currently in the
cryptographic literature: it is a core feature of the malicious model, which extends the
semi-honest model to consider more powerful adversaries. In the malicious setting,
the ideal world must capture the ability of an adversary to coordinate the actions
and inputs of players it corrupts, and force aborts during protocol execution; these
actions are unavoidable in the presence of a monolithic malicious adversary. Our
model necessarily limits the class of games that may be modeled in the ideal world
formulation of our framework, as point-to-point communication channels must exist
in the original game. Our work diﬀers from existing formulations, which attempt to
realize all games at the expense of restricting the communication interface available
to players.
Throughout the remainder of the introduction, we argue that when point-to-point
communication channels are unavoidable, it is meaningful to consider what games
are realizable in their presence. We demonstrate that a non-trivial class of games
constructed in our modified ideal world model have realizable implementations in
the real world model through the Signaling game in Subsection 7.1.2, and the classic
prisoner’s dilemma in Section 7.2. Our technical contribution, a security model for
realizing protocols from game specifications in the presence of point-to-point communication channels, is given in Section 7.3. The power of our model relative to
others is first demonstrated on the Prisoners’ Dilemma in Section 7.4. Finally, a full
proof of security for the rational secret sharing protocol of Halpern and Teague [23]
is given in Section 7.5, which is inadmissible under existing frameworks due to the
presence of point-to-point communication channels. These examples demonstrate the
key contribution of our model, which is less restrictive than prior work yet is able to
correctly model the games’ equilibria when played in the real world.
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7.1.1 Local Adversaries
Translating the standard simulation paradigm to the game theoretic setting of
rational cryptography requires addressing how adversaries should be modeled. In
the original formulation, a centralized semi-honest or malicious adversary corrupts
a subset of the players. However, rational cryptography makes no such distinction1
between honest and corrupted players, and assumes all players are rational and acting
to maximize their local utility function. Thus, translating the concept of an adversary
is not immediate. Alwen et al. [87] give a collusion preserving framework where
each player has an associated local adversary. Thus, the monolithic adversary of the
standard model is shattered into an adversary for each individual player. Canetti
et al. [63] argue that a local adversary should be defined for each ordered pair of
players, as this provides a more granular model of the flow of information. Canetti et
al. then demonstrate that the local universal composition (LUC) model can preserve
the incentive structure in games.
We follow this modeling trend of shattering the monolithic adversary A into a
set of local adversaries A = {Ai }i2[1...n] such that each player Pi 2 P is associated
with adversary Ai . Rather than considering local adversaries that "corrupt" their
associated player Pi , we simply require that the adversary selects the actions of Pi to
maximize their local utility function µi . Thus, we preserve the assumption in rational
cryptographic protocols that all players are purely rational and bound to a utility
function, rather than remaining honest unless corrupted by a monolithic adversary.
1

A mixed model has been proposed by Lysyanskaya et al. [65] where one subset of players are
arbitrarily malicious, and the other subset are utility-maximizing rational agents.
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7.1.2 Communication Resources
A core issue with existing work is how communication resources are modeled in
game descriptions. In order to prevent players from signaling information or coordinating their actions, available communication resources are tightly restricted. For
example, Izmalkov et al. [64] propose rational secure computation where only those
equilibria in the game description exist in the realized protocol. However, this result
comes at the cost of requiring forced actions and physical primitives such as opaque
envelopes and ballot boxes2 . Although not impossible to realize, in practice it has
limited applicability.
In the ideal world model of secure multiparty computation, a protocol is viewed as
an interaction between a set of players and a universally trusted third party (TTP).
An ideal computation of a function has each player send their private input to the
TTP, who computes the function and returns the results to each player. Restricting
communication resources is not necessary, as players are assumed to be mutually
distrustful. Further, any collusion between players is modeled through a monolithic
adversary A that coordinates the actions of the players it corrupts.
In order to implement arbitrary games as protocols, strict notions of privacy
preservation and the prevention of signaling and correlation must be satisfied. Arbitrary game specifications may impose restrictions on the communication resources
available to players. Thus, the corresponding protocol implementation must not allow
players to communicate more information than is possible in the ideal game specification. We briefly review the characteristics a model for implementing arbitrary games
must satisfy3 . We make the argument that even if a protocol satisfies all of these
characteristics, it is likely to fall short of satisfying the ideal world model: communi2

This result is a direct application of the GMW protocol [4].
The ECRYPT summary report [89] on rational cryptographic protocols provides background on
modeling techniques used to address privacy, signaling, and correlated actions.
3
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cation between players outside of the protocol is unavoidable in real world settings.
Thus, the model we present is not bound to satisfy these restrictions, and is a more
accurate representation of what is achievable for protocols executed in the real world.

Privacy
A protocol ⇡ implementing an arbitrary game

must preserve both pre-game pri-

vacy and post-game privacy in addition to preserving the equilibrium of . The notion
of pre-game privacy ensures that the private input of each party is not revealed, as this
will aﬀect the actions of other parties. However, protocols implementing arbitrary
games must also preserve the notion of post-game privacy, where nothing beyond the
intended result (and what can be inferred from this) is revealed. This notion is necessary so that the equilibria of future games are not perturbed by information revealed
in previous games.

Signaling
Similar to the notions of pre- and post-game privacy are the notions of pre-game
signaling and post-game signaling. The ability to signal other players allows protocol
participants to coordinate their actions to achieve a higher payoﬀ. For example,
consider two players A and B with inputs a and b. The payoﬀ function is defined as
⇧( ) ..= a

b, and described in Table 7.1.

If A or B can signal even a single bit to the other, each will receive a payoﬀ of 1
as opposed to an expected payoﬀ of 12 . Thus, similar to the restriction on privacy,
preventing pre- and post-game signaling is necessary to preserve the equilibria of
individual and future games when constructing protocols for arbitrary games.
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Table 7.1: Signaling Game
A sets a = 1 A sets a = 0
B sets b = 1
B sets b = 0

(0,0)
(1,1)

(1,1)
(0,0)

The signaling game specification can be formulated under existing frameworks
as a protocol, and demonstrated to preserve the mixed equilibrium of the original
game. Yet by ignoring the ability of players to communicate outside of the protocol,
the protocol formulation is invalidated in real world settings: players will collude
to achieve a payoﬀ of 1, rather than the expected payoﬀ of

1
2

of the original game

specification.
We only consider those game specifications that allow point-to-point communication, as these channels are unavoidable in the real world. Thus, our model correctly
predicts a payoﬀ of 1 for players in the signaling game, as point-to-point communication channels allow signaling.

Correlated Actions
Correlated actions are similar to signaling, but allow parties to coordinate actions without exchanging information. This is usually accomplished through a shared
value, such as a common reference string (CRS). The parties need not distribute information, but rather rely on the shared CRS to coordinate their actions. As with
signaling, protocol constructions for arbitrary games must prevent pre- and post-game
correlation to preserve equilibria in local as well as future games.
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Table 7.2: Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
A Remains Silent A Confesses
B Remains Silent
B Confesses

(-1,-1)
(-3,0)

(0,-3)
(-2,-2)

7.2 Prisoner’s Dilemma
As a classic example, we consider the Prisoner’s Dilemma4 : a game between two
suspects A and B that have been accused of committing both a principal and lesser
crime. The Authority has suﬃcient evidence to convict both A and B on the lesser
crime, punishable by 1 year in prison. However, there is insuﬃcient evidence to
convict A or B on the principal crime. The Authority separates A and B, and oﬀers
the following proposal: confess and serve no time while your partner serves 3 years
in prison. Players A and B are then subject to the following dilemma:
1. If both A and B remain silent, they will each be convicted on the lesser crime
and serve 1 year in prison.
2. If one confesses while the other remains silent, the confessor is set free while the
other serves 3 years in prison.
3. If both A and B confess, each will serve 2 years in prison.
From the player payoﬀs listed in Table 7.2, note that each player maximizes their
utility by confessing to the principal crime regardless of the strategy of their partner.
We use this example to illustrate the necessity of removing monolithic adversaries,
as well as how communication assumptions should be formulated in the ideal game
4

The concept was originally proposed by Flood and Dresher while working at the RAND corporation,
and is described in detail by Poundstone [90].
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description. Note that the original ideal game specification of the prisoner’s dilemma
requires that the suspects A and B are physically separated: thus unable to communicate or otherwise coordinate their actions. However, we will construct a modified
formulation in the presence of point-to-point communication channels with an equivalent equilibrium to the original formulation under our proposed model.

7.2.1 Monolithic Adversaries
Traditionally, cryptographic protocols are analyzed with respect to their resilience
to a monolithic adversary A corrupting some subset of the players. Protocol resilience
to adversarial corruption is quantified by the fraction of players that may be corrupted
before the protocol security is violated.
In the game theoretic setting of rational cryptography, this model has been called
into question by Alwen et al. [87] and Canetti et al. [63]. The goal of rational cryptography is to model each player as bound to their local utility function, rather than
controlled by a monolithic adversary with a global utility function. The monolithic
adversary in both of their models is shattered into a set of local adversaries unique to
each player. Removing the monolithic adversary in favor of a set of local adversaries
is critical to preserving game theoretic equilibria. In the running example of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma, consider the case where A corrupts both A and B. As A controls
both players, A and B may be forced to remain silent and achieve payoﬀ ( 1, 1).
However, consider the case where A (resp. B) has a local adversary AA (resp. AB ):
as AA is bound to the utility function µA (·) of A, AA maximizes µA (·) by confessing
as in the ideal specification of the game. An identical argument holds for AB as well.
Thus, a monolithic adversary is capable of introducing a stable collusion equilibrium
that does not exist in the ideal game specification, whereas the local adversary model
preserves the original incentive structure.
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7.2.2 Realistic Communication Model
To prevent pre- and post-game signaling and strategy correlation, many rational
cryptographic frameworks impose strong restrictions on the communication resources
available to players. This issue is most pronounced in the multiparty setting, where
communication resources may enable collusion. To prevent communication resources
from perturbing the equilibria of the ideal world game, existing constructions require forced player action and physical primitives [64], trusted mediators and forced
broadcast channels [85], as well as the cooperation of adversarial players to deliver
messages [87].
While these results provide strong guarantees under restrictive communication
resource assumptions, the security guarantees are with respect to the protocol only.
That is, assuming players may only interact through the protocol and its communication resources, the equilibria of the ideal world game is preserved. However, we
argue that this results in a false sense of security for protocols realized in the real
world, where players typically have access to point-to-point communication channels
- undermining the strict communication assumptions of the protocol.
Our example of the prisoner’s dilemma illustrates a salient point: the necessary
and suﬃcient condition for preserving the equilibrium of the original formulation is
the ability of A and B to privately communicate with the Authority. The original game specification requires the two players A and B to be physically separated,
and thus unable to communicate. However, the key to preserving the equilibrium
(confess, confess) of the original game

only requires preventing A and B from ob-

serving their interaction with the Authority. Consider a modified game ¯ where
all players {A, B, Authority} 2 P have access to a point-to-point communication resource R. As long as the communication links RA,Authority , RB,Authority are private,
the original equilibrium is preserved despite the presence of point-to-point communi-
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cation channels. In game theoretic terms, communication between A and B through
RA,B is considered cheap talk, as both A and B will claim to play silent, yet as utility
maximizing agents they choose to confess, which strictly dominates silent. As neither A nor B can observe the message sent by the other to Authority, the coalition
is unstable and disintegrates despite the presence of point-to-point communication
channels.

7.3 Our Contribution
We argue that ideal world protocols should assume that players have the ability
to communicate over point-to-point channels. As in the standard SMPC ideal world
model, players may not wish to communicate due to mutual distrust. However,
the option to do so should be part of the model, as this is unavoidable in the real
world. Thus, we present a modified ideal world model capturing the presence of
point-to-point communication channels between all players. Specifically, we answer
the following questions:
1. How is security formalized when all players are rational and have access to
point-to-point communication channels?
2. What benefits result from weakening the security guarantees of the standard
malicious model by considering rational players with local adversaries?

7.3.1 Unstable Coalitions
A powerful aspect of the rational cryptographic setting with local adversaries is
the ability to design protocols where coalitions are unstable. As each player has a local
adversary that selects their actions in order to maximize a utility function, protocols
may be designed to incentivize players to leave coalitions [91]. This benefit of modeling
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each player as an independently rational agent is frequently overlooked, and allows
game equilibria to be preserved despite the presence of point-to-point communication
channels. We have illustrated the power of unstable coalitions through our example of
the prisoner’s dilemma. We now consider coalition stability in the setting of rational
secret sharing, as it is the most familiar example of a rational cryptographic protocol.

Rational Secret Sharing
Candidate definitions for achieving security against rational agents should accurately model well-studied problems in rational cryptography. The most familiar
rational cryptographic protocol is rational secret sharing [22, 24, 25, 32, 35, 81]. The
goal of threshold secret sharing is to split a secret among n parties such that any k
shares are suﬃcient to recover the secret value, using a scheme such as the polynomial
interpolation approach proposed by Shamir [82]. Rational secret sharing, introduced
by Halpern and Teague [23], is particularly concerned with the process of recovering
the secret from the shares5 . As noted by Halpern et al. [23], rational players’ utility
functions are assumed to value exclusivity, where preference is given to learning the
output of the function while preventing other players from doing so. Under this assumption, no party has any incentive to distribute their share to the other parties,
which destabilizes coalition formation. The equilibrium is to wait for other players
to distribute their shares, as this is the only action that increases a player’s utility
function. Thus, a player that does not distribute their share has the potential to be
the exclusive player to recover the secret.
The authors demonstrate that this implies no deterministic protocol exists where
rational parties are willing to disseminate their shares to other players. Their ran5

Maleka et al. [92] consider rational secret sharing in the context of repeated games, and Nojoumian
et al. [78] consider the repeated game setting from a socio-rational perspective where player reputation is important.
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domized protocol is a modified game where players are distributed a set of shares,
where only one share is correct. In each round k, players distribute their shares which
evaluate to either the secret or a default value ?. The solution relies on the fact that
parties are unaware whether the current round k is terminal (k ⇤ , allowing the secret to
be recovered), or merely a “test” round k 6= k ⇤ (where the secret cannot be recovered,
but players who do not distribute shares are caught as cheaters). By choosing k ⇤ from
a geometric distribution, as in Groce et al. [32], cheating players that choose strategy
=? when k 6= k ⇤ are caught and the game may be terminated. Thus, players now
have an incentive to distribute their share, as playing ? only yields positive utility
when k = k ⇤ .
A candidate security definition should accept this probabilistic protocol for rational secret sharing as secure against rational agents. However, the strong restrictions
on communication channels imposed by existing work preclude the above protocol
from satisfying their security definitions, despite refinements considering the problem
under standard communication models [17, 19, 22, 26]. That is, the rational secret
sharing protocol of Halpern and Teague [23] assumes players have access to a nonrushing broadcast channel. This clearly violates the assumptions of models assuming
physical primitives [64], and even fails to satisfy the weakest security definition that
has been proposed: collusion-preserving computation [87]. Ideally, the original rational secret sharing protocol of Halpern and Teague should be demonstrably secure
against rational agents under a general security framework. Our framework allows
point-to-point communication in the ideal model, and thus is able to accurately model
the original solution to rational secret sharing, which we demonstrate in Section 7.5.
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7.3.2 Adversarial Model
Traditionally, an adversary A is viewed as a monolithic entity with a specified
computational complexity and ability to "corrupt" players in a static or dynamic
fashion. In our model, we consider all players to have the ability to act in an adversarial manner. Thus, rather than considering a monolithic adversary A, we endow
each player P 2 P with a local adversary AP . The adversary is bound to the player’s
utility function µP (·) and selects actions for P in order to maximize µP (·). Note that
as we bind player actions to a local adversary seeking to maximize a utility function,
we cannot bound the number of players that deviate from the protocol. This is an
unavoidable consequence of modeling players as rational agents; they select strategies
to maximize a local utility function and follow the protocol only when doing so is
advantageous. As cryptographic protocols typically require a number of rounds of
interaction, we allow the rational players to update their strategy based on observations throughout the game . Thus, we assume each local adversary is mobile [93],
and may choose to deviate or follow the protocol at each round in a dynamic fashion. Additionally, players may choose probabilistic strategies6 , so we must introduce
a random tape rP for each player P. Thus, each local adversary is adaptive, mobile,
probabilistic, malicious, runs in probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) and is presumed
rational: bound to the player’s local utility function.
Given the above definition of adversaries, the following actions are unavoidable:
• Refusal to Participate: Players may refuse to participate in the protocol.
• Input Substitution: Players may supply an input to the protocol diﬀerent
from their true input.

6

• Premature Abort: Players may abort the protocol prior to completion.
In a game theoretic setting, such strategies are referred to as mixed.
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• Collusion: Players may privately communicate over point-to-point communication channels, and collude to influence the protocol execution.
Constructions satisfying our definition thus assume that it is advantageous for
players to engage in the protocol, and that this constitutes a utility maximization
strategy with respect to their local utility function.

7.3.3 Ideal World Model
We now formalize the ideal world model, under which an ideal game specification
is constructed. We assume familiarity with standard game theoretic concepts in our
exposition7 . We first define the game specification of

under the extensive form game

representation. In the game theoretic literature, normal form game representation
is generally used for single round games where actions are played simultaneously.
As cryptographic protocols typically proceed in a series of rounds where actions are
played asynchronously, we prefer extensive form game representation, where the ideal
game specification

is represented as a tree. At each node in the game tree, a subset

P ✓ P of the players select and simultaneously play an action.
Definition 7.3.1 An extensive form game

consists of:

1. A finite set P = {Pi }ni=1 of players.
2. A (finite) set of sequences H called the history. The empty sequence ; is a
member of H. We let k denote the current decision node. If (ak )k=1,...,K 2 H
and L < K then (ak )k=1,...,L 2 H. If an infinite sequence (ak )1
k=1 satisfies
(ak )k=1,...,L 2 H for every positive integer L then (ak )1
k=1 2 H. A history
7

For a proper introduction to the subject, Katz [12] describes the current eﬀort to combine game
theoretic and cryptographic concepts, while Osborne et al. [13] and Fudenberg et al. [40] give a
complete introduction to game theory.
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(ak )k=1,...,K 2 H is a terminal history if it is infinite or if there is no aK+1
such that (ak )k=1,...,K+1 2 H. The set of actions available after the nonterminal
history h is denoted A(h) = {a : (h, a) 2 H} and the set of terminal histories
is denoted Z. We let Hk denote the history through round k.
3. A player function P that assigns to each nonterminal history (each member of
H/Z) a member of P [ {nature}. When P (h) = nature, then nature determines
the action taken after history h.
4. For each player Pi 2 P a partition Ii of {h 2 H : P (h) = i} with the property
that A(h) = A(h0 ) whenever h and h0 are in the same member of the partition.
For Ii 2 Ii we denote by A(Ii ) the set A(h) and by P (Ii ) the player P (h) for any
h 2 Ii . Thus, Ii is the information partition of player i, while the set Ii 2 Ii is
an information set of player i.
5. For each player Pi 2 P a preference relation -i on lotteries8 over Z that can
be represented as the expected value of a payoﬀ function defined on Z.
Throughout, we replace the preference relation -i by a utility function µi : A ! R,
such that µi (a)

µi (b) when b -i a.

We make the following modeling choices:
• Extensive Form Games: The ideal game specification

is described by a

game tree in extensive form representation.
• Imperfect Information: A game specification is said to have imperfect information if players may have non-singleton information sets Ii 2 Ii . That is,
at a given round in the game, players may be unaware of the move selected by
8

Even if all actions are deterministic, moves by nature can induce a probability distribution over
the set of terminal histories.
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the previous player(s). Thus, their information set may contain more than one
node in the game tree at any given round.
• Local Simulators: Each player Pi 2 P in the ideal model has a local simulator
Si that forces P to play those actions that maximize µi (·), the utility function
of player Pi . Each simulator Si has an associated adversary Ai in the real world
execution model, denoted Si = Sim(Ai ).
• Point-to-Point Communication Resources: Each player pair (Pi , Pj )i6=j 2
P has a secure point-to-point communication resource Rij .
As we consider all players to be rational agents, we model the ideal world protocol
as a game specification

that aims to achieve an equilibrium. The ideal game spec-

ification is an interaction between a set of n players P = {Pi }ni=1 , their local utility
functions µ
~ = {µi }ni=1 and action sets Ai , which contains those actions playable by
player Pi . Frequently, a deterministic choice of an action a 2 Ai will not yield a Nash
equilibrium. Thus, we allow players to choose a strategy

i:

a probability distribution

over Ai . The standard equilibrium concept in the rational cryptographic literature is
a computational Nash equilibrium [15–19], given in Definition 3.1.3. Intuitively, no
player Pi has an incentive to deviate from strategy
Pj selects their equilibrium strategy

j.

i

given that every other player

The definition of a computational Nash equi-

libria adds a negligible term negl( ) with respect to a security parameter . This is
necessary in the computational setting, as security rests on the premise that breaking
cryptographic primitives occurs with only negligible probability. Thus, this notion
must be incorporated into the equilibrium definition. Although computational Nash
equilibria are the weakest of the equilibrium concepts described in the rational cryptographic literature, preserving only computational Nash equilibria in our framework
is suﬃcient for extensions to more powerful equilibrium concepts.
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The standard ideal world model has players interact with an incorruptible trusted
third party (TTP) that accepts player inputs, computes the ideal functionality f ,
and distributes the output to players. In the setting of rational cryptography, we will
consider a Mediator that enforces the ideal game specification.
Each player Pi 2 P receives its input xi , random coins
ri and auxiliary inputa zi . Each player has the option
of inputting a diﬀerent input x̄i 6= xi , as this is unavoidable.
The Mediator allows the subset of players P ✓ P specified at each node of the game specification to simultaneously play their actions. Note that games where only
a single player moves at each node (asynchronous play)
are fully supported, as this is modeled by setting the
subset P = {Pi }.
If the current node k is terminal (i.e., k 2 Z), then the
Mediator distributes the payoﬀs associated with k to all
players Pi 2 P.

Input Distribution:

Game Execution:

Payoﬀ Assignment:

a

An auxiliary input is provided to all players to model additional information available to them [5].

Protocol 7.3.1: Ideal World Game Execution

Definition 7.3.2 Let

represent the ideal game specification in extensive form rep-

resentation, R a point-to-point communication resource available between all pairs of
players in P, S the set of local simulators, µ
~ the set of player utility functions and
z any auxiliary information provided to a player. We denote by ~x̄ the set of inputs
for players (which may diﬀer from the set of their true inputs ~x) and by r the random coins provided to a player. We then define the ith output of an ideal world
execution for players P in the presence of local simulators S as:
n

IDEAL

(i2[1...n])
,R,P,S,~
µ,z (

, ~x̄; r)

o

2N,~
x̄,r2{0,1}⇤

, { ~⇤ , I}

(7.1)
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where ~⇤ is the equilibrium in the ideal game specification

, S = {Si }i2[1...n] is the

set of simulators such that Si = Sim(Ai ), I is the information partition set for P,
|x̄i | = |x̄j |8i 6= j and |z| = poly(|x̄i |).
This ideal world model necessarily limits the class of games that may be realized, as
any game specification that disallows point-to-point communication channels between
all parties cannot be modeled in the presence of R. However, we will demonstrate
that a broad class of games that initially appear inadmissible under our model are
realizable through minor modifications to the game specification, and which preserve
the equilibria of the original game.

7.3.4 Real World Model
We now introduce the real world model protocol ⇧ that implements the ideal
game specification . In order to translate ideal game specifications into realizable
protocols, we assume the existence of a public key infrastructure (PKI) in the real
world model. That is, we must translate the ideal world point-to-point communication
resource R into an implementation allowing point-to-point private communication
between all players Pi , Pj 2 P during the execution of ⇧. We denote the real world
PKI communication resource by C, where 8(Pi , Pj )i6=j 2 P, 9Cij 2 C.
In the real world execution, each player Pi has an associated local adversary Ai ,
rather than a simulator Si as in the ideal world game. The local adversary Ai selects
the actions of Pi to maximize the player’s local utility function µi . Similarly, in the
real world execution there is no Mediator, as the goal is to remove reliance on trusted
third parties.
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Input Distribution:

Protocol Execution:

Payoﬀ Assignment:

Each player Pi 2 P receives its input xi , random coins
ri and auxiliary input zi . Each player has the option of
inputting a diﬀerent input x̄i 6= xi , as this is unavoidable.
The execution of ⇧ proceeds in a series of rounds, where
at each round a subset of players P ✓ P specified at each
node play their actions. Each player pair (Pi , Pj )i6=j 2 P
is connected by a private authenticated point-to-point
communication channel Cij , and may exchange messages
throughout the protocol execution.
If the current node k is terminal (i.e., k 2 Z), then each
player Pi 2 P receives its associated payoﬀ.

Protocol 7.3.2: Real World Protocol Execution

Definition 7.3.3 Let ⇧ represent the real world protocol implementing ⇧, C a pointto-point authenticated and private PKI communication resource available between all
pairs of players in P, A the set of local adversaries, µ
~ the set of player utility functions
and z any auxiliary information provided to a player. We denote by ~x̄ the set of inputs
for players (which may diﬀer from the set of their true inputs ~x) and by r the random
coins provided to a player. We then define the ith output of a real world execution
for players P in the presence of local adversaries A as:
n

(i2[1...n])
REAL⇧,C,P,A,~µ,z ( , ~x̄; r)

o

2N,~
x̄,r2{0,1}⇤

, { ~⇤ , I}

(7.2)

where ~⇤ is the equilibrium in the real world protocol ⇧, I is the information partition
set for P, |x̄i | = |x̄j |8i 6= j and |z| = poly(|x̄i |).
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7.3.5 Establishing the Security of Realized Protocols
The security of protocols is established by demonstrating that the real and ideal
world distribution ensembles are computationally indistinguishable9 . This guarantees
that any attack available to an adversary A in the real model is also available to a
simulator S in the ideal model.
Definition 7.3.4 (Security against Rational Adversaries) Let

be an n-player ideal

game specification and ⇧ be an n-party real world protocol. We say that ⇧ securely
realizes

if there exists a set {Simi }i2[1...n] of PPT transformations admissible in the

ideal model such that for all PPT rational adversaries A = {Ai }i2[1...n] admissible in
the real model, for all ~x 2 ({0, 1}⇤ )n and ~z 2 ({0, 1}⇤ )n , and for all i 2 [1 . . . n],
n

IDEAL

(i2[1...n])
,R,P,S,~
µ,z (

, ~x̄; r)

o

c

2N,~
x̄,r2{0,1}⇤

⌘

n

(i2[1...n])

REAL⇧,C,P,A,~µ,z ( , ~x̄; r)

o

2N,~
x̄,r2{0,1}⇤

where S = {Si }i2[1...n] is the set of simulators such that Si = Sim(Ai ), I is the
information partition set for P and r is chosen uniformly at random.
Thus, to establish the security of a realized protocol ⇧, we must construct a
simulator Si for all players Pi 2 P such that for all probabilistic polynomial-time
distinguishers D, the distributions of S in the ideal world and A in the real world can
only be diﬀerentiated with probability negligibly greater than 12 .

7.4 Demonstrating the Model on the Prisoner’s Dilemma
To illustrate the power of our model, we return to our running example of the
prisoner’s dilemma. We demonstrate that, despite the requirement of physical sep9

That is, any probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) distinguisher D cannot distinguish between an
execution of in the ideal world model and an execution of ⇧ in the real world model with probability
non-negligibly greater than 12 .
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aration (and, consequently, lack of communication between players) in the original
game specification, we are able to construct a modified game specification that is
admissible in the ideal world model, and realizable in the real world model under our
security definition.

7.4.1 Ideal World Game Specification
The ideal world game

is an interaction between a set of players P such that

P = {A, B, Authority}, where A (resp. B) has access only to a communication resource
RA,Authority (resp. RA,Authority ). That is, A and B are physically separated and, thus,
unable to communicate. In the original game , the strategy ~⇤ = {

⇤
A

= confess,

⇤
B

=

confess} is the sole Nash equilibrium. However, consider a modified game specification
¯ where there exists a communication resource RA,B enabling A and B to communicate.
We now demonstrate that ¯ is admissible in our ideal world definition.
Let ¯ be an ideal game specification, with player set P = {A, B, Authority} and
associated set of local simulators C = {CA , CB , CAuthority } that select actions for players
to maximize their local utility functions. We define the resource set R as R =
{RA,Authority , RB,Authority , RA,B }, and players A and B have identical utility functions
defined as follows:

µi ( i ,

j)

7!

8
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
:

1 :

i

0 :
3 :
2 :

i

= silent,

i

= silent,

i

= confess,

= confess,

j

j

j

= silent

= confess
j

= silent

(7.3)

= confess

Clearly ¯ is admissible under the ideal world model, as all players have access to
a point-to-point communication resource R. The modified ideal world game ¯ of the
prisoner’s dilemma proceeds as follows:
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Input Distribution:

"Cheap Talk":

Game Execution:
Payoﬀ Assignment:

Each player Pi 2 P receives its input xi , random coins
ri and auxiliary input zi . Each player has the option
of inputting a diﬀerent input x̄i 6= xi or aborting the
protocol at any time, as this is unavoidable.
Players A and B are free to communicate over RA,B , and
each may try to convince the other that they will set
= silent. However, as RA,Authority (resp. RB,Authority )
is private, neither is able to observe the message sent
to Authority. Thus, this communication is considered
"cheap talk", in that it does not aﬀect the strategy selection of the player. The local simulator Si for each
player selects mi = confess, as this maximizes µi .
The Mediator instructs A and B to send a message m
to Authority with their decision, where the message
m 2 {silent, confess}.
After Authority has received mA and mB , Mediator distributes the payoﬀs to A and B.

Protocol 7.4.1: Ideal World Game Execution

It is not diﬃcult to see that the equilibrium in the modified ideal game specification
¯ is identical to the equilibrium in the original game specification . That is, despite
the presence of a point-to-point communication channel RA,B , we achieve the desired
equilibrium of ~⇤ = {

A

= confess,

B

= confess}.
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7.4.2 Real World Protocol Construction
Input Distribution:

"Cheap Talk":

Game Execution:

Payoﬀ Assignment:

Each player Pi 2 P receives its input xi , random coins
ri and auxiliary input zi . Each player has the option of
inputting a diﬀerent input x̄i 6= xi or aborting at any
time, as this is unavoidable. The payoﬀ for abort is
equivalent to silent, and other players may continue the
protocol execution in the presence of aborts.
Players A and B are free to communicate over CA,B , and
each may try to convince the other that they will set
= silent. However, as CA,Authority (resp. CB,Authority )
is private, neither is able to observe the message sent
to Authority. Thus, this communication is considered
"cheap talk", in that it does not aﬀect the strategy selection of the player. The local adversary Ai for each
player selects mi = confess as this maximizes µi .
A and B send a message m to Authority with their decision, where m 2 {silent, confess}. Although aborting
(setting m =?) is an option, it is equivalent to setting
m = silent. As players are controlled by an adversary
seeking to maximize their utility function µ as defined
by Equation 7.3, this strategy is never played; setting
m = silent is strictly dominated by setting m = confess.
After Authority has received mA and mB , A and B receive the payoﬀs specified by their local utility functions
as defined in Equation 7.3.

Protocol 7.4.2: Real World Protocol Execution

We now translate the ideal game specification ¯ to a real world protocol ⇧, and
demonstrate that there exist simulators such that the distribution of the ideal world
game is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution of the real world
protocol execution.
In the real world model, the communication resource R is replaced with a public
key infrastructure C. Each pair of players (Pi , Pj ) 2 P has access to a private and
authenticated point-to-point communication channel Cij . Let ⇧ be a real world protocol, with player set P = {A, B, Authority} and associated set of local adversaries
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A = {AA , AB , AAuthority } that select actions for players to maximize their local utility
functions, communication channel set C = {CA,Authority , CB,Authority , CA,B }, and players
A and B have identical utility functions defined as in Equation 7.3.
Clearly ⇧ is admissible under the real world model, as the PKI infrastructure C
facilitates the point-to-point communication channels between all players. The real
world protocol ⇧ of the prisoner’s dilemma proceeds as in Protocol 7.4.2. Again, the
original equilibrium of ~⇤ = {

A

= confess,

B

= confess} is preserved despite the

presence of the communication channel C.
7.4.3 Demonstrating Protocol ⇧ Security
We use the simulation paradigm [5] to demonstrate the security of the construction
by proving the distribution of the real world protocol is computationally indistinguishable from the ideal world distribution.
Theorem 7.4.1 (Security of ⇧ against Rational Adversaries) Let ¯ be the n-party
ideal world game specification of Protocol 7.4.1 and let ⇧ be the n-party real world
execution of Protocol 7.4.2. There exists a set {Simi }i2[1...n] of PPT transformations admissible in the ideal model such that for all PPT rational adversaries A =
{A1 , . . . , An } admissible in the real model, for all ~x 2 ({0, 1}⇤ )n and ~z 2 ({0, 1}⇤ )n ,
and for all i 2 [1 . . . n],

n

(i2[1...n])
IDEAL ¯ ,R,P,S,~µ,z (

, ~x̄; r)

o

c

2N,~
x̄,r2{0,1}⇤

⌘

n

(i2[1...n])
REAL⇧,C,P,A,~µ,z (

, ~x̄; r)

o

2N,~
x̄,r2{0,1}⇤

establishing that ⇧ securely realizes ¯ .
Proof To prove the security of ⇧ against the set of rational adversaries A =
{AA , AB , AAuthority } we must construct a set of simulators S = {SA , SB , SAuthority }
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whose output in the ideal game specification ¯ is indistinguishable from the output of
A in the real world execution. To achieve this, we construct simulators Si = Sim(Ai )
that simulate all messages and the output of Ai in the real world execution of ⇧,
and is thus able to return these as its own. The simulated messages and output
returned by Si must be computationally indistinguishable such that, for all probabilistic polynomial-time distinguishers D, the probability of diﬀerentiating the ideal
world and real world distributions is at most negligibly greater than 12 .
Each simulator Si will rely on the private communication resource R to simulate
the messages exchanged and final output produced by Ai acting to maximize the
utility function µi for player Pi . The simulator Si given in Construction 7.4.1 holds
for all players P = {A, B, Authority}.
The construction relies on the computational indistinguishability of the real world
communication channel C from the ideal world private and authenticated communication resource R. All messages sent by simulators Si 2 S in the ideal world model are
passed over R. In the real world execution, messages are encrypted between players
using the PKI communication resource C. Thus, all probabilistic polynomial-time
distinguishers D are able to distinguish the view of the ideal world execution from
the real world execution with at most probability negligibly greater than
security of the PKI communication resource C.

1
2

by the
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Input Distribution:
"Cheap Talk":

Game Execution:

Payoﬀ Assignment:

The simulator Si 2 S is given input xi , random coins ri
and auxiliary input zi
The simulator Si is free to communicate over RSi ,Sj
where i 6= j. If i, j 2 {A, B}, it must simulate the "cheap
talk" between the other player’s adversary Aj . Si uses
its random coins ri to construct a random message m,
and sends m over resource RSi ,Sj . By definition, R is
a private and authenticated point-to-point communication resource. Thus, the messages sent by the simulator are computationally indistinguishable from those
sent in the real world execution, which are encrypted
under the public key infrastructure communication resource C. The local simulator Si for each player selects
mi = confess, as this maximizes µi regardless of the
messages exchanged during this phase.
The simulator Si sends a message m to SAuthority over
RSi ,SAuthority with their decision, where the message m 2
{silent, confess}. By definition, R is a private and
authenticated point-to-point communication resource.
Thus, the messages sent by the simulator to SAuthority
are computationally indistinguishable from those sent in
the real world execution, which are encrypted under the
public key infrastructure communication resource C.
After SAuthority has received mSi and mSj , each simulator
receives the payoﬀ associated with the outcome.

Construction 7.4.1: Construction of Simulator Si

7.5 Demonstrating the Model on Rational Secret Sharing
To illustrate the power of our model, we return to the example of rational secret
sharing. We demonstrate that, despite the presence of point-to-point communication
channels, the original game specification is admissible in our ideal world model, and
realizable in the real world model. This violates the assumptions of existing security
frameworks, which disallow point-to-point communication either within the protocol
execution, outside of the protocol execution, or both.
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7.5.1 Ideal World Game Specification
The ideal world game

is an interaction between a set of players P = {Pi }i2[1...n] ,

where Pi has access to a point-to-point communication resource RPi ,Pj 8j 6= i. That is,
Pi may privately communicate with any other player Pj . We now demonstrate that
is admissible in our ideal world definition.
Input Distribution:

"Cheap Talk":

Game Execution:
Payoﬀ Assignment:
a

Each player Pi 2 P receives its input share xi , random
coins ri and auxiliary input zi . Each player has the
option of inputting a diﬀerent share x̄i 6= xi or aborting
the protocol at any time, as this is unavoidable.
Player Pi is free to collaborate with all players Pj 2
P̂ over RPi ,Pj , where P̂ is the set of colluding players. Proposition 7.5.1 demonstrates that communication
over R is considered "cheap talk" (it does not aﬀect the
strategy selection of the player), and that the local simulator Si for each player will select ai = reveal, as this
maximizes µi .
The Mediator instructs Pi , 8i 2 n to play their action
ai at each round k, where ai 2 {silenta , reveal}.
At the terminal round k ⇤ where the shares yield the
secret, Mediator distributes the payoﬀs to Pi 2 P.

Note that selecting ai = silent is equivalent to aborting.

Protocol 7.5.1: Ideal World Game

Let

Execution

be the ideal game specification for rational secret sharing, with player

set P = {Pi }i2[1...n] and associated set of local simulators S = {Si }i2[1...n] that select actions for players to maximize their local utility functions, resource set R =
{RPi ,Pj }8i,i6=j , and all players Pi 2 P have utility functions defined as

µi ( i ) 7!

8
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
:

(µ++ )(p) :
(µ )(1

p) :
(µ+ ) :

i

= silent, k = k ⇤

i

= silent, k 6= k ⇤
i

= reveal

(7.4)
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where µ+ represents positive utility, µ represents negative utility, and µ++ > µ+ as
players value exclusivity.
Proposition 7.5.1 For all players Pi 2 P in
in Equation 7.4, strategy {

⇤
Pi

= reveal}8i2n > {

with utility function defined as µi ( i )
Pi

= silent}8i2n when p <

µ+
.
µ++

Proof In the original rational secret sharing protocol, the strategy ~⇤ = {

⇤
Pi

=

reveal}8i2n is the only Nash equilibrium, as the true final round k ⇤ (where combining
shares reveals the shared secret) is chosen from a geometric distribution. As the
probability of correctly guessing the final round k ⇤ is the parameter p, the expected
utility for

Pi

= silent is at most (µ++ )(p). We set µ++ > µ+ , as players are assumed to

value exclusivity (recovering the secret while preventing other players from doing so).
If a player remains silent in any round k < k ⇤ , they are caught by the other players as a
cheater and excluded from future rounds (receiving negative utility µ ). By choosing
p such that p <

µ+
,
µ++

we have (µ++ )(p) < µ+ which implies µPi (silent) < µPi (reveal).

Thus revealing the share for each round strictly dominates remaining silent. Players
in our ideal model

may communicate over R and attempt to convince other players

that they will select silent. This provides a greater degree of exclusivity, as only those
colluding players in P̂ ✓ P will recover the secret. However, this communication is
considered cheap talk, as each player maximizes µi by selecting
of the messages sent over R when p <

i

= reveal regardless

µ+
.
µ++

7.5.2 Real World Protocol Construction
We now translate the ideal game specification

to a real world protocol ⇧, and

demonstrate that there exist simulators such that the distribution of the ideal world
game is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution of the real world
protocol execution.

144
In the real world model, the communication resource R is replaced with a public
key infrastructure C. Each pair of players (Pi , Pj ) 2 P has access to a private and authenticated point-to-point communication channel Cij . Let ⇧ be a real world protocol,
with player set P = {Pi }i2[1...n] and associated set of local adversaries A = {Ai }i2[1...n]
that select actions for players to maximize their local utility functions, communication channel set C = {Cij }8i6=j , and all players have identical utility functions defined
as in Equation 7.4.
Input Distribution:

"Cheap Talk":

Game Execution:
Payoﬀ Assignment:
a

Each player Pi 2 P receives its input share xi , random
coins ri and auxiliary input zi . Each player has the
option of inputting a diﬀerent share x̄i 6= xi or aborting
the protocol at any time, as this is unavoidable.
Player Pi is free to collaborate with all players Pj 2
P̂ over CPi ,Pj , where P̂ is the set of colluding players. Proposition 7.5.1 demonstrates that communication over C is considered "cheap talk" (it does not aﬀect
the strategy selection of the player), and that the local
adversary Ai for each player selects ai = reveal, as this
maximizes µi .
Each player Pi 2 P selects and plays their action ai at
each round k, where ai 2 {silenta , reveal}.
At the terminal round k ⇤ where the shares yield the
secret, each player Pi 2 P receives its associated payoﬀ.

Note that selecting ai = silent is equivalent to aborting.

Protocol 7.5.2: Real World Protocol ⇧ Execution

Clearly ⇧ is admissible under the real world model, as the PKI infrastructure C
facilitates the point-to-point communication channels between all players. The real
world protocol ⇧ for rational secret sharing proceeds as in Protocol 7.5.2. Again, the
original equilibrium of ~⇤ = {
communication channel C.

Pi

= reveal} is preserved despite the presence of the
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7.5.3 Demonstrating Protocol ⇧ Security
We use the simulation paradigm [5] to demonstrate the security of the construction
by proving the distribution of the real world protocol is computationally indistinguishable from the ideal world distribution.
Theorem 7.5.1 (Security of ⇧ against Rational Adversaries) Let

be the n-party

ideal world game specification of Protocol 7.5.1 and let ⇧ be the n-party real world execution of Protocol 7.5.2. There exists a set {Simi }i2[1...n] of PPT transformations admissible in the ideal model such that for all PPT rational adversaries A = {Ai }i2[1...n]
admissible in the real model, for all ~x 2 ({0, 1}⇤ )n and ~z 2 ({0, 1}⇤ )n , and for all
i 2 [1 . . . n],

n

IDEAL

(i2[1...n])
,R,P,S,~
µ,z (

, ~x̄; r)

o

2N,~
x̄,r2{0,1}⇤

n
o
c
(i2[1...n])
⌘ REAL⇧,C,P,A,~µ,z ( , ~x̄; r)

2N,~
x̄,r2{0,1}⇤

establishing that ⇧ securely realizes .
Proof To prove the security of ⇧ against rational adversaries A = {Ai }i2[1...n] we
must construct a set of simulators S = {Si }i2[1...n] whose output in the ideal game
specification

is indistinguishable from the output of A in the real world execution.
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Input Distribution:
"Cheap Talk":

Game Execution:

Payoﬀ Assignment:

The simulator Si 2 S is given input share xi , random
coins ri and auxiliary input zi
The simulator Si is free to communicate over RSi ,Sj
where i 6= j. Si , 8i 6= j must simulate the "cheap
talk" between the other player’s adversary Aj . Si uses
its random coins ri to construct a random message m,
and sends m over resource RSi ,Sj . By definition, R is
a private and authenticated point-to-point communication resource. Thus, the messages sent by the simulator are computationally indistinguishable from those
sent in the real world execution, which are encrypted
under the public key infrastructure communication resource C. The local simulator Si for each player selects
mi = reveal, as this maximizes µi regardless of the messages exchanged during this phase.
The simulator Si sends a message m to Sj , 8j 6= i over
RSi ,Sj with their decision, where m 2 {silent, reveal}.
By definition, R is a private and authenticated pointto-point communication resource. Thus, the messages
sent by the simulator to Sj are computationally indistinguishable from those sent in the real world execution,
which are encrypted under the public key infrastructure
communication resource C.
After Pj 2 P, 8j 6= i has received mSi , each simulator
receives the payoﬀ associated with the outcome.

Construction 7.5.1: Construction of Simulator Si
To achieve this, we construct simulators Si = Sim(Ai ) that simulate all messages
and the output of Ai in the real world execution of ⇧, and is thus able to return these
as its own. The simulated messages and output returned by Si must be computationally indistinguishable such that, for all probabilistic polynomial-time distinguishers
D, the probability of diﬀerentiating the ideal world and real world distributions is at
most negligibly greater than 12 .
Each simulator Si will rely on the private communication resource R to simulate
the messages exchanged and final output produced by Ai acting to maximize the
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utility function µi for player Pi . The simulator Si given in Construction 7.5.1 holds
for all players P = {Pi }i2[1...n] .
The construction relies on the computational indistinguishability of the real world
communication channel C from the ideal world private and authenticated communication resource R. All messages sent by simulators Si 2 S in the ideal world model are
passed over R. In the real world execution, messages are encrypted between players
using the PKI communication resource C. Thus, all probabilistic polynomial-time
distinguishers D are able to distinguish the view of the ideal world execution from
the real world execution with at most probability negligibly greater than

1
2

by the

security of the PKI communication resource C.
7.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have proposed a security definition capturing rational cryptographic protocols in the presence of standard point-to-point communication resources.
Rather than limit the communication resources available to players, we answer the
question of how game specifications admissible in an ideal model allowing point-topoint communication channels may be realized in practice. Thus, the ideal world
model necessarily limits the class of games that are admissible and is not a general result. However, we have argued that point-to-point communication channels
are unavoidable in real-world settings, and consequently must be incorporated into
the definition of security. Further, we have demonstrated that not all game specifications forbidding point-to-point communication are inadmissible under our model.
We presented the transformation for the classic prisoner’s dilemma, which disallows
point-to-point communication through physical assumptions, into a modified game
that is admissible under our model and preserves the original equilibrium. Similarly,
we have demonstrated that the signaling game has an expected payoﬀ of 1 when
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executed in the presence of point-to-point channels, rather than an expected payoﬀ
of 12 , a distinction not captured by models that disallow communication outside of
the protocol execution. Finally, we have presented a full security proof for rational
secret sharing under our proposed framework. Although our results are not universal,
we have demonstrated a powerful benefit of our model: assigning local adversaries
may aid mechanism design in destabilizing the formation of coalitions. Thus, there
are tangible benefits from adopting our definition of security against local rational
adversaries in the presence of point-to-point communication resources.
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8 SUMMARY
In this thesis, we have presented a rational cryptographic framework for both the
two-party and multiparty settings. We have demonstrated the necessary and suﬃcient utility assumptions to achieve privacy, correctness and fairness in game theoretic
terms, as well as removed all restrictions on the communication resources available
to players. We have argued the necessity of allowing point-to-point communication
channels between players, which prior work restricts in an attempt to address collusion. Although we do not restrict the communication resources, our frameworks
accept a non-trivial class of ideal game specifications.

8.1 Summary of Main Results
8.1.1 Separated Classification and Inspection
In Chapter 4, we separate the tasks of classification and inspection in the adversarial classification problem. Although closely related, separating the task of inspection
from the task of classification yields an advantage to a defender. Working against an
active adversary, we apply game theory to make optimal operational decisions for the
inspection policy in the presence of limited resources.

8.1.2 Resolved Game Theoretic Dilemma
In Chapter 5, we resolve a game theoretic dilemma where an auction model’s foundational assumption prevented deployment in real world settings. We demonstrate
that realizable protocols for the auction model are possible by employing crypto-
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graphic primitives, and that the realized protocols satisfy the theoretical model’s
underlying assumptions.

8.1.3 Applied Stronger Equilibrium Concept
In Chapter 6, we propose the computational perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE)
concept as a replacement for the widely-used computational Nash equilibrium. We
have argued that PBE is a more realistic equilibrium concept for cryptographic protocols, which typically proceed in a series of rounds and necessarily represent games
of imperfect information.

8.1.4 Game Theoretic Security Definitions
In Chapter 6, we give definitions of privacy, correctness and fairness purely in game
theoretic terms. From these definitions, we demonstrate the necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for player utility functions in order to achieve them in protocol design.

8.1.5 Removed Restrictions on Communication Resources
In Chapter 7, we introduce a rational multiparty computation framework that
places no restrictions on the communication resources available to players. Prior
work imposed strong restrictions on the communication resources available to players,
as arbitrary communication enables collusion. However, we have demonstrated that
even ideal game specifications that restrict communication may be translated into
equivalent formulations allowing point-to-point communication. Once admissible in
our proposed ideal model, the ideal game specifications are translated into real world
protocol constructions.
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